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1. Motivation and Overview 
This dissertation examines the earnings quality in Norwegian private firms. It investigates four 
main topics, each of which concerns earnings quality in private firms. Three of these focus on 
earnings quality in private family firms, investigating the role of family control, family ownership, 
and family identity (indicated by family name). The last topic concerns the effect of negative 
performance shocks on earnings quality in private firms.  
Compared to the large body of research on financial reporting practices in public firms, 
relatively little is known about financial reporting in private firms. It is reasonable to believe that 
the financial reporting practices in private firms may differ significantly from the practices in public 
firms (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Beatty, Ke, & Petroni, 2002; Burghstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 
2006; Givoly, Hayn, & Katz, 2010; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013; Kim & Yi, 2006). Public firms 
are listed on a stock exchange, while private firms do not have publicly traded stocks (Hope, 2015). 
Compared to public firms, private firms have more concentrated ownership, more managerial 
ownership and less formal corporate governance mechanisms, they are more reliant on bank 
financing and major capital providers, such as controlling shareholders, generally take a more 
active role in management (Asker, Farre-Mensa, & Ljungqvist, 2014; Bar-Yosef, D’Augusta, & 
Prencipe, 2019; Hope & Vyas, 2017). Private firms are typically smaller and are characterized by 
a higher concentration of insider ownership and family ownership (Berzins, Bøhren, & Rydland, 
2008).1 
                                                          
1 If a single family holds more than 50% of the shares, the firm is defined as a private family firm, otherwise it is 
defined as a private non-family firm. 
10 
 
In recent years, the accounting research literature has paid increasing attention to private 
firms, but the private firm setting still remains relatively unexplored (Bar-Yosef et al., 2019). The 
limited focus on private firms in accounting research is probably due to data accessibility, rather 
than private firms lacking economic significance (Bar-Yosef et al., 2019; Hope, 2015; Hope & 
Vyas, 2017). In Norway, private firms constitute more than 99% of limited liability firms, their 
aggregated revenues are four times higher, they hold twice as much assets and employ four times 
more people than public firms (Berzins et al., 2008). This picture is probably the same in most 
countries (Berzins et al., 2008; Hope, 2015). Given the economic significance of private firms, in 
a recent comprehensive review of the state of the art of accounting research in private firms, Bar-
Yosef et al. (2019) call for more research into this field in order to better understand the accounting 
practices of private firms.2  
Hope and Vyas (2017) argue that financial accounting information may be especially 
important for stakeholders of private firms. The information environment in private firms is 
typically not as rich as that of public firms. For instance, private firms are on average less exposed 
to media coverage, they are not required to file additional filings and updates required by the 
securities regulators as they are not listed on a stock exchange, and coverage by financial analysts 
is limited or non-existing (Hope & Vyas, 2017). All these sources of information are likely to 
provide new information to stakeholders beyond merely accounting information (Hope & Vyas, 
2017). Since private firms disclose less non-accounting information compared to public firms, 
financial accounting information may become especially important for stakeholders (e.g., capital 
                                                          
2 The increased interest in financial reporting practices in private firms is also demonstrated by the regulation 
initiatives taken by financial accounting regulators. In 2009, the international standard setter, IASB, issued IFRS for 
SMEs, which is a separate set of financial reporting requirements for small and medium sized private firms. Some 
years later, in 2013, the European Union (EU) Parliament issued a new accounting directive for all EU/EAA member 
states, with emphasis on the accounting regulation of private firms. 
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providers) of private firms to monitor managers and make decisions (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2017; 
Hope & Vyas, 2017). 
High earnings quality is important for stakeholders so that they can make well-informed 
decisions based on accounting information. For instance, financial accounting information is 
important for creditors’ decision-making, both for setting terms and conditions when initiating a 
loan and for supervising managers after a loan is initiated (Gassen & Fülbier, 2015; Hope & Vyas, 
2017). Ding, Liu, and Wu (2016) document that private firms have better access to debt financing 
and lower costs of debt if they provide accounting information of high quality. Accounting 
information is important for internal decision-making as well (McNichols & Stubben, 2008), 
especially in smaller firms, as they are less likely to have a management accounting system  (Drury 
& Tayles, 1995; Feng, Hope, Qingyuan, & Xin, 2011).  
A particularly interesting feature of private firms is that many of them are controlled by one 
single family (Berzins et al., 2008). Family controlled firms differ from non-family controlled firms 
in that socioemotional wealth concerns, driven by personal attachment, strong identity to the firm 
and the risk of losing control, play a significant role when family owners make decisions (Berrone, 
Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). These decisions may involve financial reporting decisions, such as 
earnings management, made in order to preserve socioemotional wealth. Even though most family 
firms are private firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Hope, 2013), most research on family firms has 
investigated public firms (Hope, 2013; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011; Paiva, Lourenço, 
& Branco, 2016; Salvato & Moores, 2010; Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010). Since 
private firms have a greater variation in family ownership and typically more family ownership 
and control compared to public firms, the socioemotional wealth concerns may play an even 
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stronger role here than in public firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Hope, 2013), demonstrating the 
importance of investigating private family firms in particular (Miller et al., 2011).  
The earnings quality of Norwegian private firms is examined using archival data, 
employing a unique dataset from the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) database 
at the BI Norwegian Business School. Earnings quality is measured using well-established models 
to measure abnormal aggregated accruals, specific accrual (impairment) and real earnings 
management (e.g. Dechow & Dichev, 2002; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson, & Schipper, 2005; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; McNichols, 2002; Riedl, 2004; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). (See further discussion of earnings quality measures in Section 3.1.)   
The dissertation examines the earnings quality of private firms through a series of four 
research papers. Paper 1 examines whether various ownership structures, such as the level of family 
ownership, the size of the second largest shareholder and the number of family owners, are 
associated with earnings quality in private family firms. Different ownership structures may cause 
variations in agency conflicts and emphasis on socioemotional wealth in private family firms. We 
hypothesize and find that firms fully owned by the controlling family have higher earnings quality 
than firms that are only partly owned by the controlling family, and that earnings quality increases 
with the size of the second largest shareholder. We also find some evidence that earnings quality 
decreases with the number of family owners, though this evidence is less robust and should be 
interpreted with caution.  
Paper 2 examines the role of family identity in private family firms. Socioemotional wealth 
theory predicts that some family owners may identify very strongly with the firm, making them 
especially sensitive to reputational concerns. We use family name congruence (i.e., the family 
name is included in the firm name) as a proxy for family owners’ identification with the firm. Since 
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accrual-based earnings management has a higher detection risk than real earnings management, 
family owners who are sensitive to reputational costs are likely to avoid accrual-based earnings 
management, and manage earnings through real activities instead (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, & 
Imperatore, 2014). We hypothesize and find that family-named family firms have less accrual-
based earnings management and are more likely to select real earnings management over accrual-
based earnings management, compared to non-family-named family firms.  
Paper 3 examines the reporting practices of impairment losses in the private firm segment. 
We hypothesize and find that family controlled firms are less likely to report impairment losses, 
and report lower impairment losses, compared to firms that are not family controlled. 
Socioemotional wealth theory predicts that family owners are more sensitive to reputational 
concerns than owners and managers of non-family controlled firms. Since impairment losses reflect 
poor performance, family owners are likely to be more reluctant to report large impairment losses. 
We further find that having non-family board members to some extent mitigates these accounting 
practices in family controlled firms. We find that when the ratio of non-family board members 
increases, family firms are more likely to report impairment losses and typically report higher 
impairment losses. There is also some evidence suggesting that family firms with a family CEO 
report lower impairment losses, though this finding is less robust.  
Paper 4 examines how private firms respond to a negative shock to performance. Poor 
performance, or a decline in performance, may result in incentives to alter the reported performance 
number through earnings management (Balsam, Haw, & Lilien, 1995; DeFond & Park, 1997; 
Keating & L. Zimmerman, 1999; Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002). Using a difference-in-
differences design, we find that a negative shock to performance lowers earnings quality, and that 
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firms subject to such a shock may respond by managing earnings upwards to mitigate the effect on 
reported earnings. 
This dissertation contributes to earnings quality research by exploring variations in earnings 
quality in the private firm segment. There is limited research on financial reporting in private firms, 
especially in private family firms. We find evidence suggesting that owners and managers in 
private family firms manage earnings in an attempt to conceal true performance.  This dissertation 
also makes several contributions to the earnings quality and family business literature by 
documenting that the accounting practices and earnings quality of private family firms vary with 
ownership structure, family control and family identity. For instance, we find that private family 
firms fully controlled by a single family have less accrual-based earnings management and 
consequently higher earnings quality compared to private family firms that are partly owned by a 
single family. Furthermore, family named family firms (our proxy for strong family identification 
with the family firm) exhibit less accrual-based earnings management and more real earnings 
management compared to non-family named family firms. Finally, we document that family 
controlled private firms are less likely to report impairment losses and report lower impairment 
losses compared to non-family controlled private firms, suggesting a reluctance to report 
impairment losses in family controlled family firms. These results should also be of interest to 
stakeholders entering into contracts with private firms, such as debt holders, minority owners and 
others, as they can use these observable indicators (i.e., family control, ownership structure, and 
family identity) to assess the risk of private family firms with low earnings quality.  
The remaining part is structured as follows. First, I will establish the theoretical framework 
and define the concepts of earnings quality and earnings management, and relate them to the private 
firm setting. Then, I will briefly review common theories used in earnings management research 
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and relate them to the private firm and family firm setting. This section is followed by a review of 
prior literature on earnings quality with emphasis on private firms and family firms. Finally, I will 
briefly review commonly used earnings quality measures before I outline the papers of the 
dissertation. 
2. Definition, Theoretical Framework and Prior Evidence  
2.1. Earnings Quality Defined 
The earnings quality literature is voluminous (for review, see Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010)), 
and several definitions of earnings quality can be found in the literature. Earnings quality might be 
seen as a dimension of the broader concept of accounting quality. While accounting quality 
typically refers to the quality of financial statements as a whole, earnings quality concerns the 
quality of the reported earnings figure.3 Since accounting quality includes earnings quality, any 
reduction (improvement) in earnings quality will also reduce (improve) accounting quality, ceteris 
paribus.4 In this review, I will primarily discuss two widely used definitions of earnings quality, 
i.e., (1) the extent to which accounting earnings reflect true economic performance (e.g.,  Barth, 
Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Schipper & Vincent, 2003), and (2) the extent to which accounting 
earnings are decision-useful for the users of accounting information (e.g.,  Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). 
 Barth et al. (2008, p. 468) define accounting quality as accounting information depicting 
economic fundamentals, i.e., economic position and performance. A definition of earnings quality 
derived from the above definition of accounting quality will suggest that an earnings figure has 
high earnings quality if that figure provides an accurate depiction of economic performance (e.g.,  
                                                          
3 I use the term accounting quality, but similar concepts such as financial reporting quality (e.g.,  Biddle, Hilary, & 
Verdi, 2009; Feng et al., 2011; Schipper & Vincent, 2003) or merely reporting quality (e.g. Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005) can also be found in the literature. 
4 This assumes that the quality of the other parts of the financial report remain unchanged. 
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Barth et al., 2008; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). Based on this interpretation of earnings quality, any 
reported earnings figure that deviates from an accurate depiction of economic performance would 
impair that figure’s earnings quality. Any deviation from economic performance can be attributed 
to the accounting regulation of earnings or the application of that regulation when preparing 
earnings (Barth et al., 2008). Accounting regulation restricts the recognition of economic 
fundamentals in the financial statements, such as the recognition of internally generated intangibles 
and the measurement of assets and liabilities at their fair values. These restrictions will also affect 
the earnings figure’s ability to depict economic performance, since changes in assets and liabilities 
(that are not attributed to capital contributions or capital distributions) should be recorded in 
earnings.5   
The accounting regulation often requires the accounting preparer to use estimation and 
judgment when applying accounting principles and rules. Even if the intention of the accounting 
preparer is to use unbiased accounting estimates, lack of estimation skills, resources and 
information necessary to perform a high-quality estimation can introduce estimation errors. These 
are unintentional estimation errors. However, this flexibility may also provide opportunities for 
intentional errors, which I will later consider as earnings management (Dechow & Dichev, 2002).  
An alternative approach is to define accounting quality and earnings quality with reference 
to decision-usefulness (e.g.,  Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Schipper & Vincent, 
2003). This approach corresponds with the overriding objective of financial reporting as stated in 
conceptual frameworks of financial reporting, such as the Conceptual Framework of International 
                                                          
5 Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is to a large extent based on principles of historical 
cost and conservatism. Increases in fair value are only allowed to be recognized in earnings for certain well-liquid 
financial instruments held for sale (cf. Norwegian Accounting Act paragraph 5-8) or foreign currency monetary 
items (cf. Norwegian Accounting Act paragraph 5-9). 
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Accounting Standards Board (IASB), saying that it shall provide decision-useful information to 
users of accounting information (IASB, 2018, paragraph 1.2). According to the Conceptual 
Framework (IASB, 2018, paragraph 2.4), the accounting information must be relevant and it must 
faithfully represent what it purports to represent, in order to be useful. For information to be 
faithfully represented, it must be complete, neutral and free from error (IASB, 2018, paragraph 
2.13).  
The main difference between the two above-mentioned definitions of accounting quality 
(earnings quality) seems to be that the second requires that the accounting information be relevant, 
and thus decision-useful, to have high quality. The first definition only requires that the accounting 
information provides an accurate depiction – that it faithfully represents economic fundamentals.  
 Dechow et al. (2010) emphasize that earnings quality is decision-specific, i.e., it depends 
on both the specific decision to be made and the specific decision maker (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Consequently, if decision makers and decisions made by these decision makers differ between 
private and public firms, what is considered as high earnings quality, and how earnings quality 
should be assessed will differ between public and private firms as well. The earnings quality 
literature has to a large extent focused on the usefulness of earnings in equity valuation (Dechow 
et al., 2010), which has generally considered earnings to have high quality if it represents some sort 
of “persistent” or even “permanent” earnings, as earnings with these qualities is more useful in a 
valuation model  (Dechow et al., 2010).  
The concept of earnings quality should, however, not only be interpreted as the extent to 
which earnings are useful for equity valuation (Dechow et al., 2010). Other uses of accounting 
information should also be emphasized, such as the demand for accounting information for 
stewardship purposes (Gjesdal, 1981). This may be of special relevance to private firms. Stocks 
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are not publicly traded and are thus traded less frequently in private firms, which suggests that the 
need for information for equity valuation becomes less prominent, and information for stewardship 
and accountability purposes may assume a more dominant role. For instance, accounting 
information plays a role when assessing the quality of the management, in monitoring debt 
covenants, and when determining dividend payments (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Feng et al., 2011; 
Habib, Ranasinghe, & Huang, 2018).  
The arguments above suggest that the objectives of accounting information might be 
different in public and private firms. These differences in objectives are also reflected in the 
accounting regulation of private and public firms. While equity valuation is described as a primary 
objective of financial reporting in public firms (e.g., IASB, 2018, paragraph 1.2), this objective is 
not explicitly mentioned as an objective for private firms (e.g., IFRS for SMEs). As stated in IFRS 
for SMEs paragraph 2.2 (IASB, 2015), the objective is to “provide information about the financial 
position, performance and cash flows of the entity that is useful for economic decision-making for 
a broad range of users of the financial statements who are not in a position to demand reports 
tailored to meet their particular information needs.” Owners not involved in managing the 
business, creditors (both existing and potential creditors) and credit rating agencies are mentioned 
as potential external accounting users in private firms (cf. IFRS for SMEs, paragraph 1.2). The 
standard also emphasizes the stewardship objective, i.e., financial statements should be useful to 
assess the results of the stewardship of management, as an important objective of financial 
reporting in private firms (cf. IFRS for SMEs, paragraph 1.3). 
Earnings are probably the single most important accounting figure in the financial statement 
because the earnings figure, as well as metrics derived from that figure, are used for contracting 
purposes, i.e., as important determinants in compensation and debt contracts (Schipper & Vincent, 
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2003), which highlights the importance of earnings quality. Thus, low earnings quality may lead 
to unintended and possibly sub-optimal wealth transfers (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). Economic 
performance as measured by accounting earnings is also indicative of management performance, 
suggesting that information about earnings can be used for stewardship purposes to assess the 
management’s strategic investment and financing decisions. Given that accounting earnings truly 
reflects economic performance, the earnings figure will be relevant to use as a basis for an 
assessment of the management’s performance, e.g., whether the management performs above 
expectations, meets expectations or performs below expectations. Decisions can then be made on 
whether the management should be retained or replaced, or whether the management should be 
given further instructions. Earnings are also used as a basis for determining the technical limit of 
dividend payments. Overstated earnings can lead to dividend payments that can potentially hurt 
other stakeholders’, such as creditors’, claims on the firm’s resources.  
Dechow et al. (2010) argue that earnings quality is a function of both fundamental 
performance and the accounting systems’ ability to accurately report that fundamental 
performance. Information on all aspects of fundamental performance are not equally relevant to all 
decision makers. For instance, some decision makers may be more concerned with the aspect of 
fundamental performance that can be attributed to the management, i.e., relevant from a 
stewardship perspective. From an equity valuation perspective, however, the relevance of 
fundamental performance is not limited to the part of performance reflecting managers’ 
contribution to the firm’s performance. 
Earnings quality is a multidimensional concept, including dimensions such as earnings 
management, conservatism, persistence, and other properties of earnings (see Section 3.1 for a brief 
review of various earnings quality measures). This dissertation mostly focuses on the earnings 
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management dimension of earnings quality. The reasoning behind this choice is that stewardship 
is likely to be the main concern in private firms (as opposed to equity valuation where earnings 
persistence may be of high relevance), and that earnings management is a major threat to the quality 
of stewardship. If earnings management is undetected, managers and/or majority shareholders may 
be able to conceal true performance from other stakeholders, potentially causing sub-optimal 
decisions and wealth transfers as discussed above. One of the papers (Paper 3) also partly explores 
the concept of conservatism by examining impairment losses. Reporting impairment losses that are 
lower than the economic impairment indicates less conservative earnings, which we interpret as 
more earnings management and lower earnings quality. Since the main focus in the dissertation is 
the earnings management dimension of earnings quality, the definition of earnings management is 
outlined in the next subsection.  
2.1.1. Earnings Management Defined 
Earnings management is generally understood as opportunistic decisions made by management to 
alter the earnings figure in order to obtain some private gain (e.g., increased bonus, job security, 
debt financing, or minority exploitation). Earnings can be managed through real activities (real 
earnings management) or by altering accruals (accrual based earnings management). Both types of 
earnings management will be discussed in this section. 
If earnings are managed by real economic decisions that affect current or future cash flows, 
this is typically called real earnings management or real activities manipulation (e.g. Ewert & 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Kothari, Mizik, & Roychowdhury, 2016; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). 
With real earnings management, earnings are affected by sub-optimal timing or structuring of real 
transactions and events (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005). Examples of real earnings management 
include postponing research and development costs or other necessary costs such as maintenance 
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work, temporary increasing sales or affecting the timing of sales through increased price discounts 
or favorable credit terms, or increasing production to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS) and 
higher earnings (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006).  
 Earnings management will typically involve accounting decisions that exploit the flexibility 
within accounting regulation (within GAAP) or that violate accounting regulation (beyond GAAP). 
Such earnings management will affect the accrual component of earnings and is therefore often 
labeled accrual-based earnings management or accounting earnings management (Achleitner, 
Günther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2015). Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 
368) argue that earnings management occurs when “managers use judgment in financial reporting 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers”. 
  The preparation of financial statements leaves the management with significant discretion 
when determining accounting estimates (e.g., estimating economic lives or recoverable amounts in 
impairment tests). The management is also left with significant flexibility when selecting between 
alternative accounting methods (e.g., inventory valuation methods such as first-in, first-out (FIFO) 
or weighted-average) (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Managers can use this accounting flexibility to 
better inform accounting users of the underlying economic performance of the firm, or they can 
use this reporting freedom to mislead accounting users (e.g. Dechow, 1994; Scott, 2012, p. 423). 
An important element of the earnings management definition of Healy and Wahlen (1999) is that 
it rules out non-opportunistic accounting decisions, i.e., decisions made to better inform 
stakeholders of the firm’s underlying economic performance. Earnings management is instead 




Earnings management will erode earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010), and when present 
in the preparation of earnings figures it can be seen as the inverse of earnings quality (Schipper & 
Vincent, 2003). Accrual-based earnings management will, if not detected by the users of 
accounting information, reduce the decision-usefulness of earnings and potentially cause 
accounting users to make sub-optimal decisions. For instance, due to managed earnings, poor 
performing managers remain in their positions, unprofitable firms obtain new loans on favorable 
terms and debt covenant violations remain undetected. Thus, accrual-based earnings management 
will negatively affect earnings quality defined in terms of decision-usefulness. Accrual-based 
earnings management will also introduce noise in accounting earnings, causing those earnings 
figures to deviate from economic performance, which will impair earnings quality in terms of 
depicting economic performance. 
The relationship between real earnings management and earnings quality, however, is not 
straightforward. The management’s engagement in real earnings management may not affect 
earnings quality when defined as the earnings figure’s ability to depict economic performance. In 
the case of real earnings management, the economic performance is altered, yet the earnings figure 
may perfectly depict economic performance. 
As mentioned earlier, Dechow et al. (2010) argue that earnings quality is a function of both 
economic performance and the accounting systems’ ability to report that economic performance. 
Real earnings management will cause economic performance to be sub-optimal and erode the 




2.2. Theoretical Foundations 
The theoretical foundation of earnings management research and the contracting role of financial 
statements is found in positive accounting theory and agency theory (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). Positive accounting theory originated with Watts and 
Zimmerman. The theory aims to predict and explain accounting choices (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman, 
1978, 1979, 1986, 1990). The firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts. These contracts can be 
formal and explicit contracts such as remuneration contracts and debt contracts, or they can be 
informal and implicit contracts such as the relations between the firm and society. Positive 
accounting theory recognizes that accounting choices may have real economic consequences 
because they can affect the outcome of such contracts, thus causing incentives to manage earnings 
to affect the outcome of these contracts (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). Managers, and others 
with significant influence and involvement in the firm (e.g., large shareholders), typically have an 
information advantage compared to other stakeholders. This information asymmetry among the 
contracting parties creates information and contracting costs. Positive information and contracting 
costs is an important assumption, otherwise the users of accounting information could simply adjust 
the accounting figures to reflect the economic fundamentals they purport to reflect, and accounting 
choices would not matter (Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001).  
2.2.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been extensively used to predict and explain earnings management behavior, 
and it might be seen as the theoretical underpinning of positive accounting theory. A principal-
agent relationship exists if “one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). The agent and the principal may have 
conflicting interests, and the agent may not act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
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1976). A classical principal-agent relationship identified in the literature is that between 
shareholders and managers. Shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) are assumed to have 
different interests, risk attitudes and time horizons (Denis, 2001; Ronen & Yaari, 2008). Since 
owners cannot limit all managerial actions, there will be a risk that managers act in pursuit of their 
own interests, possibly behaving opportunistically towards the owners.  
Agency conflicts between shareholders and managers are sometimes referred to as type I 
agency conflicts or vertical agency conflicts (e.g. Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Hope, 2013). 
This form of agency conflicts are probably most pronounced in large, public firms characterized 
by high ownership dispersion and little or no involvement of owners in managing the firm. The 
situation in private firms, however, is different. Shareholders of private firms are typically more 
actively involved in managing the firms, hold less diversified portfolios, have a larger ownership 
stake and family relationships are more common (Asker et al., 2014; Bar-Yosef et al., 2019; Hope, 
2013; Hope et al., 2013). Private firms are characterized by a concentrated ownership structure. 
Large shareholders, i.e., shareholders with a large ownership stake, are generally believed to be 
better monitors of managers compared to smaller shareholders (Hope, 2013). Monitoring activities 
are costly, and the potential benefits of monitoring must be greater than the costs if monitoring is 
to be a rational strategy. A larger shareholder will face greater potential benefits through 
monitoring managers compared to a smaller shareholder. Individual shareholders are therefore 
more willing to endure monitoring costs as their percentage of ownership increases. As a result, 
one would expect less type I agency costs (i.e., conflicts between owners and managers) when 
ownership concentration increases (Hope, 2013).   
At the same time, shareholders are not a homogenous group with identical interests, risk 
attitudes and influence over the firm’s decisions. Larger shareholders have more influence and 
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power over the firm compared to smaller shareholders, and may extract private benefits from 
minority shareholders or other stakeholders (e.g., creditors). Consequently, one would expect type 
II agency conflicts to increase as ownership concentration increases (Hope, 2013). This suggests 
that, as opposed to public firms which largely face type I agency conflicts, private firms are 
probably more susceptible to type II agency conflicts, i.e., owner-owner conflicts (Asker et al., 
2014; Bar-Yosef et al., 2019). 
A third type of agency conflicts described in the literature involves creditors as well as 
managers and shareholders (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Debt financing is an important 
financing source for private firms, which makes private firms susceptible to potential agency 
conflicts between creditors on one side and shareholders and managers on the other (Bar-Yosef et 
al., 2019; Gassen & Fülbier, 2015; Hope & Vyas, 2017). Creditors provide the firm with capital 
and can be viewed as the principal, with managers and shareholders being the agents. To protect 
themselves from opportunistic actions conducted by the managers and/or shareholders, creditors 
often restrict the firm’s investing and financing activities through debt covenants. A debt covenant 
is typically based on some accounting figures, for instance requiring the firm to be below a certain 
debt ratio. Such debt covenants may provide incentives to manage earnings to avoid a violation of 
these debt covenants restrictions or to improve the negotiation position if violated (e.g. Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002; Fields et al., 2001; Sweeney, 1994; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). 
Managers and/or shareholders may also have incentives for managing earnings when obtaining 




2.2.2. Socioemotional Wealth Theory 
In recent years, a new theory called the socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory has evolved within 
the field of family business research (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & 
Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2014; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Gomez-Mejia, 
Patel, & Zellweger, 2018; Gomez‐Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Martin, 2016). SEW theory 
builds on both agency theory and behavioral decision theory such as prospect theory. The unique 
and innovative aspect of socioemotional wealth theory is that it predicts that family principals are 
loss averse to an affective component labeled socioemotional wealth. Socioemotional wealth refers 
to non-financial aspects that meet the affective needs of family members (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007). SEW theory also differs from traditional agency theory in that it centers on loss aversion 
rather than risk aversion. If an agent is assumed to be risk averse, as in traditional agency theory 
(e.g. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), risk preferences are assumed to be 
consistent, i.e., the agent will be equally risk averse to expected gains and expected losses. Prospect 
theory, on the other hand, predicts that decision makers are risk averse to potential gains, but risk 
seeking when it comes to potential losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986, p. 149). This is called loss aversion, and placed in a principal agent context, it predicts that 
agents are more sensitive to a loss in wealth than to an increase in wealth, implying that they will 
accept a higher risk to avoid a loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
SEW is a multidimensional concept, and Berrone et al. (2012) develop a theoretical five-
dimensional model of SEW (the FIBER-model). The dimensions are family control and influence, 
family identity, binding social ties, emotional attachment and dynastic succession. Family 
members often require control over the firm to preserve SEW, and this can be achieved through 
27 
 
high family ownership concentration and by controlling and influencing important strategic 
positions such as CEO and other management positions as well as board member positions. Family 
members may also identify strongly with the firm, and Gomez-Mejia et al. (2014) argue that the 
family firm may even become a projection of the family’s core values, making family members 
especially sensitive to reputational concerns. Emotional concerns can also be an important aspect 
in family firms, and even affect their decision-making processes (Berrone et al., 2012). Typically, 
the time-horizon of family members is long. The firm becomes the family’s heritage and saving 
for future generations can become an important goal. This goal can create incentives to reduce 
dividend payments and can be in conflict with the interests of other shareholders. 
SEW theory does not exclude opportunistic behavior from family owners, but their 
motivations to behave opportunistically may differ from those suggested by agency theory 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Kellermanns, Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2012). Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2014) argue that family owners’ incentives to engage in earnings management are mainly non-
financial. Family owners are not indifferent to financial gain, but if SEW goals and financial goals 
are in conflict, family owners will typically sacrifice financial goals in pursuit of SEW goals, at 
least to some extent (Berrone et al., 2010; Martin, 2016). SEW and financial performance are likely 
to be correlated, so that an increase in financial performance also increases SEW and vice versa, 
especially if financial performance is extreme in terms of very high or very low performance 
(Martin, 2016). Poor performance may attract negative publicity and affect other stakeholders such 
as employees or creditors negatively, especially if the poor performance can be attributed to the 
performance of family members involved in the firm rather than some exogenous event. This in 
turn may have a negative impact on family reputation, family members’ continued involvement in 
the firm (external stakeholders may require less family involvement) or dynastic succession (less 
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attractive to pass on a poor performing firm or there might even not be a firm to pass on in the case 
of bankruptcy), which again will impact SEW negatively (Martin, 2016). Good performance is 
likely to have the opposite effect.  
According to SEW theory, family owners consider the effect on their socioemotional wealth 
in addition to financial wealth when evaluating strategic decisions (Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014; 
Martin, Campbell, & Gomez-Mejia, 2016). The value they place on each dimension, however, may 
vary across firms, causing earnings management strategies to vary across family firms as well. 
Family owners may also differ regarding which dimension of socioemotional wealth they favor 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). For instance, for some family owners, enhancing and protecting their 
reputation is important, while for other family owners the main motivation may be to remain and 
enhance family control. Different emphasis on different socioemotional wealth components may 
be a source of heterogeneity in accounting practices across family firms as well (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2014). As different family owners will favor different dimensions of SEW, and the different 
dimensions predict different earnings management strategies, there is likely to be a substantial 
variation in earnings management among family firms. 
2.3. Prior Evidence 
2.3.1. Prior Research on Earnings Quality and Earnings Management in Private Firms 
The literature on earnings quality and earnings management is substantial. This literature has 
investigated various approaches to uncover or indicate earnings quality and earnings management, 
and a significant number of factors which may affect earnings quality and the risk of earnings 
management have been investigated, such as earnings management incentives, corporate 
governance mechanisms (among these proxies of audit quality) and specific firm characteristics 
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(see Dechow et al., 2010 for review). Most prior research on earnings quality and earnings 
management, however, has been conducted on public firms.  
As argued in the introduction of this dissertation, it is not evident that findings of earnings 
quality and earnings management in public firms can be generalized to private firms. Private and 
public firms differ greatly regarding important characteristics such as ownership concentration, 
capital structure and formal corporate governance mechanisms (Asker et al., 2014; Bar-Yosef et 
al., 2019; Hope & Vyas, 2017). A distinctive characteristic of public firms is that they rely more 
on equity capital than do private firms (i.e., the main reason for being listed in the first place). This 
provides public firms with stronger incentives than private firms to prepare high quality accounting 
information in order to attract equity investors. Lack of high quality information implies higher 
information risk and equity capital risk, which will reduce access to reasonably priced equity 
capital. As a result, public firms are probably more concerned with the usefulness of earnings for 
valuation purposes, i.e., the informativeness of earnings, than private firms. This suggests that if 
there are incentives to manage earnings in private firms, e.g., to affect dividend payments or to 
avoid debt covenant violations, they are probably less concerned that earnings management will 
distort the informativeness of earnings compared to public firms (Burghstahler et al., 2006).  
An important line of accounting research on private firms has examined how accounting 
practices in public firms differ from those in private firms (Bar-Yosef et al., 2019). Two competing 
sets of arguments are found in the literature regarding whether earnings quality is higher or lower 
in public firms than in private firms. One set of arguments propones that earnings quality is higher 
in public firms because they are subject to stronger disciplinary market forces and more monitoring 
by market participants (Bar-Yosef et al., 2019; Burghstahler et al., 2006). The other set of 
arguments suggests that public firms face stronger incentives than private firms to manage earnings 
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to meet or beat earnings targets set by market participants (Bar-Yosef et al., 2019; Givoly et al., 
2010; Hope et al., 2013). This suggests lower earnings quality in public firms compared to private 
firms. The empirical evidence on whether public firms have higher or lower earnings quality than 
private firms is inconclusive. Consistent with the notion of more demand for high quality earnings 
in public firms, multiple studies have found that private firms exhibit lower earnings quality than 
public firms (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Burghstahler et al., 2006; Hope et al., 2013). In support of 
stronger earnings management incentives, several studies find lower earnings quality in public 
firms than in private firms (Beatty et al., 2002; Givoly et al., 2010; Kim & Yi, 2006).  
These studies all differ greatly in terms of sample and context, and may therefore not be 
directly comparable. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examine timely loss recognition (i.e., the extent 
to which losses are incorporated in earnings in a timely manner) in private and in public firms using 
British data. They find that public firms incorporate losses into earnings in a more timely manner, 
suggesting higher earnings quality in public firms compared to private firms. Burghstahler et al. 
(2006) examine earnings management using data from 13 European countries, and find more 
earnings management and lower earnings quality in private firms than in public firms. Hope et al. 
(2013) compare the accounting quality of public and private United States (US) firms. US private 
firms are not required to file financial statements, thus the US setting of private firms is quite 
different from the European setting. Beatty et al. (2002) compare US public banks with US private 
banks. The banking industry is heavily regulated and it is thus not clear whether these results are 
generalizable to other industries (Burghstahler et al., 2006; Hope et al., 2013).  
In a recent study, Bonacchi, Marra, and Zarowin (2019) find that the differences between 
public and private firms’ earnings quality may depend on whether the reporting entity is structured 
as a group or as a stand-alone firm. Using data from several European countries, they demonstrate 
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that when using the whole sample of private firms, public firms exhibit higher earnings quality 
than private firms. However, if they exclude the firms with a lower demand for high earnings 
quality and strong incentives to manage earnings to minimize taxes (i.e., private stand-alone firms), 
this relationship reverses (i.e., lower earnings quality in public firms compared to private firms). It 
is questionable whether these results are relevant to a Norwegian setting. The book-tax alignment 
in Norway is very low (Nobes & Schwencke, 2006), which suggests weak tax-related incentives 
for managing reported earnings. Moreover, the Norwegian accounting regulation requires financial 
reports for all limited liability firms and external auditor for all but the very smallest firms.6 This 
ensures that the accounting information of Norwegian private firms holds a certain quality 
regardless of demand, which questions whether the demand side of earnings quality is as profound 
as demonstrated by Bonacchi et al. (2019). To summarize, empirical results of differences in 
earnings quality between private and public firms yields mixed results, and may vary in different 
institutional settings.  
A growing body of literature has established determinants of earnings management and 
earnings quality in private firms. Financial reporting in private firms is likely to be driven by 
dividends, compensation policies, taxation and debt financing (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Feng et 
al., 2011; Habib et al., 2018).  
Dividend payments are to a large extent constrained by net income and retained earnings. 
This may induce incentives to increase reported earnings to maximize dividend payments, or 
reduce reported earnings to justify a lower dividend payment if desirable. Larger private firms are 
also likely to use some sort of bonus payment system based on accounting figures, creating 
incentives to manage earnings in order to maximize bonus payments. It has been documented in 
                                                          
6 Cf. Norwegian Accounting Act paragraphs 1-2 and Act on Auditing and Auditors paragraph 2-1. 
32 
 
public firms that bonus contracts are associated with more earnings management (Healy, 1985; 
Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). Earnings can be used in 
wage bargains as a proxy for performance. Labor unions or individual workers may use favorable 
accounting figures such as high earnings or earnings growth as an argument to secure higher wages. 
This may provide incentives to manage earnings downwards so as to reduce the pressure of a wage 
increase demand. Poor performance can be used as an argument by the principal to withhold raises 
(e.g., the firm cannot afford a raise at the moment because it is performing poorly). 
 Several studies report findings suggesting that private firms may be inclined to manage 
earnings downwards to minimize taxes (Garrod, Kosi, & Valentincic, 2008; Penno & Simon, 1986; 
Szczesny & Valentincic, 2013). Tax motivated earnings management incentives are likely to be 
less relevant in the setting of Norwegian firms, which is used in this dissertation, due to low book-
tax alignment in Norway (Nobes & Schwencke, 2006).  
Bank financing is an important source of financing in private firms, and is crucial for growth 
in these firms (Bar-Yosef et al., 2019; Gassen & Fülbier, 2015; Haw, Lee, & Lee, 2014; Hope et 
al., 2017). Financial statements can be used by banks to assess a firm’s ability to generate future 
cash flows, the risk associated with these cash flows and determining assets that can be used as 
collateral (Feng et al., 2011). Since analysts, institutional investors, credit rating agencies, media 
and regulators typically focus more on public firms than private firms, accounting quality is even 
more important for creditors of private firms than public firms, due to fewer information channels 
(Ding et al., 2016). 
Creditors’ demand for accounting information will increase the demand for high quality 
accounting information in private firms, but can at the same time induce earnings management 
incentives as well (Hope & Vyas, 2017). Thus, the first order effect of debt financing on earnings 
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quality can be hard to predict and may vary among settings. Several studies have documented that 
debt financing is associated with earnings quality in private firms. However, empirical evidence 
regarding the direction of this association is mixed. 
Some researchers find that creditors increase the demand for high quality earnings in private 
firms (Bigus & Hillebrand, 2017; De Meyere, Vander Bauwhede, & Van Cauwenberge, 2018; Ding 
et al., 2016), while others, such as Mafrolla and D'Amico (2017), find that more debt is associated 
with more earnings management. Gassen and Fülbier (2015) find that debt financing is associated 
with earnings smoothing in private firms. However, as noted by Hope (2015), there is limited 
discussion of the role of smoothing in Gassen and Fülbier (2015). Earnings smoothing has typically 
been viewed negatively and as a form of earnings management in prior research (Hope, 2015).  
There might exist other incentives as well, such as incentives to avoid losing control or 
incurring reputational damage. These incentives were discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2.2 
above.  
2.3.2. Prior Evidence of Earnings Quality and Earnings Management in Family Firms 
Private firms might have a characteristic that public firms typically do not have: a substantial 
portion of them are controlled by one single family (Berzins et al., 2008). A family controlled firm 
may differ from non-family controlled firms in that personal attachment, strong identity to the firm 
and risk of losing control may explain some of the decisions family owners make (Berrone et al., 
2012). These decisions may also involve financial reporting decisions such as earnings 
management.  
Financial reporting decisions have traditionally been explained by propositions found in 
positive accounting theory, which again are rooted in agency theory (e.g. Fields et al., 2001; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1978, 1986; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Salvato and Moores (2010), however, 
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argue that agency theory may not be appropriate to explain accounting practices in private family 
firms. Rather, they proclaim that SEW theory, which has emerged in the family business literature, 
is more appropriate. Stockmans et al. (2010) find empirical support for this theory being 
appropriate as a reference point for making predictions on accounting practices in family firms.  
Compared to non-family firms, family firms may face other motivations for decision-
making, including financial reporting decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). While incentives to 
manage earnings in non-family firms may be linked to personal wealth and gain, incentives to 
manage earnings in family firms are probably closer linked to personal attachment to the firm. 
Most prior research on accounting practices in family businesses has been on public firms, 
and research on earnings quality in the context of private family firms is limited (Paiva et al., 2016). 
Hope (2013) encourages researchers to examine family ownership in private firms rather than 
public firms since private firms provide more variation in family ownership.  
  Evidence from public firms generally suggests that the accounting practices in family firms 
differ from those in non-family firms. Several studies suggest that family ownership is associated 
with higher earnings quality and better financial disclosure practices than non-family firms (e.g. 
Ali et al., 2007; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2014; Jiraporn & DaDalt, 2009; Tong, 2007; Wang, 2006). 
These studies have all been conducted using data from US public firms. Hope (2013) argues that 
the results from family ownership in US public firms may not be generalizable to other settings. 
Most of these studies employ a low threshold for classifying firms as “family firms” (often 5% 
ownership).  
Results from public firm studies using data from other countries are not as conclusive (e.g., 
Achleitner et al., 2014; Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010; Greco, Ferramosca, & 
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Allegrini, 2015; Ho & Shun Wong, 2001; Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola, & Pozza, 2011; Prencipe, 
Markarian, & Pozza, 2008; Yang, 2010). For instance, using data from Italian listed firms, Cascino 
et al. (2010) find lower abnormal accruals in family firms and Prencipe et al. (2011) find less 
income smoothing in family firms, compared to non-family firms. Prencipe et al. (2008) find 
evidence suggesting that compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to smooth 
earnings, but more likely to manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violations.  Another study by 
Greco et al. (2015), which also uses data from Italian listed firms, suggests that the reported 
impairment losses of family firms better reflect economic fundamentals than impairment losses in 
non-family firms. They attribute these findings to a higher propensity for big bath accounting in 
non-family firms. Achleitner et al. (2014) examine accrual-based and real earnings management 
differences between German listed family and non-family firms. Their results show that family 
firms engage in less real earnings management, but more income decreasing accrual-based earnings 
management than non-family firms.  
Using data from private firms, both Kvaal, Langli, and Abdolmohammadi (2012) and 
Borralho, Gallardo Vázquez, and Hernández-Linares (2019) find a negative association between 
family firm status (i.e., whether or not the firm is a family firm) and earnings management, 
measured as signed abnormal accruals. Their interpretation of these results, however, differs. 
Borralho et al. (2019) interpret this negative coefficient as less earnings management in private 
family firms compared to private non-family firms. Kvaal et al. (2012) interpret the negative 
association as more income decreasing earnings management in family firms compared to non-
family firms, consistent with the interpretation in Achleitner et al. (2014). Kvaal et al. (2012) 
further document that private family firms manage earnings upwards when leverage is high. This 
could suggest that family owners are reluctant to give up their control of the firm, e.g., to avoid 
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that creditors claim rights to the firms’ assets, consistent with SEW theory which predicts that 
family control is important for family owners. A family CEO reinforces these earnings 
management tendencies in private family firms, while independent board members seem to 
attenuate them. These earnings management patterns in family firms seem to diminish over time 
(Kvaal et al., 2012), consistent with the generational effect observed in Stockmans et al. (2010). 
While differences in accounting practices between family and non-family firms have been 
the subject of several studies, evidence of variations in accounting practices among family firms 
are more scarce (e.g. Paiva et al., 2016). Evidence from public family firms shows lower earnings 
quality for firms acquired by families in a market transaction compared to family firms that are 
founded or inherited by the family owners (Pazzaglia, Mengoli, & Sapienza, 2013). The authors 
attribute this finding to lower identification with the acquired firm, consistent with SEW theory. 
Yang (2010) finds evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange that more insider ownership is 
associated with more earnings management in family firms. Further, non-family CEOs have a 
greater tendency to manage earnings than family CEOs in family firms (Yang, 2010).  
Evidence from private family firms suggests that first-generation family firms perform 
more income increasing earnings management than second- and third- (and later)-generation 
family firms, conditional on poor firm performance (Stockmans et al., 2010). Additionally, 
founder-led family firms engage in more income increasing earnings management than non-
founder-led family firms when firm performance is poor (Stockmans et al., 2010). The authors 
attribute these findings to lower emphasis on SEW in later generations. Stockmans, Lybaert, and 
Voordeckers (2013) find a constraining effect of independent board members and CEO non-duality 
on earnings management in private family firms, but this is conditional on agency conflicts between 




3.1. A Measure of Earnings Quality 
The concept of earnings quality is multidimensional, and Dechow et al. (2010) group earnings 
quality measures into the following three categories: properties of earnings, investors’ 
responsiveness to earnings and external indicators of earnings misstatements (e.g., restatements). 
The first category, i.e., the properties of earnings, is likely to be most relevant in a private firm 
setting.7 The properties of earnings include several features, such as earnings persistence, earnings 
smoothness, asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition, and abnormal accruals (Dechow 
et al., 2010). Both earnings persistence and smoothness will be affected by accounting rules and 
regulation, earnings management, and the volatility of the fundamental performance, and these 
effects can be difficult to disentangle (Dechow et al., 2010). Thus, it is difficult to interpret whether 
persistence and smooth earnings are of high or low quality. Persistent and smooth earnings have 
been viewed as favorable characteristics of earnings by equity investors especially, as these 
characteristics may be more useful in an equity valuation model (Dechow et al., 2010). However, 
as discussed is Section 2.1, equity valuation is of less importance for users of accounting 
information in private firms, suggesting that measuring earnings quality using persistence or 
smoothness may be less relevant in a private firm setting.  
Asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition are measures of conservatism and reflect 
the extent to which managers incorporate losses in earnings in a timely manner (as opposed to 
postponing or minimizing reported losses to avoid the negative effect on earnings) (Dechow et al., 
                                                          
7 Investors’ responsiveness to earnings is generally measured by a capital market benchmark such as the change in 
stock prices, and is thus not relevant for private firms. As opposed to public firms, private firms are not subject to the 
oversight by Security and Market Authorities, e.g. the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, which is often the 




2010). More timely loss recognition is typically interpreted as higher earnings quality, but this 
assumption is conditional on the prerequisite that asymmetric timeliness (i.e., incorporation of 
unrealized losses, but not unrealized gains, into earnings) is decision-useful (Dechow et al., 2010). 
In a public firm setting, this has typically been measured as the association between future earnings 
and current stock returns, dependent on the stock return being positive or negative (Basu, 1997; 
Dechow et al., 2010). Since private firms do not have observable stock prices, an alternative is to 
examine whether the time-serial properties of earnings differs between positive and negative 
earnings; the general idea being that the association over time should be weaker for negative 
earnings as they are less persistent (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Basu, 1997; Dechow et al., 2010). 
This dissertation does not employ this model directly, but it does to some extent explore the concept 
of conservatism by focusing on impairment losses in Paper 3. The recognition of impairment losses 
is a direct consequence of conservative accounting, and a reluctance to report impairment losses 
may indicate earnings management behavior. 
The stewardship objective is the main objective of financial reporting in private firms, 
suggesting that earnings management measures may be especially relevant in a private firm setting, 
as managed earnings are a major threat to the quality of stewardship. Thus, the remaining 
discussion will focus on measuring earnings management as a proxy for earnings quality.  
3.1.1. The Role of Accruals 
Accounting earnings consists of two components: cash flows and accruals. The role of 
accruals is to render earnings a better measure of firm performance than cash flows (Dechow, 
1994). The cash flow component of earnings is generally not subject to discretion. The accrual 
component, however, is determined, at least to some extent, by the managers’ own discretion. Since 
accruals require the use of estimation and discretion, it might be difficult for outsiders to assess the 
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accuracy of these accruals. This gives the managers some flexibility to opportunistically report 
accruals in order to mislead stakeholders.  
A conventional approach to indicate the extent to which reported earnings are subject to 
earnings management is to estimate the portion of accruals that is abnormal or discretionary (e.g. 
DeAngelo, 1986; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991). The amount of discretionary 
accruals is then used as a proxy for earnings management and as an inverse proxy for earnings 
quality.  
Earnings management is generally investigated in terms of discretionary aggregated 
accruals or in terms of discretionary specific accruals. An advantage of using measures of 
discretionary aggregated accruals is that one can capture a wider range of manipulating strategies 
compared to specific accruals (Jones, 1991). A limitation of aggregated accruals, however, is that 
they do not provide information about which components of earnings firms actually manage 
(McNichols & Stubben, 2018; Stubben, 2010). Investigation of specific accruals, however, may 
provide accurate insights into the manipulation of a specific accrual, but at the cost of not detecting 
earnings management if earnings are managed through other items than those investigated 
(McNichols, 2000). 
3.1.2. Aggregated Accruals 
3.1.2.1. The Jones Model and the Modified Jones Model 
The use of accruals to indicate earnings management creates the challenge of separating non-
discretionary (normal) accruals from discretionary (abnormal) accruals. Early papers on earnings 
management made use of rather unrealistic assumptions concerning the time-series properties of 
non-discretionary accruals. Healy (1985) assumed that non-discretionary accruals would be similar 
to an arithmetic mean of the previous year’s total accruals, whereas DeAngelo (1986) simply 
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assumed that the previous year’s total accruals would be equal to the current year’s non-
discretionary accruals. Both these assumptions are unlikely to be valid.  
Non-discretionary accruals will be affected by the firm’s operational activities and 
economic circumstances, suggesting that the amount of non-discretionary accruals will be firm- 
and time-specific. The first attempt to estimate the amount of non-discretionary accruals based on 
determinants other than simply previous years’ total accruals, was proposed by Jones (1991). The 
logic behind the Jones model is that the non-discretionary portion of total accruals can be predicted 
by changes in sales and the level of property, plant and equipment. Jones (1991) notes that changes 
in revenue are likely to be correlated with the portion of total accruals that is caused by changes in 
working capital accounts such as inventory and accounts payable. The level of property, plant and 
equipment is included in the model to control for non-discretionary depreciation charges included 
in total accruals (Jones, 1991). This model was later refined and today exists in many different 
versions (e.g. Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; Dechow et al., 1995; Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2005; McNichols, 2002). 
The original Jones model implicitly assumes that revenues are non-discretionary. If 
earnings are managed through discretionary revenues, the model will not be able to detect this as 
earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995). To alleviate this concern, Dechow et al. (1995)  
developed the modified Jones model by subtracting changes in receivables from changes in 
revenues, assuming that changes in receivables are discretionary. Dechow et al. (1995) find that 
this modified version of the Jones model outperforms the original Jones model in empirical tests. 
However, both models have relatively low power of detecting earnings management for 
magnitudes that are economically plausible (Dechow et al., 1995).  
41 
 
For each firm the authors determined a time period assumed to have no earnings 
management (the estimation period), and a time period believed to be subject to earnings 
management (the event period). The regression coefficients for changes in revenues and the level 
of property, plant and equipment are estimated based on observations from the estimation period. 
These coefficients are then used to estimate non-discretionary accruals in the event period. These 
predicted values of discretionary accruals are then subtracted from aggregated accruals to form 
estimates of discretionary accruals.  
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) introduce a cross-sectional estimation of these models to 
obtain the estimates of discretionary accruals. A great advantage of the cross-sectional estimation 
is that it controls for time-and industry trends, and reduces the influence of particular instances of 
unobservable earnings management on the parameter estimates of non-discretionary accruals 
(Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000).  However, these advantages come at the cost of ignoring the fact 
that firms in a single industry may be structurally different (Owens, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2017; 
Peasnell et al., 2000). 
Peasnell et al. (2000) test the cross-sectional version of the Jones model and modified Jones 
model, and their findings suggest that the cross-sectional estimation may be more powerful in 
detecting earnings management. In contrast to Dechow et al. (1995), Peasnell et al. (2000) find that 
the models work relatively well at detecting earnings management at economically plausible 
magnitudes. 
Cross-sectional estimation has become the standard estimation procedure today (McNichols 
& Stubben, 2018). Both the time-series version and the cross-sectional version of this model appear 
to be miss-specified for firms experiencing extreme performance in terms of very high or low 
earnings or cash flows (Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2000). The 
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estimates of discretionary accruals obtained from these models tend to be abnormally high (low) 
for firms experiencing very high (low) earnings or cash flows performance, increasing the risk of 
a type I error, i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management when it is true (Dechow 
et al., 1995; Peasnell et al., 2000).  
To alleviate these concerns, Kothari et al. (2005) suggest controlling for performance by 
either matching on return on assets (ROA) or adding ROA as an additional variable in the Jones or 
modified Jones model in those cases where performance is unimportant to the research question 
studied. The discretionary accrual measures will then capture the additional earnings management 
above what would be expected given their level of performance (Kothari et al., 2005). Kothari et 
al. (2005) demonstrate that performance adjusted discretionary accruals are less likely to suffer 
from type I errors for firms exhibiting unusually high or low performance, compared to 
discretionary accruals that are not performance adjusted. The model employed by Kothari et al. 




) +∝2 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +∝3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +∝4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 indicates total accruals, ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual changes in revenues less annual changes 
in receivables. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant and equipment, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is return on assets. All variables 
are scaled by lagged total assets. 
A potential problem with the performance adjusted model is that it might extract too much 
discretion from the discretionary accruals estimate (i.e., a portion of the discretionary accruals is 
classified as non-discretionary) when earnings are being managed (Dechow et al., 2010). ROA is 
a noisy proxy for fundamental performance, especially when earnings are being managed. Income 
increasing (decreasing) earnings management will increase (decrease) ROA, but will not affect 
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fundamental performance. This indicates that ROA’s ability to reflect fundamental performance 
decreases with the level of earnings management. The extent of earnings management will then be 
correlated with both the dependent variable ‘total accruals’ and our proxy for fundamental 
performance – the independent variable ROA – so that an increase (decrease) in earnings 
management will increase (decrease) both total accruals and ROA. This leads to an omitted variable 
problem, where changes in total accruals are attributed to changes in performance (ROA), but are 
in reality caused by earnings management. Thus, the model will tend to underestimate the 
discretionary component of total accruals, leading to low power tests (Dechow et al., 2010).  
3.1.2.2. The Dechow and Dichev Model 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a new model, frequently called the Dechow and Dichev model 
or simply the DD model, which uses accrual estimation errors to indicate earnings quality. They 
recognize that working capital accruals (WCAccr) should be realized in operating cash flows (CFO) 
in adjacent periods. These accruals are considered to be of high quality if they are realized in 
operating cash flows the previous year, the current year or the following year:   
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The original approach was to use the standard deviation of the residuals from this regression as a 
proxy for earnings quality. A higher standard deviation indicates higher variability in the residuals 
from year to year, i.e., more variation in the quality of working capital accruals mapping into cash 
flows. Wysocki (2009) demonstrates that using the standard deviation of the residuals may be 
problematic since firms that systematically engage in earnings management activities, such as 
income smoothing for instance, can be classified as having high earnings quality. A firm with a 
poor mapping of working capital accruals into cash flows will still have a low standard deviation 
of the residuals as long as the poor mapping is relatively constant over time. Later research has 
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typically used the absolute value of the residuals instead (e.g. Dou, Hope, Thomas, & Zou, 2018; 
Hope et al., 2013, 2017) 
The original DD model does not separate discretionary from non-discretionary accruals. 
McNichols (2002) suggests combining the Jones and DD models to get a better calibrated measure 
of discretionary accruals than what can be obtained using the original Jones model alone. 
McNichols (2002) proposes the following model for estimating discretionary accruals controlling 
for the mapping of working capital accruals into cash flows: 
𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The residuals from this regression estimate discretionary (abnormal) working capital accruals.  
Positive residuals from aggregated accruals models suggest income increasing discretionary 
accruals, while negative residuals suggest income decreasing abnormal accruals. The signed 
residuals are often used as a proxy for earnings management, while the unsigned residuals (i.e., the 
absolute value) is commonly used as a proxy for earnings quality (Hribar & Nichols, 2007; Owens 
et al., 2017). A higher value of unsigned residuals suggests more earnings management and lower 
earnings quality (e.g. Hope et al., 2013; Wang, 2006).  
 Hribar and Nichols (2007) demonstrate the importance of controlling for firms’ operating 
volatility when using unsigned residuals. In the main test models we use several measures to proxy 
for the firms’ operating volatility such as size (natural logarithm of total assets), growth (percentage 
change in revenues) and firm age. Younger firms, high-growth firms, and smaller firms are more 
likely to have more volatile operating environments (Hribar & Nichols, 2007).  
The reported earnings figure is intended to reflect economic performance, but true 
economic performance is hard to measure and for most practical circumstances unobservable. This 
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makes it challenging to assess the extent to which reported earnings truly depicts economic 
performance. Since true economic performance is unobservable, the true amount of discretionary 
accruals will be unobservable as well, and the discretionary accruals proxy derived from these 
models will be a function of true discretionary accruals and measurement error in the proxy 
(Dechow et al., 1995; McNichols & Stubben, 2018; McNichols & Wilson, 1988). Consequently, 
all efforts to detect earnings management are joint tests of earnings management and the ability of 
earnings management proxies to accurately detect that earnings management (Kothari et al., 2005). 
The extent to which measurement error in the discretionary accruals proxy is a major concern will 
vary between studies. McNichols and Stubben (2018) note that this measurement error is of special 
concern if the error differs between the two groups being studied, or different factors contributing 
to earnings management differ between the groups, and is not properly controlled for. McNichols 
and Stubben (2018) suggest minimizing this concern through the use of control variables, 
propensity score matching, fixed effects and/or exploring exogenous events. This dissertation 
makes use of these techniques. All test models include control variables as well as industry and 
year fixed effects.8 Several papers use propensity score matching as a robustness test and Paper 4 
explores an exogenous event.  
The discretionary accruals models have received a significant amount of criticism over the 
years, some of which have led to significant improvements in the models and researchers’ test 
design (e.g., the need to control for performance and operating volatility as discussed above). 
Jackson (2018) criticizes the fact that the discretionary accruals estimates will be affected by 
industry peers. The cross-sectional estimation based on industry-years makes the discretionary 
                                                          
8 Paper 4 also includes firm fixed effects in the robustness test. This is not done in the other papers because the 
variables of interest in these papers are relatively stable over time, and firm fixed effects requires variation over time 
in the variable of interest. 
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accruals estimate an estimate of discretion relative to the industry norm rather than a measure of 
absolute discretion employed by the firm. However, as McNichols and Stubben (2018) point out, 
this is not necessarily undesirable, as the incremental level of discretion relative to the industry 
norm might be an appropriate measure of earnings management in most settings.9  McNichols and 
Stubben (2018) suggest that articulating the story (e.g., when, how and why would earnings 
management occur?) as well as additional cross-sectional tests will improve the validity of the 
results. This dissertation attempts to follow this advice through the use of additional analyses to 
test some of the theory and arguments underlying our hypotheses. For instance, in Paper 1 we argue 
that fully owned family firms will exhibit higher earnings quality than partly owned family firms, 
partly due to concerns relating to the fear of losing control or to avoid unpleasant questions and 
inquiries regarding the family’s control over the firm. If this is true, we would expect that fully 
owned and partly owned family firms respond differently to situations with poor performance, as 
questions and concern regarding family control and influence may emerge in such situations. In 
additional analysis, we find that partly owned family firms have more positive discretionary 
accruals (suggesting income increasing earnings management) compared to fully owned family 
firms when performance is poor. Another example is from Paper 2. Here, we expect that family 
named family firms are more likely to choose real earnings management over accrual-based 
earnings management because of higher detection risk of accrual-based earnings management, 
which we believe is of higher concern in family named family firms. In additional analysis, we 
examine whether the difference in earnings management between the two groups is conditional on 
whether or not the firm is being audited by a Big 4 auditor (our proxy for detection risk). 
                                                          
9 If the researcher is interested in the average level of discretion in an industry, on the other hand, the cross-sectional 
estimation procedure may wash away the effect (McNichols & Stubben, 2018).  
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We also use both the performance adjusted modified Jones model and the modified DD 
model, as described above, in all three papers on aggregated accruals in order to assess the validity 
of our results. The aggregated accruals models described in this section have been used for decades, 
and are still used in research published by high-quality journals (e.g. Bonacchi et al., 2019; Che, 
Hope, & Langli, 2020; Dou et al., 2018; Hope et al., 2017; Hope, Yue, & Zhong, 2019). 
3.1.3. Real Earnings Management 
Research on real earnings management has become increasingly popular in recent years. The 
models commonly used today to indicate real earnings management were developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006). He describes several methods for managers to manage earnings through 
real activities. First, managers can attempt to increase the level of sales in the current period by 
offering aggressive price discounts or lenient credit terms (sales manipulation). Second, managers 
of manufacturing firms can increase production to spread fixed costs over a larger number of units 
and consequently decrease cost of goods sold (COGS) per unit (overproduction). Third, managers 
can reduce discretionary expenditures such as research and development costs or advertising costs 
(discretionary expenditures).  
These forms of real activities manipulation will have various effects on the level of 
operating cash flows (CFO), production costs and discretionary expenses relative to sales. Both 
sales manipulation and overproduction will increase production costs relative to sales, causing 
higher abnormal production costs. Reducing discretionary expenditures will reduce the level of 
discretionary expenditures relative to sales. The effect on abnormal CFO, however, is ambiguous, 
as all the three manipulation strategies will affect CFO relative to sales, though not necessarily in 
the same direction. Sales manipulation and overproduction will reduce abnormal CFO, while 
lowering discretionary expenses will increase abnormal CFO.  
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Financial reports prepared according to NGAAP (Norwegian Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles) do not provide data on discretionary expenditures that are easily accessible, 
and Roychowdhury (2006) cautions against using abnormal CFO for cross-sectional predictions 
due to the ambiguous effects of the different real earnings management strategies on CFO. In this 
dissertation, we measure real earnings management as abnormal production costs. The model for 
abnormal production costs is presented below: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 indicates production costs this period and is equal to the sum of COGS and change 
in inventory (𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡+ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡), 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 is sales this period, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 is change in sales this period 
and ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 is change in sales previous period.  
The residuals from this regression measures abnormal production costs. A higher value 
indicates abnormally high production costs given the level of sales (suggesting either 
overproduction to decrease COGS and/or sales manipulation) and hence more real earnings 
management (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2014; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). 
This dissertation uses the models described above to measure earnings quality in three of the 
papers, which is the outcome variable in the main test regressions (in the last paper the outcome 
variable is impairment losses/decisions). Most main test models are estimated using OLS, while 
one of the test models in Paper 2 uses logistic regression (here the outcome variable reflects the 
choice between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management).  
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4. The Dissertation 
4.1. Data 
All four papers in this dissertation use data from the Center for Corporate Governance Research 
(CCGR) at BI Norwegian Business School. This center’s database contains unique and detailed 
data on all private limited liability firms in Norway, including, but not limited to, financial 
accounting data as well as data related to ownership and governance. A special and unique feature 
of this database is that it contains data on family relationships among the firms’ shareholders, board 
members and CEOs. BI Norwegian Business School has obtained these data from the Norwegian 
tax authorities, and all data on family relationships are anonymously presented to the users of the 
database. Family relationships are determined using both marriage and blood line, going back four 
generations and extending out to third cousins.10  
The second paper of this dissertation also uses data from PROFF AS, a Norwegian firm 
providing financial data, such as accounting and credit data, on Norwegian firms. The main purpose 
of this paper is to investigate earnings quality in a private firm setting where there are strong family 
ties with the firm. To investigate this, we use a dummy variable signaling whether or not the family 
name is included in the firm name. This variable was constructed based on the family name of the 
shareholders, the board members and the CEO of each firm, in addition to the firm name. This 
information was provided by PROFF AS, and a data architect at BI Norwegian Business School 
matched this variable with data from the CCGR database. 
                                                          




4.2. Presentation of Papers 
4.2.1. Paper 1 
This paper investigates how earnings quality is associated with ownership structures in private 
family firms.11 Extant research on earnings quality in family firms mainly compares family firms 
with non-family firms, and Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, and Dekker (2014) call for more research to assess 
differences in earnings quality among family firms. We focus on the association between 
ownership structures and earnings quality. Specifically, we examine the size of family ownership, 
the role of the second largest shareholder and the number of family owners. We use discretionary 
accruals as our proxy for earnings management, indicating earnings quality, where lower 
discretionary accruals are interpreted as higher earnings quality. Specifically, we use the absolute 
values of the residuals from the DD model, as modified by McNichols (2002), in our main tests, as 
well as the performance adjusted Jones model, as developed by Kothari et al. (2005), in robustness 
tests. 
We hypothesize and find that family firms fully owned by the family have higher earnings 
quality compared to family firms partly owned by the family. Agency theory suggests that 
concentrated ownership may cause agency conflicts between the controlling and non-controlling 
owners. When family ownership is high, the family may exploit non-controlling owners and use 
firm resources to benefit family members (e.g., tunneling), causing incentives to manage earnings 
to cover up such activities. When the firm is fully owned by the family, there are no minority non-
family owners, and agency conflicts and earnings management incentives are probably lower. SEW 
theory predicts that perceived threats to the controlling family’s continued control may induce 
earnings management behavior in family firms (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
                                                          
11 Private firms with more than 50% ownership are classified as private family firms. 
51 
 
2014). Any threats to family control, or unpleasant questions regarding the family’s continued 
control, are likely higher when there are minority non-family owners present. Thus, SEW theory 
suggests less earnings management and higher earnings quality in fully owned family firms as well.  
The second largest shareholder, whether family member or not, may monitor the largest 
shareholder and reduce earnings management. The incentives and ability for the second largest 
shareholder to monitor the largest shareholder will likely increase as the ownership stake of the 
second largest shareholder increases (Hope, 2013). We hypothesize and find a positive association 
between the second largest shareholder and earnings quality.  
We hypothesize that the number of family owners is negatively associated with earnings 
quality. Intra-familial conflicts may increase as the number of family owners increases, thus 
increasing the potential for agency conflicts and incentives to manage earnings. Our findings 
suggest a negative association between the number of family owners and earnings quality in our 
main tests. However, we fail to find any significant association in robustness tests using either the 
performance adjusted Jones model, restricting the sample to multiple family owners, or in a 
subsample of larger firms. Thus, this finding should be interpreted with caution.  
4.2.2. Paper 2  
The second paper examines how family identity and reputational concerns are associated with 
earnings management in private family firms. SEW theory predicts that family members who 
identify strongly with the family firm are more sensitive to reputational concerns (Berrone et al., 
2012), and more likely to choose an earnings management strategy with lower detection risk 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014).  
 Family firms with the family name included in the firm name are probably more sensitive 
to reputational concerns (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013), and we use this family name congruence 
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as our proxy for family identity. We hypothesize and find that family named family firms exhibit 
less accrual-based earnings management, and are more likely to select real earnings management 
over accrual-based earnings management. Real earnings management are generally believed to 
have lower detection risk than accrual-based earnings management (e.g. Das, Kyonghee, & Patro, 
2011; Kothari et al., 2016; Zang, 2012). We also find that these differences in earnings management 
strategies between family named and non-family named firms seem to increase as incentives to 
manage earnings increases (proxied by debt ratio), and when detection risk is higher (proxied by 
Big4 auditor).  
4.2.3. Paper 3 
In the third paper we use specific accruals (i.e., impairment losses) to indicate earnings quality. 
This study examines whether private family firms differ from private non-family firms in reporting 
impairment losses. Controlling for other economic factors believed to affect the reporting of 
impairment losses, any additional associations with impairment losses and family firm status (i.e., 
whether the firm is a family firm or not) may indicate differences in impairment reporting behavior. 
Drawing on SEW theory, we argue that family firms may be reluctant to report impairment losses 
– especially large impairment losses – as this may reveal poor performance. This may induce 
troublesome questions and concerns from stakeholders regarding the family’s control over the firm, 
and potentially harm the family’s reputation as well, ultimately resulting in a SEW loss. We 
hypothesize and find that private family firms are less likely to report impairment losses, and report 
lower impairment losses, compared to private non-family firms. 
 Whether or not the controlling family also holds the CEO position and the portion of non-
family board members may influence family firms’ ability to affect reporting decisions. We 
hypothesize that family firms with a family CEO are less likely to report impairment losses, and 
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report lower impairment losses, while non-family board members are positively associated with 
both the reporting of impairment losses and the reported amount. We do not find strong evidence 
regarding the relationship between family CEO and impairment losses. We find no significant 
differences in the likelihood of reporting impairment losses, but we find a negative association 
between family CEO and the reported figure. However, this negative association is no longer 
significant when we use tobit regression instead of OLS or when we use an alternative definition 
of family firms. Regarding non-family board members, our results suggest that the likelihood of 
reporting impairment losses, and the impairment amount, increases when the ratio of non-family 
board members increases. 
4.2.4. Paper 4 
The last paper examines the effect of a negative shock to performance on earnings quality in private 
firms. Fundamental performance is unobservable and therefore difficult to measure. Existing 
research has mainly been conducted on public firms and has used proxies that are subject to 
estimation errors and endogeneity concerns, or without a proper control group (e.g. Balsam et al., 
1995; DeFond & Park, 1997). It is not clear that these findings from public firms can be generalized 
to private firms. Public firms are subject to capital market forces which private firms are not, and 
this may affect both incentives to manage earnings and the demand for high quality earnings. 
This study takes advantage of the exogenous shock in oil prices in 2014 and uses a 
difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effect of a negative shift in performance on 
earnings quality. Firms that were not directly affected by the decline in oil prices are used as a 
control group. We hypothesize and find that the negative shock to performance impairs earnings 
quality in private firms. This result holds even after controlling for measured performance, 
suggesting that performance measures derived from accounting numbers do not fully capture 
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fundamental performance. Additional tests suggest that firms affected by the shock responded by 
managing earnings upwards, suggesting a desire to reduce the negative effect of reduced 
performance on earnings quality.  
4.3. Overall Contribution and Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of earnings quality in private firms and private 
family firms by examining how various characteristics of private firms relates to their earnings 
quality. It examines earnings quality in private firms through a series of four papers. Three of these 
papers are related to topics concerning family firms, while the fourth paper examines whether 
private firms in general manage earnings in response to a shock in fundamental performance. There 
is limited research on earnings management incentives and earnings quality in a private firm 
setting, and some have even questioned the motivation for financial reporting in private firms 
(Habib et al., 2018). Ownership is typically less dispersed in private firms, making it possible to 
communicate through private channels to a larger extent (Burghstahler et al., 2006). Prior literature 
on private firms has to a large extent focused on the demand for financial reporting from 
debtholders and other stakeholders (e.g. Bigus & Hillebrand, 2017; De Meyere et al., 2018; Ding 
et al., 2016; Gassen & Fülbier, 2015; Hope et al., 2017; Mafrolla & D'Amico, 2017). Our study 
contributes to this stream of research by demonstrating that a negative shock to performance 
increases discretionary accruals for these firms compared to a group of control firms that were not 
affected by this shock. This suggests that managers of private firms manage earnings to conceal 
the negative effect of fundamental performance on earnings. This indicates that managers of private 
firms do have incentives to manage earnings, suggesting that financial reporting has an important 
role in private firms as well. If there was no motivation for financial reporting in private firms other 
than to meet the requirements of the authorities, there should be no incentives to manage earnings 
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and consequently we should not have observed any effect on discretionary accruals for firms 
affected by a negative shock to performance.  
The remaining papers focus on family firms, as these constitute a significant portion of private 
firms. We document significant differences in earnings quality related to family firm status 
(whether the firm is a family firm or not), and family firms’ opportunities and incentives to 
manage earnings. These papers contribute to the earnings quality and family business literature 
by focusing on an unexplored setting (private family firms) and focusing on variations among 
family firms, as opposed to differences between family and non-family firms. We document less 
earnings management and higher earnings quality among fully owned family firms, family firms 
with a large second largest shareholder and family firms more sensitive to reputational concerns. 
Family members who identify more strongly with the family firm seem to be more likely to select 
real earnings management over accrual-based earnings management. Findings also suggest that 
family firms are less likely to report impairment losses and report lower impairment losses than 
non-family firms. Additional analyses suggest that the reported impairment losses in non-family 
firms better reflect future economic performance, suggesting a reluctance to report impairment 
losses among private family firms. This differs from prior evidence from public family firms, 
suggesting that impairment losses of family firms better reflect economic fundamentals, thus 
highlighting the importance of studying private family firms in particular, since evidence from 
public family firms may not reflect the behavior of private family firms (Miller, Breton-Miller, & 
Lester, 2012). These findings and insights on private family firms’ accounting practices may be 
useful for accounting standard setters when developing accounting policies and standards, 




Future research should further explore relevant aspects of private firms and private family 
firms, or test whether these results hold in other relevant settings. For instance, we find that family 
firms are less likely to report impairment losses and report lower impairment losses compared to 
private non-family firms in a setting with low book-tax conformity. Do these results also hold in a 
setting were book-tax conformity is high? Or will family firms then report higher impairment losses 
than non-family firms in an attempt to save taxes?  
The heterogeneity of family firms in the private firm segment should be further explored. 
For instance, what corporate governance mechanisms, other than those explored in this dissertation, 
will affect the reporting behavior of private family firms? Future research should also explore other 
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This study examines the association between earnings quality and ownership of the controlling 
family and the second largest owner, and the number of family owners using a unique dataset 
containing detailed information on family relationships for the whole population of Norwegian 
private family firms. Results show that, compared to fully owned family firms, earnings quality is 
lower for family firms that are only partly owned by the controlling family. Moreover, the 
ownership of the second largest owner is positively associated with earnings quality, and we find 
some evidence indicating that earnings quality may be negatively associated with the number of 
family owners, but this finding is less robust. 
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This paper examines the role of family ownership in explaining earnings quality in Norwegian 
family controlled firms.12 Earnings quality in family firms is likely to differ from non-family firms 
due to more concentrated ownership, and due to strong involvement and strong emphasis from 
family owners on preserving socioemotional wealth (Paiva, Lourenço, & Branco, 2016). Salvato 
and Moores (2010) argue that the relatively little focus on earnings quality in family firms may 
have hampered theoretical advancements in both the accounting and the family business literature.  
In this study we focus on earnings management as an inverse measure of earnings quality. 
The literature on family firms has mainly focused on public firms. Why private family firms would 
engage in earnings management is an important question that still remains unresolved (Stockmans, 
Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010).  As worldwide the majority of family firms are private, there are 
increasing calls for more understanding of private family firms (Chrisman, Sharma, & Taggar, 
2007; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011). This study responds to the calls and contributes 
to the literature by investigating the heterogeneity in ownership structure and earnings quality 
among private family firms.  
Norway provides an excellent setting to examine this topic because the unique register data 
in Norway include all private limited liability firms, all Norwegian limited liability firms are 
required to issue financial reports, we can trace firm ownership to ultimate owners and we can 
determine relationships using variables such as kinship, marriage and adoption (Che & Langli, 
2015).   
                                                          
12 Firms with a controlling family owning more than 50% of the shares are classified as private family firms. There 




The theoretical arguments used to develop the hypotheses on earnings quality and family 
ownership are rooted in agency theory and socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory.13 While agency 
theory is useful to elucidate the agency issues in private family firms, it may only provide a partial 
explanation of private family dynamics (Howorth, Westhead, & Wright, 2004). Salvato and 
Moores (2010) argue that agency theory may be insufficient to explain variations in earnings 
quality observed in family firms, and suggest complementing agency theory with other 
perspectives. Stockmans et al. (2010) demonstrate that SEW theory grounded in behavioral agency 
theory (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007) provide a fruitful theoretical underpinning to explain variations in earnings quality in 
private family firms.  
Family owners may engage in earnings management to reduce the risk of non-family 
owners asking questions about the family’s control and influence over the firm – a risk which is 
especially prominent when earnings are low. Since we investigate private family firms, we take 
advantage of the fact that in some firms the controlling family holds all the shares (i.e., fully 
owned). This is unique to the private firm setting and provides us with an excellent opportunity to 
test whether earnings management incentives in family firms may be related to fear of losing family 
influence and control, as suggested by SEW theory. When the family firm is fully owned by the 
controlling family, there are no minority (non-family) owners to ask unpleasant questions about 
the controlling family’s control and influence, or to threaten the family’s ultimate power and 
influence over the firm. This suggests that earnings quality will be higher when the firm is fully 
owned by the family, compared to family firms partly owned by the controlling family. 
                                                          
13 The socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory has roots in behavioral agency theory (e.g.,  Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, 
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) and is a multidimensional concept (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2012).  It includes dimensions such as preserving family influence and control. More details will be provided 
in Section 2. 
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Agency theory suggests that concentrated ownership creates incentives for controlling 
owners to expropriate financial wealth from non-controlling owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).14 The controlling owners may use earnings 
management to mislead non-controlling owners to facilitate expropriation or to conceal 
expropriation. When the firm is fully owned by the controlling family, however, agency conflicts 
and earnings management incentives are likely to be lower. Thus, both SEW theory and agency 
theory may serve as theoretical bases for our first hypothesis (H1), suggesting that earnings quality 
is higher in fully owned than in partly owned family firms. 
Our second hypothesis (H2) concerns the role of the second largest shareholder. Hope 
(2013) argues that there is a positive relationship between the shareholdings of the second largest 
owner and her willingness and ability to monitor the largest shareholder. Using data on public 
family firms, Jara Bertin and López Iturriaga (2014) find that there is less earnings management 
when the ownership of the second and third shareholder increases. The second largest shareholder 
may play an even more important role in preventing earnings management in private family firms, 
compared to public family firms, as private firms are not disciplined by the capital market forces. 
Thus, our second hypothesis (H2) states that the shareholding of the second largest owner is 
positively associated with earnings quality.  
The third hypothesis investigates whether the number of family owners is associated with 
earnings quality. More family members may result in more internal conflicts, which provides 
incentives to supply less information and hence lowers earnings quality (Paiva et al., 2016; 
                                                          
14 For instance, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) document that the management team of Time Mirror Company 
maintained a special dividend for the Chandler family, even though they substantially cut dividends to other 
shareholders in 1994.   
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Poutziouris, 2002). We expect that the number of family owners will be negatively related to 
earnings quality (H3).  
Our empirical results support the first hypothesis, suggesting higher earnings quality in 
firms that are fully family owned. In additional analyses, we find a positive association between 
poor performance (return on assets; ROA) and positive discretionary accruals, and this association 
is weaker for fully owned family firms than for partly owned family firms. This may indicate that 
controlling family owners of partly owned family firms manage earnings upwards to conceal poor 
performance to a greater extent, possibly due to more threats to family control and influence when 
performance is poor for partly owned family firms.  
In additional analyses we also test whether the association between family ownership and 
earnings quality is non-linear. For partly owned family firms, agency conflicts increase with family 
ownership, while threats to family control and influence decrease with the level of family 
ownership. Hence, relatively high or low family ownership may be negatively related to earnings 
quality (Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga, & López-de-Foronda, 2008).15 We examine the non-linear 
relationship between family ownership and earnings quality using cut-offs based on ownership 
thresholds in the Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act, which grants different levels of 
decision-making power when ownership is above 50%, 2/3, and 90%, respectively.16 Compared to 
fully owned family firms, earnings quality is lower for family controlled firms with low family 
ownership (i.e., above 50% but less than 2/3) and high family ownership (i.e., above 90% but less 
than 100%). 
                                                          
15 As there is no or less agency conflicts when the controlling family owns 100% of the firm, and the concern of 
losing control is very low, if not zero; “too high family ownership” means high but less than 100% family ownership. 




We find a positive relationship between the second largest ownership and earnings quality. 
Thus, H2 is also supported. The results from the main test of H3 suggests that the number of family 
owners is negatively associated with earnings quality. However, when using either an alternative 
earnings quality measure or restricting the sample to firms with more than one family owner, we 
find no association between the number of family owners and earnings quality. Moreover, when 
we split the sample in two, based on firm size, we find no association between the number of family 
owners and earnings quality for larger firms. Thus, the main results for the number of family 
owners should be interpreted with caution. 
This paper adds several contributions to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine the relationship between earnings quality and the ownership of the 
controlling family and the second largest owner in a setting of private family firms. Most studies 
have focused on either public family firms or compared family firms to non-family firms. While 
the distinction between family and non-family firms is important for understanding the different 
forms of organizations, an approach similar to the ones above implicitly assumes that family firms 
are homogeneous. This paper, however, explicitly studies the heterogeneity among these firms. In 
addition, the majority of firms worldwide are private, which emphasizes the importance of 
investigating private firms.  
Secondly, as ownership structure is an important governance mechanism, which could 
affect incentives for financial reporting, the investigation of how earnings quality might vary with 
ownership in private family firms sheds new insights on the accounting practices in private family 
firms. These findings might be useful for regulators making accounting policy decisions, for 
creditors making loan decisions and for owners. 
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Thirdly, while most studies in private family firms use a small sample, e.g., Stockmans et 
al. (2010) obtain 896 responses out of the 8,367 questionnaires distributed, this paper uses a unique 
and extensive dataset that covers the whole population of private family firms in Norway.  
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the literature and hypotheses 
development and Section 3 describes the research design and descriptive statistics. Main results,  
robustness tests and additional analyses are presented in section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature, Theories and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Literature 
The literature investigating earnings quality in family firms has mainly focused on public family 
firms and the differences between family and non-family firms (in terms of both public and private 
firms). A number of studies have examined earnings quality using data on public family firms. 
Yang (2010) investigates firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and finds evidence suggesting 
that more insider ownership (i.e., the fraction of shares owned by executive and non-executive 
directors, top managers and large shareholders) is associated with more earnings management in 
family firms. Pazzaglia, Mengoli, and Sapienza (2013) show that firms acquired by families in a 
market transaction have lower earnings quality than family firms that are founded or inherited by 
the family owners. Using data on Italian listed firms, Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola, and Pozza 
(2011) document that family controlled firms, where both the CEO and board chairman are 
members of the controlling family, are less likely to smooth earnings compared to other family 
controlled firms.  
As family firms have certain unique organizational characteristics, researchers have often 
contrasted family firms with non-family firms. The literature that compares earnings quality 
between family and non-family firms does not provide conclusive findings. On the one hand, the 
majority of studies conclude that family firms have higher earnings quality than non-family firms 
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(Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010; Chen, Chen, 
& Cheng, 2014; Chen, Chen, & Cheng, 2008; Jiraporn & DaDalt, 2009; Prencipe et al., 2011; 
Tong, 2007; Wang, 2006). On the other hand, some studies find family control to be associated 
with lower earnings quality (Achleitner, Günther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014; Ho & Shun Wong, 
2001; Kvaal, Langli, & Abdolmohammadi, 2012; Prencipe, Markarian, & Pozza, 2008; Yang, 
2010).  
In contrast to previous research on public family firms, Kvaal et al. (2012) compare earnings 
quality between private family and non-family firms. They find that private family firms are more 
likely to manage earnings downwards than non-family firms (e.g., to reduce dividend payments). 
However, when leverage is high, private family firms are more likely to manage earnings upwards 
than private non-family firms. This suggests that family controlled private firms may manage 
earnings to conceal true performance and avoid debt covenant violations, possibly due to the fear 
of losing control and influence over the firm. 
One study that investigates earnings quality among private family firms is Stockmans et al. 
(2010). Using a small survey-based sample, they examine the association between earnings 
management and the firm’s generational stage, and whether the firm CEO is a founding CEO, a 
descendent CEO or a non-family CEO. They find that first-generation family firms (founder-led 
family firms) perform more income increasing earnings management than firms in the second and 
third (and later) generation (non-founder-led family firms), conditional on poor firm performance. 
The authors attribute these findings to lower emphasis on SEW in later generations. 
The similarity between Stockmans et al. (2010) and our paper is that both investigate the 
heterogeneity in earnings quality among private family firms. However, there are several main 
distinctions. First, we use data from the whole population of private family firms in Norway over 
a long period, from 2002 to 2015. In contrast, Stockmans et al. (2010) sent out 8,637 questionnaires 
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and only received 896 responses in total. Second, they examine how earnings quality varies with 
different generations, the composition of the management team and the CEO position. Our paper 
focuses on ownership structure and examines how the ownership of the controlling family and the 
second largest owner, and the number of family owners, are associated with earnings quality. Third, 
Stockmans et al. (2010) only use SEW theory and focus on upwards earnings management, while 
we combine agency theory and SEW theory and study both upwards and downwards earnings 
management. 
2.2 Theories 
Agency theory has been widely used to explain conflict issues in corporate governance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Compared to the extensively studied agency conflicts between the owners and 
the management (Agency Problem I), main agency conflicts in private family firms are different. 
These firms generally have more concentrated family ownership, and there is often a stronger 
alignment effect between the controlling owners and management. The CEO and other top 
managers often belong to the controlling family and/or the controlling family have stronger 
incentives and power to monitor management (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006). The conflicts between 
the controlling family owners and minority non-family owners (Agency Problem II) may result in 
entrenchment issues, and have become the main concerns of agency conflicts in family firms (Ali 
et al., 2007; Wang, 2006).  
Although agency theory is still important to elucidate the agency issues in private family 
firms, it is not sufficient to explain the variations in accounting practices observed in family firms 
(Salvato & Moores, 2010). Moreover, Howorth et al. (2004) argue that agency theory may only 
provide a partial explanation of private family dynamics. In recent years, SEW theory has gained 
support in research on family firms (Salvato & Moores, 2010; Stockmans et al., 2010; Stockmans, 
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Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2013). Stockmans et al. (2010) illustrate that SEW theory, which is rooted 
in behavioral agency theory (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007), provides another perspective for governance issues in private family firms. Similar to 
agency theory, SEW theory states that family principals can behave opportunistically at the expense 
of other stakeholders such as non-family shareholders or creditors. An important implication of 
SEW theory, however, is that family principals are not merely driven by financial gains and 
benefits, but also by the preservation of socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012). SEW theory 
predicts that if SEW goals and financial goals are in conflict, family principals may choose SEW 
over financial goals (Berrone et al., 2012). This can lead to sub-optimal business decisions taken 
by family principals to preserve SEW rather than to maximize financial profits, i.e., decisions made 
at the expense of stakeholders favoring profit maximization.  
Socioemotional wealth is a multidimensional concept (Berrone et al., 2012). It includes 
dimensions such as a strong desire to preserve family control and influence over the firm, strong 
social ties and emotional attachment, significant identification with the firm, which makes the 
family members especially sensitive to reputational concern, and a desire to pass down the firm to 
future generations (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, & Imperatore, 2014). Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2014) argue that family firms may favor different dimensions of SEW, and that these  
dimensions may lead to different reporting strategies. For instance, families that emphasize the 
“control and influence” aspect of SEW may resort to a reporting strategy which conceals true 
performance if they believe that their control over the firm is threatened (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2014).  
Family owners may differ from non-family owners in several respects. An important 
attribute of family owners is that they may favor non-financial goals over financial goals, in order 
to satisfy their socioemotional needs (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). This can cause conflicts between 
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controlling family and non-family owners, or among family owners, especially when some family 
owners are not members of the same nuclear family. 
We argue that the complementarity of agency theory and SEW can provide a more complete 
theoretical basis when forming predictions about earnings quality in the private family firm 
segment, and we thus adopt both theories in this study to motivate our hypotheses. 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
2.3.1 Family Ownership and Earnings Quality 
Private firms with a controlling family holding more than 50% of the shares are classified as private 
family firms. The controlling family may play a crucial role in terms of earnings quality. Agency 
theory indicates that family owners have incentives to expropriate wealth from minority non-family 
owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which could lead to earnings management behavior. As 
ownership concentration increases, agency conflicts between majority (family) shareholders and 
minority (non-family) shareholders are likely to increase as well. High family ownership provides 
the family with significant power and control over the firm, and the opportunity to extract private 
benefits and manage earnings is likely to be high as well. Family members can use their extensive 
control to direct firm resources to projects that mainly benefit family members, rather than directing 
these resources to projects that would maximize firm value (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 
2002; Paiva et al., 2016; Stulz, 1988). They may try to conceal this kind of behavior through 
earnings management. However, when the firm is fully owned by the controlling family, there are 
no non-family minority owners, and agency conflicts are likely to be lower. Hence, agency theory 
76 
 
suggests that earnings quality is likely to be higher when a firm is fully owned by the controlling 
family, compared to firms that are partly owned by non-family owners, ceteris paribus.17 
SEW theory predicts that family owners’ behavior can be explained with reference to family 
members’ affective needs as well as financial benefits (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger, 
2018). Many family owners are likely to be concerned with maintaining the family’s control and 
influence over the family firm (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). If family owners 
emphasize the “control and influence” aspect of socioemotional wealth, it is important for the 
family owners to maintain control of the firm, and relinquishing family control would lead to a 
substantial socioemotional wealth loss for them (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014).  
When the family firm is not fully owned by the family, minority non-family owners may 
raise unpleasant questions regarding the family’s control if the firm performs poorly. Minority non-
family owners also posit a threat to the family’s ultimate control and influence. Certain decisions 
require more than a simple majority (i.e., more than 50%) to be approved. For instance, minority 
(non-family) owners can block resolution changes and decisions to merge or demerge when they 
have more than 1/3 ownership.18 If minority owners perceive that the controlling family 
mismanages the firm, they can consequently block any suggestions made by the family. The 
concern of losing some control and influence, or the concern of questions regarding the family’s 
control, may result in incentives to manage earnings, for instance to cover up poor performance.  
Threat to family control and influence is probably higher when family ownership is 
relatively low and decreases with family ownership. A family firm that is fully owned by a family 
                                                          
17 This is conditional on the assumption that external conflicts between the controlling family and external 
stakeholders are more serious than the internal conflicts among family members. It may happen that internal agency 
costs within the controlling family are also large, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
18 Cf. The Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act paragraphs 5-18, 13-3, and 14-6. 
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(100% family ownership), has fewer incentives to manage earnings. Since there are no minority 
non-family owners, there is no real threat of losing family control and influence and no threat of 
unpleasant inquiries or questions from non-family owners. Thus, the above discussion based on 
SEW theory also suggests that earnings quality is higher when a firm is fully owned by the family. 
A counterargument is that there is less demand for high quality earnings when the firm is 
100% owned by the family, as information can more easily flow through private channels. This 
suggests lower earnings quality when the firm is fully owned by the family. Still, all limited liability 
firms in Norway are obliged to prepare a financial report with financial statements and additional 
notes (cf. Norwegian Accounting Act paragraphs 1-2, 3-1, and 3-2). All these firms, except for the 
very smallest, are also required to engage an independent auditor to control their financial report 
(cf. Act on Auditing and Auditors paragraph 2-1). This suggests that financial reports will hold a 
certain amount of information of a certain quality, regardless of the demand for that information. 
Thus, the effect on earnings quality due to fewer earnings management incentives is expected to 
outweigh the effect of less demand for high quality earnings information. We formulate our first 
hypothesis as such: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Private family firms that are fully owned by the family have higher 
earnings quality than private family firms partly owned by the family. 
2.3.2 Earnings Quality and the Ownership of the Second Largest Owner 
The second largest owner might perform an alternative corporate governance mechanism through 
monitoring the largest owner (Che & Zhang, 2016), and may prevent the largest owner from 
behaving opportunistically (Che & Langli, 2015; Hope, 2013). Hope (2013) argues that the 
willingness and ability of the second largest shareholder to monitor the largest shareholder 
increases with her ownership stake.  
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 Jara Bertin and López Iturriaga (2014) show that the contestability to control (i.e., the 
proportion of shares owned by the second and third shareholder relative to the largest shareholder) 
reduces earnings management in public family firms. The importance of a second largest 
shareholder to prevent earnings management can be even more crucial in private family firms, as 
private firms are not subject to disciplinary capital market forces as public family firms are. Che 
and Langli (2015) find that the ownership of the second largest shareholder is positively associated 
with firm performance in private family firms, which indicates that the second largest shareholder 
may function as an important governance mechanism in these firms. 
The presence of a large second largest shareholder may increase the risk of earnings 
management being detected (Hope, 2013). Because of higher detection risk, the largest shareholder 
may consider earnings management too risky, since the potential costs of earnings management 
may be higher than the potential benefits. We expect that the presence of a large second largest 
shareholder will mitigate earnings management. Based on the discussion above, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The ownership of the second largest shareholder is positively associated 
with earnings quality in private family firms. 
2.3.3 Earnings Quality and the Number of Family Owners 
Family owners are not a homogenous group of owners, as they may have conflicting interests, 
different risk attitudes and divergent preferences of time horizons. Family firms can suffer from 
family feuding (Paiva et al., 2016; Poutziouris, 2001, 2002). As the number of family owners 
increases, conflicting goals and interests among these owners may also increase. The presence of 
more family owners may increase the likelihood that the (familial) relationship among the family 
owners is more distant. Family members from different nuclear families (e.g., different sibling 
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branches) can significantly increase the level of family conflicts (Gersick, 1997), which can 
potentially cause agency conflicts among family owners. Controlling family owners can exploit 
non-controlling family owners and manage earnings to cover up such activities, which would 
suggest a negative association between the number of family owners and earnings quality.  
At the same time, it can be argued that an increasing number of family owners increases the 
demand for accounting information as well. When there are few family owners, they are more 
likely to establish and maintain close relationships, which enable them to use informal channels of 
communication (Paiva et al., 2016; Poutziouris, 2002). However, it will probably be more 
challenging to rely on private information channels such as information sharing over a family 
dinner, when the number of family owners increases. The lack of information efficiency through 
private channels may increase the demand for information through more formal channels, such as 
financial reports. An increased demand for high quality accounting information would suggests a 
positive relationship between the number of family owners and earnings quality. However, the 
Norwegian institutional setting, with obligated financial reports for all limited liability firms and 
independent auditor for all but the very smallest limited liability firms, ensures that accounting 
information holds a certain quality regardless of demand. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the 
negative effect of increased conflicts among family owners as the number of family owners 
increases outweighs any positive effect of increased demand. Based on this discussion, we 
formulate our third hypothesis as such: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The number of family owners is negatively associated with earnings 




3. Research Design and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Data 
The data are obtained from the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI 
Norwegian Business School. The CCGR database contains financial accounting information on all 
limited liability companies in Norway. Norwegian limited liability companies are required to 
prepare and issue a financial report according to Norwegian GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles), which to some extent is similar to IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards) for SMEs (Small and Medium sized enterprises). 1920  
The CCGR database also provides unique data on family relationships between 
shareholders, board members and CEOs. Data on family relationships are based on marriage and 
blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to third cousins (Che & Langli, 2015). 
There are 3 166 838 firm-year observations in the database for the period from 2002 to 2015. We 
exclude very small firms by requiring a minimum of NOK 1 million in yearly sales (adjusted by 
consumer price index) for a firm to be included in our sample. After eliminating firms with less 
than 1 million in sales, public firms, unlimited liability companies, financial firms, firms that are 
not defined as private family firms and firms with missing values, our final sample consists of 446 
514 firm-year observations. Details of the sample selection process is presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                          
19 They may also prepare the financial report according to IFRS (cf. Norwegian Accounting Act paragraph 3-9), but 
very few do so. 
20 The Norwegian accounting regulation required all limited liability companies to issue audited financial statements 
up to the year 2011. Effective from May 1, 2011, the smallest limited liability companies were allowed to deselect 
their auditor (cf. Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act paragraph 7-6).These firm-years are not included in 
our sample as they have missing observations for the variable Big4 from 2011 to 2015. However, to make sure this 
does not affect our results, we rerun the regression from the period 2002–2010 only. Untabulated results show that 
our results are qualitatively similar. 
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3.2. Methodology and Variable Measurement 
We specify the following regression equation as our main model: 
(1) 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂100𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑁𝑜_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variable, EarningsQuality, is measured using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
(DD model), as modified by McNichols (2002) and as applied by Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper (2005): 
(2)𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =∝0+∝1 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 +∝2 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +∝3 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 +∝4 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +∝5 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is working capital accruals, measured as change in current assets – change in 
cash – change in short-term debt + change in interest-bearing short-term debt + change in proposed 
dividends, scaled by lagged total assets. CFO is cash flows from operations, measured as net 
income before extraordinary items – total accruals, scaled by lagged total assets.21 Total accruals 
is measured as working capital accruals + depreciation expenses + impairment losses.22 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is 
annual change in revenues, scaled by lagged total assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant and equipment, 
scaled by lagged total assets. Consistent with prior literature, we winsorize the variables in this 
model at the 1st and 99th percentiles (e.g.,  Francis et al., 2005). This model is estimated for each 
industry-year with a minimum of 20 observations, and the residuals measure the discretionary 
working capital accruals.23 We follow the literature (e.g.,  Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013) and 
                                                          
21 A substantial amount of firms in our sample are not required to prepare cash flow statements. Hence, we use the 
balance sheet approach for calculating total accruals.  
22 Depreciation expenses and impairment losses are reflected in the database as a negative amount. 
23 These regressions are run in a sample of firms with similar economic fundamentals. That is, before we exclude 
non-family firms and firms with missing observations. 
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multiply the absolute value of discretionary accruals by -1 to proxy for earnings quality. Hence, 
higher value of EarningsQuality indicates higher earnings quality.  
The test variable FO100 reflects whether the family firms are fully owned by the family or 
not. Specifically, FO100 takes the value 1 if family ownership is 100% and 0 if not. The coefficient 
of this variable, β1, is expected to be positive (H1). The ownership of the second largest shareholder 
(2nd_Largest_Owner) is a continuous variable that measures the proportion of shares owned by the 
second largest owner. The coefficient of 2nd_Largest_Owner, β2, is expected to be positive (H2). 
The number of family owners (No_FamilyOwners) is the natural logarithm of the number of 
owners from the controlling family. This variable tests H3 and we expect the coefficient β3 to be 
negative.  
We include control variables based on prior research. LOSS is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the firm has negative earnings and 0 if not, which accounts for the asymmetric nature of gains 
and loss recognition incorporated in the accounting system (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006). SIZE is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Yang (2010) documents that SIZE is correlated 
with discretionary accruals in family firms. Big4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial 
report is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 if not. Prior research documents that the use 
of a Big 4 audit firm is associated with the level of discretionary accruals (e.g. Becker, Defond, 
Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998). Previous research on family firms suggests an association 
between having a family CEO and earnings quality (Kvaal et al., 2012; Stockmans et al., 2010; 
Yang, 2010). For example, Yang (2010) finds that non-family CEOs have a greater tendency to 
manage earnings than family CEOs in family firms. We include an indicator variable, FamilyCEO, 
which equals 1 if the CEO is from the largest family and 0 if not. FamilyChair is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the chair of the board belongs to the controlling family and 0 if not. 
Evidence suggests that family influence on the board of directors is associated with earnings quality 
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(Kvaal et al., 2012; Prencipe et al., 2011; Stockmans et al., 2013). DebtRatio is measured as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets, and is included in the model in order to control for threats to family 
control posited by debtholders (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014), and an increased demand for accounting 
information from debtholders (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2016).  
Kvaal et al. (2012) document that growth in sales is correlated with discretionary accruals 
in private family firms. Thus, we include sales growth, GROWTH, which is measured as changes 
in sales from year t–1 to year t. Moreover, Stockmans et al. (2010) document a generational effect 
in private family firms. ROA is included as a control because previous studies document an 
association between performance and the level of discretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1995; Kasznik, 1999; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; McNichols, 2000). ROA is 
measured as net income in year t divided by the average book value of total assets in year t and 
t−1. We include FirmAge, measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm’s 
foundation date, to proxy for generational effects (Kvaal et al., 2012). Variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix. The variables ROA, SIZE, DebtRatio and GROWTH are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. We also control for year and industry fixed effects. To adjust for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity, the standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White 
Sandwich Estimator, clustered at the firm level (Petersen, 2009).  
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Descriptive statistics, presented in Table 2, panel A and B, show that family ownership in our 
sample is high. A total of 299 886 firm-year observations are from fully owned family firms, while 
146 628 firm-year observations belong to partly owned family firms. The mean value of family 
ownership in partly owned family firms in our sample is 74%.  
 [Insert table 2 about here] 
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Contrary to our expectations, the mean value of EarningsQuality is slightly lower in the group of 
fully owned family firms (mean value: -0.09) than in the group of partly owned family firms (mean 
value: -0.08). It is important to note, however, that these statistics do not account for any 
confounding effects, and the remaining descriptive statistics demonstrate that the two groups are 
different in many respects. Compared to partly owned family firms, the mean value of 
2nd_Largest_Owner is smaller for fully owned family firms (13% for fully owned vs. 25% for 
partly owned). The average number of family owners is 1.56 in fully owned and 1.94 in partly 
owned family firms. There are no differences in the mean value of LOSS, though there are large 
differences in size. The mean value of total assets is 9.70 million NOK for fully owned family 
firms and 17.61 million NOK for partly owned family firms.24 A total of 19% of fully owned family 
firms are audited by a Big4 auditor and the corresponding number for partly owned family firms is 
24%.  Not surprisingly, fully owned family firms are more likely to have a FamilyCEO (85% vs. 
67%) and FamilyChair (92% vs. 73%) than partly owned family firms. Differences in the mean 
value of other economic variables such as DebtRatio (73% vs. 74%) and GROWTH (7% vs. 8%) 
are smaller, and the mean value of ROA is 8% for both groups. Fully owned family firms are on 
average younger (14.57 years) than partly owned family firms (16.28 years). All these differences 
between fully owned family firms and partly owned family firms demonstrates the importance of 
controlling for these variables when assessing differences in earnings quality between the two 
groups. 
Panel C of Table 2 reports correlation coefficients among the test and control variables. 
Looking at the test variables, only the coefficient of 2nd_Largest_Owner has the expected sign 
(positive). The correlation between FO100 and EarningsQuality is negative, and the correlation 
                                                          
24 The average exchange rate between USD and NOK is 1 USD=6.44 NOK, during the sample period 2002 to 2015. 
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between No_FamilyOwners and EarningsQuality is positive, contrary to our expectations. 
However, a correlation matrix does not control for any confounding effects that may interfere with 
these results. The highest correlation in magnitude is -0.65 between ROA and LOSS. The rest of 
the correlations are reasonably low.  
4. Results 
4.1 Main Results 
Our main analysis examines the association between earnings quality and the ownership of the 
controlling family (i.e., fully owned by the family vs. partly owned by the family), the ownership 
of the second largest shareholder and the number of family owners. We regress earnings quality on 
test and control variables using the regression equation (1) specified in Section 3.2. Table 3 reports 
the results.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
The coefficient of FO100 (β1=0.002, t-value=3.68) is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. This suggests that family firms fully owned by the controlling family have higher earnings 
quality than family firms that are partly owned by the controlling family, providing support for H1. 
This is consistent with the notion that earnings management incentives in private family firms are 
stronger when the firm is only partly owned by the controlling family. Threats to family control 
and influence are likely to be stronger when the firm is not fully owned by the family, and family 
owners are likely to be reluctant to relinquishing any control over the firm as this may lead to a 
socioemotional wealth loss for them (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Stockmans et al., 2010).  
The coefficient of 2nd_Largest_Owner is positive and significant (β2=0.015, t-value=11.27), 
which suggests that earnings quality in private family firms increases as the ownership of the 
second largest shareholder increases. This is consistent with the argument that the second largest 
shareholder can monitor the largest shareholder, and the incentive and ability to do so increases 
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with her ownership stake (Hope, 2013). It also supplements previous findings in the literature that 
the ownership of the second largest shareholder is positively associated with firm performance in 
private family firms (Che & Langli, 2015), and that the contest to the control is negatively 
associated with earnings management in public family firms (Jara Bertin & López Iturriaga, 2014). 
This result supports H2.25  
No_FamilyOwners is negative and significant (β3=-0.002, t-value=-4.59), suggesting that 
earnings quality decreases with the number of family owners, and supports H3. A higher number 
of family owners can increase agency conflicts among family owners, and thus incentives to 
manage earnings. 
Most of the control variables have significant coefficients. The coefficient of LOSS is 
negative and significant, suggesting that firm-year observations with negative net income are 
subject to lower earnings quality than those with positive net income. SIZE is positively associated 
with earnings quality, indicating that earnings quality increases with firm size. Both having a family 
member as the CEO (FamilyCEO) and having a family member as chair of the board (FamilyChair) 
are positively associated with earnings quality. DebtRatio, GROWTH and ROA are all negatively 
associated with earnings quality. The positive coefficient of FirmAge suggests that earnings quality 
increases over time, consistent with Stockmans et al. (2010). 
                                                          
25 We do not know whether the second largest owner is a family member or not, because our data do not provide the 
identity of the second largest owner. However, we identify non-family second largest owners using a subsample of 
firms with multiple owners but only one family owner, and family second largest owner using a subsample of firms 
with multiple owners and 100% family ownership. Untabulated results show that the coefficient of 
2nd_Largest_Owner is positive in both samples, and significant at the 10% level in the subsample of firms where the 
second largest owner is not a family member as well as significant at the 1% level in the subsample of firms where 
the second largest owner is a family member. 
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4.2 Alternative Measurement of Earnings Quality 
We test whether our results hold using an alternative measure of earnings quality.26 Panel A in 
Table 4 reports the results when we compute earnings quality based on the performance adjusted 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; Kothari et al., 2005):27 
(3) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =∝0+∝1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖.𝑡−1
) +∝2 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +∝3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +∝4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 indicates total accruals, measured as working capital accruals + depreciation 
expenses + impairment losses, scaled by lagged total assets.28,29 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual change in 
revenues less annual change in receivables, scaled by lagged total assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant 
and equipment for firm i in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is net income for firm 
i in year t, scaled by average total assets. All variables in the performance adjusted Jones model 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This model is estimated for each industry-year with a 
minimum of 20 observations, and the absolute value of the firm-specific residuals, multiplied by -
1, are used as our proxy for earnings quality (Hope et al., 2013).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The coefficients of FO100 and 2nd_Largest_Owner are both positive and significant, consistent 
with the main results, and provide support for H1 and H2. In contrast to the results in Table 3, the 
                                                          
26 We choose the DD model in the main test rather than the Jones model because of the strong theoretical 
underpinning between cash flows from operations and working capital accruals in the DD model (i.e., the mapping 
of accruals into cash flows), which are lacking in the Jones model. The Jones model has been heavily criticized for 
this lack of theoretical underpinning and accused of being arbitrary in separating between normal and abnormal 
accruals (e.g.,  McNichols, 2002).   
27 We run these regressions in a sample of firms with similar economic fundamentals (i.e. before we exclude non-
family firms and firms with missing observations).  
28 Depreciation expenses and impairment losses are reflected as a negative amount in the database. 
29 We calculate total accruals using the balance sheet approach as a substantial amount of firms in our sample are not 
required to prepare cash flow statements.    
88 
 
coefficient of No_FamilyOwners is not significant, and we do not get support for H3 when earnings 
quality is measured using the performance adjusted modified Jones model. This suggests that the 
support for H3 in the main analysis (Table 3) should be interpreted with caution.  
4.3 Alternative Definition of Family Firms 
There is no single definition of family firms agreed upon in the literature (Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, & 
Dekker, 2014). Several previous accounting studies rely on a definition based on either the 
percentage of family ownership, or a family member in top management or on the board of directors 
(Ali et al., 2007; Cascino et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2008; Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 
2009; Jiraporn & DaDalt, 2009; Tong, 2007; Wang, 2006). We test whether our results hold when 
using an alternative definition of family firms (the original definition of family firms was family 
ownership above 50%). For this purpose, we require a firm to have more than 50% family 
ownership, and the CEO and at least one board member to belong to the controlling family, to be 
classified as a family firm. By restricting our sample to these criteria, we get 347 092 firm year 
observations. Panel B in Table 4 shows that the results from this regression are consistent with the 
main results in Table 3, indicating that our findings are robust to alternative definition of private 
family firms.  
4.4. Requiring More Than One Family Owner 
According to our original definition of family firms (i.e., family ownership is above 50%), a firm 
that is owned by one single person will be classified as a family firm. In this robustness test, we 
limit our definition of family firms to include only firms with more than 50% family ownership 
and two or more family owners. There is likely to be more potential for family dynamics, 
relationships and possibly intra-familial conflicts in the firm if there are several family owners 
present. Table 4, panel C reports the results from this regression. The coefficient of FO100 and 
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2nd_Largest_Owner are both positive and significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The 
coefficient of No_FamilyOwners is negative, as in the main test, but not significant at conventional 
levels with a p-value of 0.129.30 
4.5 Analyses for Firms of Different Size 
We test whether our results are robust to firm size, e.g., both small and large firms, or whether the 
results are driven by one specific size category. We split the sample into two groups, based on the 
median value of average total sales.31 Table 5 reports the regression results for large and small 
firms based on equation (1). FO100 is positive and significant at the 5% level in both samples, 
while 2nd_Largest_Owner is positive and significant at the 1% level in both samples. These results 
are qualitatively similar to those for the whole sample, suggesting that the results for both H1 and 
H2 seem to be quite robust across different size categories. Comparing the two samples in Table 5 
we observe that the coefficient of 2nd_Largest_Owner is more positive and significant for small 
firms than for large firms, which may suggest that this association is stronger for small firms.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The coefficient of No_FamilyOwners is negative and significant at the 5% level in the 
subsample of small firms, similar to our main results in Table 3. We do not find a significant 
association with No_FamilyOwners in the subsample of large firms, suggesting that this observed 
association may be limited to smaller firms only, and is not very robust across size categories.  
4.6. Summary of Main Findings and Robustness Tests  
To summarize, the analyses show that our main findings for FO100 and 2nd_Largest_Owner are 
robust to different definitions of family firms, alternative measures of earnings quality, and firms 
                                                          
30 In an untabulated analysis we also tested our results in a subsample of firms with more than one owner (family or 
not), and the main results hold. 
31 The median value of average total sales is 6.625 million NOK. 
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of different size. Thus, there seems to be quite robust support for H1 and H2. Regarding H3 and 
the corresponding variable No_FamilyOwners, we find that our main results are robust to an 
alternative definition of family firms. However, we do not find any significant associations using 
the performance adjusted modified Jones model as an alternative earnings management measure,  
restricting our sample to more than one family owner, or in the subsample of larger firms.32  
4.7. Additional Analyses 
4.7.1. Moderating Effects of Firm Performance 
In this section, we attempt to test more of the theory underlying H1. In Section 2.3.1. we argue that 
threats to family control and influence, or unpleasant questions and inquiries regarding family 
control, may create earnings management incentives when the firm is not fully owned by the 
family. This is likely to be more prominent when the firm is performing poorly, as poor 
performance may trigger stakeholders to question the family’s ultimate control over the firm. This 
suggests that family firms that are partly owned by the controlling family are more likely to manage 
earnings upwards in order to mask true performance when performance is poor, compared to family 
firms fully owned by the family. We test this by interacting the variable ROAlow with FO100, 
where ROAlow is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s ROA is below the 20th percentile of 
yearly ROA and 0 if not.33 
                                                          
32 We focus on associations rather than causality in this study. While endogeneity issues can be challenging for many 
studies, we argue that this is not a big concern for our paper. For example, we do not think a firm’s earnings quality 
can directly affect the ownership structure of the family firm. In private firms, the absence of a liquid market to buy 
and sell shares makes it hard for owners to adjust the ownership structure to accommodate changed conditions or 
unanticipated events (Nagar, Petroni, & Wolfenzon, 2011). Ownership structure is therefore to a large extent 
exogenously determined in private firms (Che & Langli, 2015; Nagar et al., 2011). 
33 We acknowledge ROA is a noisy measure of firm performance. For instance, if firms with poor performance 
manage earnings upwards, this could increase ROA so much that the firm is classified in the zero-group (i.e., ROA 
above th 20th percentile). However, this would be a bias against finding the predicted results. Despite its limitations, 
ROA has been used as a measure of performance in previous studies on earnings quality (e.g. Balsam, Haw, & Lilien, 
1995; DeFond & Park, 1997). 
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We then use signed discretionary accruals (DiscretionaryAccruals) to test the interaction 
between FO100 and poor performance for a sample of firms with positive discretionary accruals 
only.34 The reason for using signed discretionary accruals is that, unlike in our main analyses, we 
now have clear predictions on whether firms will manage earnings upwards or downwards. That 
is, we predict that firms not fully owned by the controlling family and exhibiting poor performance, 
will manage earnings upwards to a greater extent to mask true performance. This is consistent with 
strong earnings management incentives in family firms where the controlling family perceives their 
future influence and control to be threatened (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Stockmans et al., 2010). 
Upward earnings management is associated with positive discretionary accruals. Hence, we use 
positive discretionary accruals when adding the interaction term FO100*ROAlow to the main 
regression, to capture the impact of poor performance on upward earnings management. This 
regression equation is presented below. 
(4) 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 +𝑖,𝑡= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂100𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂100𝑖,𝑡 ∗
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽42𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽14𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6, panel A, reports the results from this regression. Note that because higher positive 
discretionary accruals measures lower earnings quality, positive coefficients indicate negative 
impact on earnings quality.  
                                                          
34 EarningsQuality=the absolute value of the firm-specific residuals from the DD model, multiplied by -1; 
DiscretionaryAccruals=the value of the firm-specific residuals from the DD model. 
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The coefficient of ROAlow, β2, is positive and significant, while the coefficient of the 
interaction term ROAlow*FO100, β3, is negative and significant. Taken together, this suggests that 
firms that are partly owned by the family (FO100=0) have a greater tendency to book more positive 
discretionary accruals when performing poorly, compared to family firms that are fully owned by 
the family and performing poorly (FO100=1, β2+ β3< β2). This strengthens our results that earnings 
quality is negatively affected by the fear of losing control and influence in family firms that are not 
fully owned by the family. 
4.7.2. Variations in Family Ownership 
In our main analysis, we compare firms that are fully owned by the family with firms that are partly 
owned by the controlling family (FO100). For firms that are partly owned by the controlling family, 
the ownership of the controlling family spans from more than 50% to less than 100%. This suggests 
that family ownership has a wide range in partly owned family firms, and earnings management 
incentives and opportunities to manage earnings are not likely to be constant across the broad 
group. In this section, we test for variations in earnings quality across firms that are not fully owned 
by the family. 
 In Section 2.3.1 we discuss that SEW theory predicts that family owners may have 
incentives to manage earnings to avoid any threats to family control and influence. This threat is 
likely to be greater when family ownership is relatively low, e.g., 51%, as minority (non-family) 
owners have more power and incentives to monitor the family. This suggests that earnings 
management incentives related to fear of losing family control and influence, or unpleasant 
questions and inquiries regarding family control, are likely to decrease with family ownership. At 
the same time, agency conflicts between majority (family) owners and minority (non-family) 
owners are likely to increase with family ownership. Family owners’ opportunity to benefit 
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themselves at the expense of non-family owners and manage earnings to conceal such activities 
are likely to increase with family ownership. Thus, earnings management incentives to retain 
control decreases with family ownership, while opportunities to extract private benefits and 
manage earnings increases with family ownership. Taken together, these opposite effects might 
suggest that the association between family ownership and earnings quality might be non-linear.  
 As we expect a non-linear relationship between family ownership and earnings quality, we 
split the family ownership into several intervals inspired by the piecewise linear specification 
(Morck et al., 1988). While it is difficult to determine the exact kink points, and there may be 
various ways to do so, we use the cutting points based on the Norwegian Limited Liability 
Companies Act. Che and Langli (2015) argue that 50%, 2/3, and 90% are reasonable cutting points 
because Norwegian corporate law grants excessive rights to shareholders to take certain actions at 
these levels of ownership. The Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act states that when 
shareholders have more than 50% of the voting rights at the general meeting, these shareholders 
have simple majority and can for instance appoint or dismiss the board members (cf. paragraph 5-
17).35 In order to make amendments to the company’s statues, shareholders representing 2/3 of 
both the votes and the shares at the general meeting must vote in favor of the amendment (cf. 
paragraph 5-18).  The same is the case when approving a merger or demerger (cf. paragraphs 3-13 
and 14-6). In order to modify the shareholder’s rights to dividends, shareholders at the general 
meeting holding more than 90% of the shares must vote in favor of the amendment (cf. paragraph 
5-19). Moreover, shareholders who have more than 90% of the votes and 90% of the shares at the 
general meeting can force the minority shareholders to sell their remaining shares to the majority 
                                                          
35 Normally, one share gives the right to cast one vote at the general meeting, which means that an ownership stake 
above 50% is needed to have simple majority.  
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shareholders. Equally important, when the minority non-family owners together own less than 10% 
of the shares, the Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act grants them less minority 
protection.36  Based on the above regulation, we use 50%, 2/3, 90%, and 100% as thresholds of 
family ownership in this test.  
 These cutting points are used to investigate earnings quality at various levels of family 
ownership. More specifically, we define FO50to67 as 1 if family ownership is larger than 50% and 
less than 2/3, and 0 if not. FO67to90 equals 1 if family ownership is equal to or larger than 2/3 and 
less than 90% and 0 if not. FO90to99 equals 1 if family ownership is equal to or larger than 90% 
and less than 100% and 0 if not. FO100 is 1 if the family firm is fully owned by the controlling 
family and 0 if not.  
We have already demonstrated in our main analysis that earnings quality is highest when 
the firm is fully owned by the family. Hence, we take the scenario of 100% family ownership 
(FO100) as a benchmark when examining earnings quality related to different levels of family 
ownership, indicating that FO100 is not included in the regression. We specify the following 
regression equation as our additional model:  
(5) 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑂50𝑡𝑜67𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑂67𝑡𝑜90𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂90𝑡𝑜99𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽42𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑜_𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴 +
𝛽14𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Table 6, panel B, reports the results from this regression. The coefficient of FO50to67 is negative 
                                                          
36 For instance, minority owners with less than 10% shares can no longer demand an extraordinary general meeting 
(cf. paragraph 5-6), a court-ordered investigation (cf. paragraph 5-25), a court-ordered additional auditor (cf. 




and significant at the 5% level. This suggests that firms with family ownership between 50% and 
2/3 have lower earnings quality than firms with 100% family ownership. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of FO90to99 is also negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that firms 
with family ownership above 90% but less than 100% (FO90to99) have lower earnings quality 
than firms with 100% family ownership. This may indicate the existence of an entrenchment effect 
when family ownership is relatively high. When family ownership exceeds 90%, the Norwegian 
Limited Liability Companies Act grants less protection to minority (non-family) owners. Thus, the 
controlling family may have significant opportunities to extract private benefits and manage 
earnings to conceal improper activities from other stakeholders (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006).  
The coefficient of FO67to90 is positive, but insignificant. Hence, we do not find significant 
differences in earnings quality of the group of firms with family ownership between 2/3 and 90% 
(FO67to90), compared to firms with 100% family ownership (FO100). This may indicate that the 
intermediary group (FO67to90) has relatively less incentives to manage earnings compared to the 
group with relatively low family ownership (FO50to67), and less opportunity to extract private 
benefits compared to the group with high family ownership (FO90to99). The insignificant 
coefficient of FO67to90 shows that, for private family firms that have less than 100% family 
ownership, earnings quality is higher for firms with intermediary levels of family ownership than 
for firms with lower or higher family ownership.  
Taken together, our results suggest a non-linear relationship between family ownership and 
earnings quality, where firms with relatively low family ownership (FO50to67) and firms with 
relatively high family ownership (FO90to99) have lower earnings quality than firms with family 




This study focuses on private family firms and examines how the heterogeneity in ownership 
structure is associated with earnings quality using a unique dataset that contains the whole 
population of private limited liability firms in Norway. More specifically, we investigate the 
ownership of the controlling family and the second largest owner, respectively, and the number of 
family owners. As ownership structure is one important mechanism for corporate governance and 
could affect incentives and power distribution, the investigation on how ownership structure affects 
accounting earnings would provide new evidence of accounting practices in private family firms.  
 We employ both agency theory and SEW theory to motivate our hypotheses. The results 
show that earnings quality is higher for fully owned family firms than for partly owned family 
firms. Additional analysis indicates that earnings management incentives in partly owned family 
firms may be related to fear of losing control and influence over the firm, or unpleasant questions 
regarding family control, when performance is poor. We also find some evidence suggesting that 
the relationship between family ownership and earnings quality is non-linear, where firms with 
100% and intermediate (between 2/3 and 90%) family ownership have relatively higher earnings 
quality than those with relatively low or high family ownership. 
 Analyses of the ownership of the second largest owner document that earnings quality 
increases with the magnitude of the second largest owner’s shareholdings. Finally, we find a 
negative association between the number of family owners and earnings quality, though this finding 
seems to be less robust and should be interpreted with caution. 
Our results may be of use to accounting users entering into transactions with private family 
firms. This study suggests that accounting users of private family firms may use ownership 
structure as an indicator of the risk of earnings management and consequently low earnings quality. 
It may also be of use for regulators and standard setters.  
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 Future research should further explore the relationship between governance mechanisms 
and earnings quality in private family firms. Given our findings that the earnings quality is 
significantly lower in partly owned family firms, it might be interesting to explore whether 
governance structures such as for instance independent board members or a high quality auditor 
matters more regarding improving earnings quality in partly owned family firms compared to fully 
owned family firms. Another potential avenue is to further explore whether the association between 
earnings quality and the second largest shareholders depends on whether the second largest owner 
is a family member or not. We were not able to identify family relationships with the second largest 





Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
EarningsQuality Earnings quality, measured as the absolute values of the residuals from the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, modified by McNichols (2002), for firm i 
in year t, multiplied by -1. More details are provided in Section 3.2. 
EarningsQualityJones Earnings quality, measured as the absolute values of the residuals from the 
performance adjusted modified Jones model for firm i in year t, multiplied by -
1. More details are provided in Section 4.2.  
DiscretionaryAccruals+ Positive discretionary accruals, measured as the value of the residuals from the 
Dechow  and Dichev (2002) model, modified by McNichols (2002), for firm i 
in year t. 
Family_Ownership The aggregated fraction of shares held by the largest owning family, calculated 
using ultimate ownership. 
FO50to67 Dummy variable that equals 1 if family ownership is above 50% and less than 
2/3, and 0 if not. 
FO67to90 Dummy variable that equals 1 if family ownership is at least 2/3 and no more 
than 90% and 0 if not. 
FO90to99 Dummy variable that equals 1 if family ownership more than 90% and less than 
100% and 0 if not. 
FO100 Dummy variable that equals 1 if family ownership is 100% and 0 if not. 
2nd_Largest_Owner Fraction of shares owned by the second largest shareholder.   
No_FamilyOwners Natural logarithm of the number of owners from the largest owning family 
(ultimate ownership). 
ROAlow Dummy variable that equals 1 if ROA is below or equal to the 20th percentile, 0 
if not.  
LOSS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has negative earnings, 0 if not. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Big4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statements are audited by one of 
the Big 4 audit firms, 0 if not. 
DebtRatio The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
FamilyCEO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is from the largest owning family, 0 
if not. 
FamilyChair A dummy variable that equals 1 if the chair of the board belongs to the 
controlling family, 0 if not. 
GROWTH Change in sales in year t ( . 
ROA Net income in year t divided by the average book value of total assets in year t 
and t−1. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Firm-years 
Observations in the CCGR database for the years 2002–2015 3 166 838 
Exclusion criteria  
Firms with sales less than 1 million NOK in at least one year 2 118 684 
Public firms and unlimited liability firms  130 598 
Financial firms 5 543 
Non-family firms 243 607 
Firms with missing information on family relationships 143 936 
Firms with missing information on other variables 77 956 





Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Family Firms Fully Owned by the Family 
         
 N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
EarningsQuality 299 886 -0.09 0.10 -0.27 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 
Family_Ownership 299 886 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2nd_Largest_Owner 299 886 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.50 
No. of family owners 299 886 1.56 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 
LOSS 299 886 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Total Assets (MNOK) 299 886 9.70 22.63 0.57 1.52 3.35 8.10 36.03 
Big4 299 886 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FamilyCEO 299 886 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FamilyChair 299 886 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DebtRatio 299 886 0.73 0.30 0.25 0.55 0.75 0.89 1.17 
GROWTH 299 886 0.07 0.26 -0.28 -0.06 0.03 0.14 0.52 
ROA 299 886 0.08 0.16 -0.17 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.37 
Firm age (years) 299 886 14.57 11.95 3.00 6.00 12.00 19.00 35.00 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Family Firms Partly Owned by the Family 
         
 N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
EarningsQuality 146 628 -0.08 0.10 -0.26 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 
Family_Ownership 146 628 0.74 0.15 0.51 0.60 0.70 0.88 0.99 
2nd_Largest_Owner 146 628 0.25 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.25 0.34 0.48 
No. of family owners 146 628 1.94 1.28 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
LOSS 146 628 0.22 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Total Assets (MNOK) 146 628 17.61 35.20 0.77 2.27 5.50 15.07 80.71 
Big4 146 628 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
FamilyCEO 146 628 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
FamilyChair 146 628 0.73 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DebtRatio 146 628 0.74 0.29 0.29 0.58 0.75 0.88 1.13 
GROWTH 146 628 0.08 0.28 -0.29 -0.05 0.04 0.16 0.56 
ROA 146 628 0.08 0.16 -0.17 0.01 0.07 0.16 0.35 
Firm age (years) 146 628 16.28 13.74 3.00 7.00 13.00 21.00 40.00 
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Panel C: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
               
               
  v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 
EarningsQuality            v1 1.00             
FO100                           v2 -0.02*** 1.00            
2nd_Largest_Owner     v3 0.04*** -0.31*** 1.00           
No_FamilyOwners       v4 0.07*** -0.17*** 0.55*** 1.00          
LOSS                            v5 -0.17*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 1.00         
SIZE                           v6 0.23*** -0.18*** 0.07*** 0.24*** -0.14*** 1.00        
Big4                           v7 0.04*** -0.06*** 0.01*** 0.08*** -0.00 0.20*** 1.00       
FamilyCEO              v8 -0.01*** 0.20*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.18*** -0.09*** 1.00      
FamilyChair           v9 -0.00*** 0.24*** -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.17*** -0.07*** 0.15*** 1.00     
DebtRatio                v10 -0.26*** -0.01*** 0.00*** -0.05*** 0.30*** -0.20*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02*** 1.00    
GROWTH               v11 -0.12*** -0.02*** 0.00** -0.01*** -0.18*** 0.08*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 1.00   
ROA                       v12 -0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.65*** 0.03*** -0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.31*** 0.25*** 1.00  
FirmAge                    v13 0.13*** -0.06*** 0.04*** 0.14*** -0.04*** 0.26*** 0.04*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.02*** 1.00 
Panel A and panel B present descriptive statistics: mean (Mean), standard deviation (SD), the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles for firms fully owned by the family and for firms partly owned by the family, 








 Coefficients t-stat. 
FO100 0.002*** (3.68) 
2nd_Largest_Owner 0.015*** (11.27) 
No_FamilyOwners -0.002*** (-4.59) 
   
LOSS -0.055*** (-91.33) 
SIZE 0.013*** (62.09) 
Big4 -0.000 (-0.38) 
FamilyCEO 0.005*** (9.41) 
FamilyChair 0.005*** (9.35) 
DebtRatio -0.079*** (-65.30) 
GROWTH -0.043*** (-50.14) 
ROA -0.125*** (-47.26) 
FirmAge 0.003*** (11.75) 
Year fixed effects Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  
Constant -0.208*** (-55.93) 
N 446 514  
Adjusted R2 0.162  
This table presents the results of regressing EarningsQuality on the 
test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS). The 
variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry 
are included. The first column reports the coefficients and the second 
column reports the t-statistics adjusted for within-cluster correlation 
using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates 
significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent levels using two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4. Regression Results Using an Alternative Earnings Quality Measure, Alternative Definition of Family Firms, 
and a Subsample of Firms Requiring More than One Family Owner 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Alternative Earnings 
Quality Measure 
Alternative Definition of 
Family Firms 
More than One Family 
Owner 
 EarningsQualityJones EarningsQuality EarningsQuality 
 Coefficients t-stat. Coefficients t-stat. Coefficients t-stat. 
FO100 0.002*** (2.96) 0.002*** (3.87) 0.001** (2.09) 
2nd_Largest_Owner 0.017*** (8.66) 0.015*** (10.20) 0.011*** (4.57) 
No_FamilyOwners -0.001 (-0.98) -0.003*** (-4.67) -0.001 (-1.52) 
       
LOSS -0.031*** (-39.12) -0.056*** (-83.73) -0.052*** (-57.97) 
SIZE 0.009*** (29.86) 0.014*** (55.63) 0.011*** (38.03) 
Big4 -0.003*** (-4.25) 0.000 (0.29) -0.002*** (-2.86) 
FamilyCEO 0.012*** (15.48)   0.004*** (6.11) 
FamilyChair 0.005*** (5.74) 0.003*** (4.44) 0.003*** (4.02) 
DebtRatio -0.083*** (-63.70) -0.079*** (-59.02) -0.070*** (-38.22) 
GROWTH -0.066*** (-53.55) -0.042*** (-44.19) -0.038*** (-29.00) 
ROA -0.157*** (-56.64) -0.135*** (-45.65) -0.124*** (-28.92) 
FirmAge 0.008*** (20.77) 0.003*** (10.15) 0.002*** (4.65) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.221*** (-39.34) -0.211*** (-49.37) -0.180*** (-34.05) 
N 446 514  347 092  182 410  
Adjusted R2 0.089  0.164  0.153  
This table presents the results of regressing EarningsQuality on the test and control variables using alternative EarningsQuality measure 
(panel A), alternative definition of family firms (panel B) and in a subsample of firms with more than one family owner (panel C), using 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. The variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A reports the coefficients and t-statistics when the 
dependent variable (earnings quality) is measured by EarningsQualityJones. Panel B reports the coefficients and t-statistics using an 
alternative definition of family firms. Panel C reports the coefficients and t-statistics for a subsample of firms with two or more family 
owners. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The t-values are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-




Table 5. Regression Results for Subsamples of Firms Based on Size 
 
 Large Firms Small Firms 
 EarningsQuality EarningsQuality 
 Coefficients t-stat. Coefficients t-stat. 
FO100 0.001** (2.16) 0.002** (2.20) 
2nd_Largest_Owner 0.009*** (5.62) 0.018*** (8.49) 
No_FamilyOwners -0.001 (-1.37) -0.002** (-2.42) 
     
LOSS -0.052*** (-65.67) -0.057*** (-64.97) 
SIZE 0.008*** (30.76) 0.019*** (41.11) 
Big4 0.001 (1.27) -0.001 (-1.44) 
FamilyCEO 0.005*** (8.57) 0.003*** (3.75) 
FamilyChair 0.003*** (4.14) 0.008*** (7.11) 
DebtRatio -0.063*** (-38.00) -0.085*** (-53.76) 
GROWTH -0.042*** (-38.21) -0.045*** (-33.68) 
ROA -0.110*** (-29.41) -0.136*** (-37.23) 
FirmAge 0.004*** (12.73) 0.003*** (6.47) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.149*** (-29.90) -0.291*** (-38.46) 
N 223 257  223 257  
Adjusted R2 0.134  0.175  
This table presents the results of regressing EarningsQuality on the test and control 
variables in subsamples based on size (measured by sales) using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model. The variables are defined in Appendix. The first two columns 
report the coefficients and t-statistics for the subsample of firms with total average sales 
above or equal to the median value. The last two columns report the coefficients and t-
statistics for the subsample of firms with total average sales below the median value. 
All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The t-values are adjusted for 
within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** 





Table 6. Regression Results when Taking into Account Moderating Effects 
of Firm Performance and for Several Family Ownership Categories 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Moderating Effects of 
Firm Performance 
Variations in Family 
Ownership 
 DiscretionaryAccruals+ EarningsQuality 
 Coefficients t-stat. Coefficients t-stat. 
FO100 0.001** (2.43)   
ROAlow 0.044*** (25.19)   
FO100*ROAlow -0.012*** (-6.61)   
FO50to67   -0.001** (-2.10) 
FO67to90   -0.001 (-1.03) 
FO90to99   -0.004*** (-5.58) 
2nd_Largest_Owner -0.017*** (-10.76) 0.014*** (10.59) 
No_FamilyOwners 0.003*** (5.42) -0.002*** (-4.04) 
     
LOSS 0.030*** (29.66) -0.055*** (-91.27) 
SIZE -0.007*** (-30.35) 0.013*** (62.16) 
Big4 0.001 (1.28) -0.000 (-0.37) 
FamilyCEO -0.005*** (-7.72) 0.005*** (9.54) 
FamilyChair -0.007*** (-10.48) 0.005*** (9.50) 
DebtRatio 0.043*** (31.76) -0.079*** (-65.31) 
GROWTH 0.007*** (5.47) -0.043*** (-50.15) 
ROA 0.429*** (116.49) -0.125*** (-47.26) 
FirmAge -0.005*** (-15.95) 0.003*** (11.88) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.133*** (29.74) -0.206*** (-56.26) 
N 224 326  446 514  
adj. R2 0.314  0.162  
This table presents the results from additional analyses. Panel A presents the results (coefficients and 
corresponding t-statistics) from regressing positive discretionary accruals (DiscretionaryAccruals+) on 
test and control variables as described in Section 4.7.1 (equation (4)). Panel B presents the results 
(coefficients and corresponding t-statistics) from regressing EarningsQuality on test and control variables 
as described in Section 4.7.2 (equation (5)). The variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control 
for year and industry fixed effects. The t-values are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-
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Abstract 
This study examines the role of family identity and reputational concerns in private family 
firms. Socioemotional wealth theory predicts that family owners’ identification with the firm 
may affect their reporting decisions and earnings management strategies (Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, 
& Imperatore, 2014).  We use whether or not the family name is included in the firm name as 
a proxy for family members’ identification with the family firm and sensitivity to reputational 
concerns. Our results show that accrual-based earnings management is lower for family firms 
with the family name included in the firm name (family named family firms). Moreover, our 
findings also indicate that family named family firms are more likely to select real earnings 
management over accrual-based earnings management, compared to non-family named family 
firms.  
Key words: private family firms, family identity, real earnings management, accrual-based 
earnings management, family name congruence  
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This paper examines whether family members’ identification with the family firm and 
sensitivity to reputational concerns impact their earnings management strategies. Agency 
theory has long been a dominant theory explaining earnings management behavior and 
strategies (e.g. Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). In recent years, however, 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory has emerged as an alternative theory explaining earnings 
management behavior in family firms (e.g. Achleitner, Günther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014; 
Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Paiva, Lourenço, & Branco, 
2016; Pazzaglia, Mengoli, & Sapienza, 2013; Salvato & Moores, 2010; Stockmans, Lybaert, & 
Voordeckers, 2010).  
One of the important predictions of SEW theory is that family owners might be willing 
to make actions that increase their socioemotional wealth at the expense of financial wealth 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Martin, 
Campbell, & Gomez-Mejia, 2016). This paper draws upon the theoretical framework developed 
by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2014) and investigates whether family owners are more inclined to 
make earnings management decisions that favor their socioemotional wealth over their financial 
wealth in a setting of private family firms. Private firms with a controlling family owning more 
than 50% of the shares are classified as private family firms. 
Earnings management can be viewed as a gamble which family owners are willing to 
take if they expect some net gains. When assessing this gamble, family owners do not just 
consider potential financial wealth effects, but also the effects on socioemotional wealth, and 
weigh potential losses against potential gains (Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018; 
Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014; Martin, 2016). Family owners may place different emphasis on 
financial vs. socioemotional output, and on the dimensions of socioemotional wealth (e.g., 
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family control vs. family identity), causing earnings management behavior to vary among 
family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). 
Existing earnings management literature using SEW theory has generally focused on 
different motivations for accrual-based earnings management, not real earnings management. 
Real earnings management has direct cash flow effects, while accrual-based earnings 
management may not. Real earnings management, however, has the advantage of lower 
detection risk (Das, Kyonghee, & Patro, 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Zang, 2012). Family 
members who identify strongly with the firm are likely to be more sensitive to reputational costs 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Such family firms may be more inclined to 
engage in real earnings management than accrual-based earnings management due to lower 
detection risk for real earnings management (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014).  
We argue that family name congruence is an appropriate measure to proxy for family 
firm identification. When the firm’s name includes the family name, family members will 
identify more with the firm and be more motivated to pursue a favorable reputation than when 
the family name is not part of the firm’s name (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). We use this 
proxy and examine whether family named family firms have lower levels of accrual-based 
earnings management, and are more likely to select real earnings management over accrual-
based earnings management, compared to non-family named family firms.  
We use data from private family firms, which is a group of firms largely ignored in the 
family business earnings management literature (Paiva et al., 2016).1 The percentage of shares 
owned by the controlling family is generally higher in private firms compared to public firms, 
indicating that both personal attachment to the firm and discretionary power over the firm are 
higher in private firms (Berrone et al., 2012). This makes private firms a suitable setting to test 
some of the implications of SEW theory (Salvato & Moores, 2010). We use a unique and rich 
                                                          
1 Some notable exceptions are Stockmans et al. (2010) and Stockmans, Lybaert, and Voordeckers (2013), who 
use data from private Flemish firms. 
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dataset from private firms, containing the whole population of private firms in Norway for a 
long time period. Family relationships are determined through blood lines, marriage and 
adoption (going back four generations and extending to third cousins).  
Our results confirm that family firm identification (proxied by family name congruence) 
is associated with earnings management behavior. Specifically, we hypothesize and find that 
family firms with the family name included in the firm name exhibit lower accrual-based 
earnings management compared to family firms where the family name is not part of the firm 
name. Moreover, family-named firms are more likely to have low accrual-based earnings 
management combined with high real earnings management, compared to non-family-named 
firms.  
Our results are robust to alternative measures of abnormal accruals and alternative 
classifications of real vs. accrual-based earnings management. We also employ a propensity 
score matched sample and use an alternative approach to test the trade-off between real and 
accrual-based earnings management in robustness tests, and the results hold. We also find that 
the propensity for family named family firms to select real earnings management over accrual-
based earnings, compared to non-family named family firms, increases as incentives to manage 
earnings (proxied by increasing debt ratio) increase and when detection risk is high (proxied by 
the firm being audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms).  
We make multiple contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the growing 
stream of research testing predictions from SEW theory, by demonstrating that family owners’ 
emphasis on socioemotional wealth goals vs. financial goals vary across family firms, and that 
some family owners are willing to engage in earnings management decisions that may favor 
socioemotional wealth over financial wealth. Second, we add to the earnings management and 
family business literature by demonstrating that family firm identity and reputational concerns 
are associated with both the level of accrual-based earnings management and the choice of real 
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vs. accrual-based earnings management. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
document that earnings management behavior varies with family name congruence. Third, we 
also contribute to the general family business literature by demonstrating that family name 
congruence may be a valid construct and possibly a good proxy for family firm identity and 
reputational concerns, thus adding validity to a construct previously used in other areas in the 
family business literature (e.g. Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; 
Rousseau, Kellermanns, Zellweger, & Beck, 2018). Fourth, we contribute to the literature on 
private family firms by using data on private firms. There is limited research on earnings 
management behavior in private family firms, even though most family firms are private 
(Chrisman, Sharma, & Taggar, 2007; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011; Paiva et al., 
2016).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the literature 
review and hypotheses development, Section 3 describes the data and research design and 
Section 4 presents the main results, robustness tests and additional analyses. Finally, Section 5 
provides a discussion of the research findings and conclusion. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Family Name and Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
A favorable reputation can be a valuable economic resource (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & 
Sever, 2005; Sageder, Mitter, & Feldbauer‐Durstmüller, 2018). Prior literature suggests that a 
good reputation can ensure customer loyalty, provide higher profit margins, attract more 
qualified employees and provide greater access to capital and financial resources (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Sageder et al., 2018; Yang, 2010). Given these benefits of good reputation, firms 
should in general be motivated to pursue a favorable reputation and be sensitive to reputational 
damages. Socioemotional wealth theory predicts that family firms may have even stronger 
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motivations to pursue and preserve a favorable reputation than mere financial gains (e.g. 
Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2016; Sageder et al., 2018).  
According to SEW theory, family owners strive to preserve and enhance their 
socioemotional wealth. This wealth provides non-financial forms of utility such as pleasure 
derived from family control and influence over the business, family identity, dynastic 
succession and emotional ties (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Gómez-Mejía 
et al., 2007; Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014). For family members who identify strongly with the 
firm, it is important to protect and maintain a favorable reputation, as this is an important 
socioemotional wealth goal (Berrone et al., 2010; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2014; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013). When the family members identify 
strongly with the firm, the firm can be seen as an extension of the family itself and the family 
members become especially prone to reputational concerns (Berrone et al., 2012).   
According to SEW theory, sensitivity to reputational costs may prevent family members 
who identify strongly with the firm from engaging in earnings management, especially accrual-
based earnings management (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Pazzaglia et al., 2013). Such family 
members may view earnings management as too costly, since there is a risk that earnings 
management will be detected. Accrual-based earnings management is managing earnings 
through accruals, and if this earnings management behavior is uncovered, it could lead to 
substantial socioemotional wealth loss for them. The reputation of the firm could be hurt, for 
instance through bad press and talk in the community. As these family owners identify so 
strongly with the family firm, the reputational damage would affect them personally and lead 
to a socioemotional wealth loss for them. Family members’ identification with the firm is likely 
to vary across family firms, as some family owners may actively seek a strong identification 
with the firm while others may not (Rousseau et al., 2018; Sundaramurthy & Kreiner, 2008).  
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Measuring family firm identity using archival data is challenging. Pazzaglia et al. (2013) 
find that public family firms acquired through a market transaction exhibit lower earnings 
quality (higher accrual-based earnings management) than public family firms that are founded 
by the family or inherited within the family. They attribute these results to stronger 
identification with the family firm when it is founded or inherited by the family. However, the 
acquisition itself is an event that can also influence earnings quality both prior to and after the 
event. Selling a firm may create incentives to manage earnings in order to increase the purchase 
price, which will result in lower earnings quality both prior to (caused by manipulating accruals) 
and after (caused by reversal of manipulated accruals) the transaction is completed. We propose 
an alternative approach to measure family firm identity to mitigate this concern, namely family 
name congruence. 
 Deephouse and Jaskiewicz (2013) argue that having the family name included in the 
firm name is an indicator of family essence that can explain variations and heterogeneity among 
family firms. Family members are likely to identify more strongly with the firm if the firm 
carries the family name (Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, & Dekker, 2014). Early research in this field 
suggests that an important non-financial objective of family firms is to develop and maintain a 
positive view of the family name in public (de Vries, 1993).   
Family name congruence indicates the family members’ identification with the firm, 
their motivation to pursue a favorable reputation and hence their sensitivity to reputational 
damage. It is likely one of the most effective ways to signal the strong linkage between the 
family and the firm to both family members as well as external stakeholder (Deephouse & 
Jaskiewicz, 2013; Rousseau et al., 2018). Family and firm name congruence render the 
boundaries between family, firm and individual owners less distinctive, and it becomes more 
visible to the public and external stakeholders that the firm is owned by the family (Kashmiri 
& Mahajan, 2010; Rousseau et al., 2018; Zellweger et al., 2013).  
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Prior research suggests that family name congruence may be an appropriate measure of 
family member’s identification with the firm. More specifically, Deephouse and Jaskiewicz 
(2013) find a positive association between family name congruence and corporate reputation, 
and Kashmiri and Mahajan (2014) find that family named firms are more likely to have a history 
of fewer product-related weaknesses compared to firms that are not family named, suggesting 
higher product quality to protect their reputation. Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) find differences 
in strategic behavior between family named and non-family named firms. They also find 
evidence suggesting that family named firms perform better than non-family named firms. 
Finally, Rousseau et al. (2018) find that family name congruence negatively interacts with 
relationship conflicts and affects subjective firm valuations in family firms. Taken together, this 
suggests that family name congruence might be an appropriate measure of family members’ 
identification with the firm. Hence, in this study we adopt family name congruence as our 
measure of family members’ identification with the firm.  
Based on the discussion above, we expect that family firms with the family name included 
in the firm name will be more sensitive to reputational costs and identify more strongly with 
the firms, which in turn will prevent them from engaging in accrual-based earnings management 
due to the fear that this reporting strategy will be detected.  Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Family named family firms have lower levels of accrual-based earnings 
management than non-family named family firms. 
2.2. Family Name, Accrual-Based Earnings Management and Real Earnings 
Management 
Earnings can be managed through real activities manipulation (i.e., real earnings management) 
as well as through reporting decisions (i.e., accrual-based earnings management). Real earnings 
management is real actions taken to improve short-term earnings, but with a negative impact 
on long term cash flows (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Kothari, 
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Mizik, & Roychowdhury, 2016; Roychowdhury, 2006). Since family owners typically have a 
long investment horizon and a substantial amount of their personal wealth tied to the family 
firm, the negative cash flow consequences of real earnings management might affect them 
heavily (Achleitner et al., 2014).   
Examples of real earnings management include accelerating the timing of sales by 
offering generous price discounts or credit terms, decreasing the cost of goods sold by 
increasing production or decreasing discretionary expenses such as R&D expenses, SG&A 
expenses or advertising expenses (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Graham et al., 2005; Kothari et al., 
2016; Roychowdhury, 2006).  Research on real earnings management in family firms is scarce, 
with a notable exception of Achleitner et al. (2014) who document that family firms are less 
likely to engage in real earnings management compared to non-family firms. They attribute this 
finding to the long term orientation of family firms which make them more subject to the 
negative future impact of real earnings management. 
 Real earnings management is likely to vary across family firms just like accrual-based 
earnings management does. However, it is not given that family firm characteristics associated 
with high accrual-based earnings management are associated with high real earnings 
management as well. On the contrary, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2014) argue that certain types of 
family firms may select one of the earnings management strategies over the other. Recent 
refinements to SEW theory have tried to take into account how socioemotional and financial 
wealth may work in tandem, by viewing strategic decisions as a mixed gamble with potential 
for both losses and gains, though with an uncertain outcome (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; 
Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014; Kotlar, Signori, De Massis, & Vismara, 2018; Martin, 2016). Family 
firms do not only consider the potential for financial gains and losses when evaluating a risky 
decision, but also the potential losses and gains of SEW (Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014).  Thus, 
family owners consider the trade-off between socioemotional and financial wealth, and the 
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optimal trade-off may vary among family firms, indicating that some firms may value 
socioemotional wealth higher than financial wealth, or vice versa (Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014). 
This suggests that some family owners may be willing to sacrifice financial wealth in order to 
preserve or enhance socioemotional wealth.  
 Family members with the family name included in the firm name are likely to be 
sensitive to reputational costs and identify strongly with the firm (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 
2013; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010, 2014; Rousseau et al., 2018). Accusations of earnings 
management would probably lead to a substantial socioemotional wealth loss for them. Real 
earnings management probably has a lower detection risk compared to accrual-based earnings 
management (Das et al., 2011; Kothari et al., 2016; Zang, 2012), hence such family members 
are more likely to choose real earnings management over accrual-based earnings management 
if they manage earnings (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). This suggests that family members who 
identify strongly with the firm are willing to forego financial gains to protect their 
socioemotional wealth. Zang (2012) finds that managers’ trade off real earnings management 
and accrual-based earnings management based on their relative costs. Accrual-based earnings 
management is likely more costly for family members who identify strongly with the firm since 
they are more sensitive to reputational concerns (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). 
Based on this discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Family firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management 




3. Research Design and Summary Statistics 
3.1. Data 
We use data from Norwegian private limited liability companies. All limited liability companies 
in Norway are required to prepare and issue a financial report in accordance with Norwegian 
GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) (cf. Norwegian Accounting Act paragraph 
1-2)2. External auditing is mandatory for all but the very smallest limited liability companies 
(cf. Act on Auditing and Auditors paragraph 2-1).3 
We obtain most of our data from the CCGR database at the BI Norwegian Business 
School. The CCGR database contains financial accounting information on all limited liability 
companies in Norway, and provides unique data on family relationships between shareholders, 
board members and CEOs. Family relationships are determined through blood lines, adoption, 
and marriage. It traces family relationships back four generations and extends out to third 
cousins (Che & Langli, 2015).  
Name of the shareholders, CEOs, and board members are provided by PROFF Forvalt.4 
These data, together with firm name, are used to construct the test variable SameName. This 
variable is then matched with the data from the CCGR database. The data from PROFF Forvalt 
had to be ordered separately, and as the price of this order would increase with the size of the 
sample, we decided to limit the sample by excluding the smallest firms, as this would also 
mitigate concerns that our results would be influenced by very small firms with low economic 
significance (e.g. Che & Langli, 2015). Thus, we require a minimum of 3.5 million NOK5 
                                                          
2 Norwegian GAAP is to some extent similar to IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) for SMEs 
(small and medium sized enterprises). They may also prepare the financial report according to IFRS (cf. 
paragraph 3-9), but not many do so. 
3 The smallest limited liability companies were allowed to deselect their auditor, effective from May 1, 2011 (cf. 
Norwegian Limited Liability Companies Act paragraph 7-6). These firm-years will not be included in our 
sample as they have missing observations for the variable Big4. 
4 PROFF Forvalt is a Norwegian database containing financial and non-financial information on Norwegian 
firms. PROFF AS gather information on shareholders, CEOs and board members from Brønnøysundregistrene, a 
Norwegian government agency that is responsible for a number of public registers 
5 This equals approximately EUR 321 000 (1 EUR=10.89 NOK, as of 08.10.2019).  
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yearly sales (adjusted by the consumer price index) to be included in our sample. There are 
3 166 838 firm-year observations in the CCGR database for the period 2002 to 2015. After 
eliminating firms with less than 3.5 million NOK yearly sales, public firms, unlimited liability 
firms, financial firms, non-family firms6, and firms with missing information on family 
relationships and other test variables, our final sample consists of 209 041 firm-year 
observations from 28 535 unique firms. Table 1 presents the details of the sample selection 
process.  
[Insert table 1 about here] 
3.2. Variable Measurement and Methodology 
We specify the following regression equation as our main model to test H1:  
(1) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽32𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Our dependent variable, AccrEM, is measured as abnormal accruals using the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model (DD model), modified by McNichols (2002), and as applied by Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005)7:  
(2) 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =∝0+∝1 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 +∝2 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +∝3 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 +∝4 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +∝5 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is working capital accruals, measured as change in current assets – change in 
cash – change in short-term debt + change in interest-bearing short-term debt + change in 
proposed dividends, scaled by lagged total assets. CFO is cash flows from operations. CFO is 
measured as net income before extraordinary items – total accruals, scaled by lagged total 
                                                          
6 We include only family controlled firms (i.e., family ownership above 50%) in our sample, in order to be able 
to test for heterogeneity among family firms, as opposed to differences between family and non-family firms. 
7 We run these regressions in a sample of firms with similar economic fundamentals. That is, before we exclude 




assets.8 Total accruals is measured as working capital accruals + depreciation expenses + 
impairment losses.9 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual change in revenues, scaled by lagged total assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
is property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t, scaled by lagged total assets. We estimate 
this model for each industry-year with a minimum of 20 observations, and use the absolute 
values of the firm-specific residuals as our proxy for accrual-based earnings management 
(Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013). We winsorize all variables in this model at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles (Francis et al., 2005). This model, and variations of this model, has been used in 
numerous earnings management studies (e.g. Feng, Hope, Qingyuan, & Xin, 2011; Francis et 
al., 2005; Hope et al., 2013; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2016; Lawson & Wang, 2016). 
SameName is our test variable. It reflects whether the firm is family named or not. It is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the family name of any of the shareholders, board members 
or CEOs is included in the firm name and 0 if not. Specifically, the family name (last name) of 
each shareholder, board member, and CEO is matched with the firm name, and if the firm name 
contains the family name (either alone or as part of a longer name) the observation is classified 
as a family named firm.10 H1 implies that β1 < 0. 
We include control variables based on prior research. Several studies document that 
family ownership is associated with earnings management (Achleitner et al., 2014; Cascino, 
Pugliese, Mussolino, & Sansone, 2010; Jiraporn & DaDalt, 2009; Tong, 2007; Wang, 2006), 
hence we include the variable FamilyOwnership in our model. FamilyOwnership is measured 
as the percentage of shares owned by the largest owning family. Sundkvist, Che, and Stenheim 
(2020) find that the ownership stake of the second largest shareholder is associated with 
                                                          
8 We use the balance sheet approach for calculating total accruals, as a significant number of firms in our sample 
are not required to prepare cash flow statements.  
9 Depreciation expenses and impairment losses are reflected in the database as a negative amount. 
10 This variable is based on family name and not family relationships, thus we cannot know for sure whether, for 
instance, the CEO “Hansen”, which is a common name in Norway, is a relative of the owner “Hansen”. 
However, since this variable also requires the firm name to include the name “Hansen” we think that 
misclassification due to common names is a marginal problem. 
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earnings management in private family firms, thus we add the variable 2nd_Largest_Owner11 to 
our model. LOSS is a dummy variable equal to 1 for negative earnings, and zero if not. This 
variable is meant to account for the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses (Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2006). SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Prior research has 
documented that SIZE is correlated with earnings management in family firms (Yang, 2010). 
We control for audit quality by using the variable Big4, which is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the financial report is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 if not. The use 
of a Big 4 audit firm has been shown to be negatively associated with the level of earnings 
management (e.g., Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Che, Hope, & Langli, 
2020). We include the variable FamilyCEO, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
CEO is from the largest owning family and 0 if not. Whether or not the CEO is a family member 
has been shown to be associated with earnings management (e.g. Kvaal, Langli, & 
Abdolmohammadi, 2012; Stockmans et al., 2010; Yang, 2010). The variable FamilyChair is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the family member of the largest owning family is the chairman 
of board and 0 if not. This variable is included because prior research suggests an association 
between family influence on the board of directors and earnings management (e.g. Kvaal et al., 
2012; Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola, & Pozza, 2011; Stockmans et al., 2013).  
To control for potential threats from debtholders to family control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2014), and an increased demand for high quality accounting information from external 
stakeholders (Hope et al., 2016), we include the variable DebtRatio in the model. DebtRatio is 
measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The variable GROWTH is measured as the 
percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. Sales growth has been shown to be correlated 
with earnings management in private family firms (Kvaal et al., 2012). We include ROA as a 
                                                          
11 The data from the CCGR database does not allow us to identify whether the second largest owner is a family 
member or not. Thus, 2nd_Largest_Owner measures the fraction of shares owned by the second largest owner, 
regardless of whether the second largest owner is a family member or not. 
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control variable because several studies document an association between performance and 
earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Kasznik, 1999; Kothari, Leone, & 
Wasley, 2005; McNichols, 2000). ROA is measured as net income in year t divided by the 
average book value of total assets in year t and t−1. Finally, to proxy for generational effects, 
we include FirmAge in our model (Kvaal et al., 2012; Stockmans et al., 2010). FirmAge is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since a firm’s foundation year. We 
specify the following regression equation as our main model to test H2: 
(3) 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽32𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
This is a logistic regression model. H2 implies that β1 > 0.  
 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 reflects the relative importance of real earnings management compared to 
accrual-based earnings management. It is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if real 
earnings management (REM) is high and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) is low, 
and 0 if real earnings management (REM) is low and accrual-based earnings management 
(AEM) is high. More specifically, 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 takes the value 1 if the firm-specific signed 
residual from equation (4) (i.e., REM) is above the 75th percentile of each industry-year and 
the firm-specific signed residual from equation (2) (i.e., AEM) is between the 25th and 75th 
percentile (i.e., values close to zero representing low levels of AEM) of each industry-year. It 
takes the value 0 if the firm-specific signed residual of equation (2) (i.e., AEM) is above the 
75th percentile of each industry-year and the firm-specific signed residual of equation (4) (i.e., 
REM) is below the 75th percentile and above the 25th percentile (i.e., values close to zero 
representing low levels of REM) of each industry-year.12  
                                                          
12 As with the regressions for abnormal accruals and abnormal production costs, these percentile values are 
calculated for a sample of firms with similar economic fundamentals (before we exclude non-family firms and 
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We focus on signed residuals in this test for the following reasons. First, REM has 
typically been used as a signed measure in previous research (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2014; 
Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Dou, Hope, Thomas, & Zou, 2018; 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). Using signed residuals for AEM as well makes the two 
measures comparable. Second, by focusing on the highest values of the signed measure, we 
focus on income increasing earnings management, which is likely associated with more 
reputational costs than an accusation of being “too conservative” (i.e., income decreasing 
earnings management). Third, Chen, Hribar, and Melessa (2018) caution against using signed 
residuals, though this criticism is mostly relevant when the residual measures are not 
transformed in any way. Consequently, in H1 we transform using absolute values, in H2 we 
transform by calculating RelREM and in robustness tests (see Section 4.5) we focus on positive 
residuals only.  
Accrual-based earnings management is measured using residuals from the DD model 
described in our AccrEM measure. Real earnings management (REM) is measured as abnormal 
production costs. Firms may increase production to report lower production costs (COGS), 
resulting in higher earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006).  Managers can manage earnings upwards 
by producing more goods than is necessary to meet expected demand (i.e., overproduction). 
Higher production will lead to lower fixed costs per unit as fixed costs are now spread over a 
larger number of units. This will in turn reduce the cost of goods sold (COGS) and increase 
earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). Managers can also manage earnings upwards by temporarily 
increasing sales by offering aggressive price discounts or favorable credit terms that are not 
sustainable in the long run (i.e., sales manipulation).  Overproduction and sales manipulation 
                                                          
firms with missing observations on other variables than those necessary to measure abnormal accruals and 
abnormal production costs). 
127 
 
will increase production costs relative to sales, resulting in higher abnormal production costs 
(Roychowdhury, 2006).  
The model for abnormal production costs focuses on both COGS and inventory. The 
model predicts the normal level of COGS using current period sales, and normal inventory 
growth using growth in sales in the current period and in the previous period. As production 
costs are defined as the sum of COGS and growth in sales, the normal level of production cost 
is predicted in the model by current period sales and growth in sales in the current period and 
in the previous period (Roychowdhury, 2006). Following Roychowdhury (2006), we estimate 




= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
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𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1







) + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡is production costs this period and is measured as the sum of COGS and change 
in inventory in period t (𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆𝑡+ ∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡), 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 is sales in period t, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 is change in sales 
period t and ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 is change in sales in period t-1.  
The residual from this regression is our measure of abnormal production costs. A higher 
value indicates abnormally high production costs given the level of sales and hence more real 
earnings management (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2014; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). As with our 
AccrEM measure, the model for abnormal production costs is estimated for each industry-year 
with a minimum of 20 observations, and we winsorize all the variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. This model has been used in multiple studies as a measure of real earnings 
management (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2014; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
                                                          
13 This regression is run in a sample of firms with similar economic fundamentals (i.e. before exclusion of non-
family firms and firms with missing observations). 
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Zang, 2012). In the main models (i.e., equation (1) and (3)), we winsorize the variables ROA, 
SIZE, DebtRatio and GROWTH at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We control for year and industry 
fixed effects in all our regressions, and adjust for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity by 
calculating the standard errors using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator, clustered at the firm 
level (e.g. Che & Langli, 2015; Petersen, 2009).   
3.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the subgroups FN-
firms (family name included in firm name) and NFN-firms (family name not included in firm 
name), while panel B presents correlations. A total of 32% of the firms in our sample (N=66 
855) have the family name included in the firm name. Descriptive statistics indicate that these 
firms are on average larger, measured by total assets (18.03 million NOK vs. 17.08 million 
NOK). They also have a higher frequency of employing a Big 4 auditor (27% vs. 24%), family 
CEO (81% vs. 75%) and family chairman (85% vs. 81%). On average, family named firms also 
have lower debt ratio (71% vs. 74%) and LOSS (19% vs. 20%), and higher family ownership 
(92% vs. 89%) and GROWTH (7% vs. 6%). Family named firms are on average somewhat older 
(16.90 years vs. 16.58 years). The mean values of ROA and 2nd_Largest_Owner are similar 
across the two groups (ROA=8% and 2nd_Largest_Owner=18%). All the differences are 
statistically significant, suggesting these variables are important control variables. Panel B 
shows that SameName is negatively correlated with AccrEM and positively correlated with 
RelREM, providing preliminary support for our first two hypotheses. The correlation between 
AccrEM and RelREM is negative due the way these variables are constructed (i.e., RelREM 
takes the value 1 when AEMres is close to zero, and when AEMres is close to zero AccrEM will 
be low as well). The highest correlation among the independent variables is -0.31, between 
Family_Ownership and 2nd_Largest_Owner.  




4.1. Main Results 
Table 3, panel A, presents the results from equation (1) testing H1. The coefficient of 
SameName is negative and significant (β1=-0.002, t-value=-4.46), suggesting that SameName 
is negatively associated with accrual-based earnings management. This indicates that there is 
less accrual-based earnings management in firms with the family name included in the firm 
name compared to firms without the family name included in the firm name, providing support 
for H1.  
The control variables LOSS, DebtRatio, GROWTH and ROA are all positively 
significant, suggesting a positive association between these variables and AccrEM. FamilyCEO 
and FamilyChair are both negatively significant, indicating that family firms with a family 
member as either CEO or chairman of the board have less accrual-based earnings management 
compared to family firms where these positions are filled by non-family members. SIZE is 
negatively associated with AccrEM, suggesting less accrual-based EM in larger firms. The 
significantly negative coefficient of FirmAge suggests that accrual-based earnings management 
tends to decrease over time. 2nd_Largest_Owner is also negatively associated with earnings 
management, suggesting that accrual-based earnings management decreases with the 
ownership of the second largest shareholder. 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Table 3, panel B, presents the result from equation (3), testing H2. The coefficient of 
SameName is positive and significant (β1=0.210, z-value=5.80), suggesting that firms with the 
family name included in the firm name are more likely to select the combination of high 
abnormal production costs (real earnings management) and low discretionary accruals (accrual-
based earnings management) than the other way around (low abnormal production costs and 
high discretionary accruals), compared to firms where the family name is not included in the 
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firm name. This provides support for H2, and suggests that family firms with the family name 
included in the firm name are more likely to select real earnings management over accrual-
based earnings management. Among the control variables, Big4, FamilyCEO, FamilyChair, 
DebtRatio and GROWTH are positively associated with RelREM. This suggests that family 
firms are more likely to select real earnings management over accrual-based earnings 
management if they employ a Big4 auditor, employ a family CEO or chair, or have higher 
growth prospects. The variables LOSS, SIZE, ROA and FirmAge are negatively associated with 
RelREM, suggesting that firms reporting losses, larger firms, firms with higher ROA and older 
firms are less likely to favor real earnings management over accrual-based earnings 
management. We find no significant association between RelREM and Family_Ownership and 
2nd_Largest_Owner, respectively.  
4.2. Alternative Measure of Earnings Management 
In our main test, we measure accrual-based earnings management using abnormal working 
capital accruals. We test whether our results are robust to an alternative measure of earnings 
management. For this purpose, we measure AccrEM-Jones (accrual-based earnings 
management) as discretionary accruals measured using the performance adjusted modified 
Jones (1991) model, as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005):14 
(5) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =∝0+∝1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖.𝑡−1
) +∝2 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +∝3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +∝4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 indicates total accruals measured as working capital accruals + depreciation 
expenses + impairment losses.15 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual change in revenues less annual change in 
receivables, scaled by lagged total assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant, and equipment for firm i in 
                                                          
14 We run these regressions before we exclude non-family firms and firms with missing observations, i.e. in a 
sample of firms with similar economic fundamentals.  
15 Working capital accruals is measured as change in current assets – change in cash – change in short-term debt 
+ change in interest-bearing short-term debt + change in proposed dividends. Depreciation expenses and 
impairment losses are reflected in the database as a negative amount. 
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year t, scaled by lagged total assets, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is net income for firm i in year t scaled by 
average total assets. All variables in this model are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. As 
in the main test, this model is also estimated for each industry-year with a minimum of 20 
observations. We use the absolute value of the firm-specific residuals as our proxy for accrual-
based earnings management (Hope et al., 2013). We also create an alternative RelREM variable 
based on this alternative measure of accrual-based earnings management. RelREM-Jones takes 
the value 1 if abnormal production costs (REM) is above the 75th percentile of the sample and 
the residuals from the performance matched Jones model is between the 25th and 75th percentile 
value of the sample, and 0 if it is the other way around. 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports the results from these regressions. The results are generally in line with the 
results from the main test, suggesting that our results are robust to an alternative measure of 
abnormal accruals (AEM). The coefficient of SameName is negative and significant in panel 
A, providing support for H1, and positive and significant in panel B, providing support for H2.  
4.3. Different Classification of RelREM 
In our original tests of H2, we construct the variable RelREM to take the value 1 if real earnings 
management is high (above the 75th percentile) and accrual-based earnings management is low 
(between the 25th and 75th percentile), and 0 if it is the other way around (low real earnings 
management and high accrual-based earnings management). This means that we exclude 
observations that simultaneously have high values on both accrual-based and real earnings 
management. The same is true for observations that simultaneously have low values on both 
accrual-based and real earnings management. This probably provides the cleanest test of H2, 
though at the cost of losing many observations. In this section, we test whether our results are 
sensitive to the exclusion of these groups. Table 5 reports the results from these regressions. 
Panel A presents the results from regressing RelREM on test and control variables when firm-
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year observations with simultaneously low accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and 
real earnings management (REM) are included in the model. This means that the variable 
RelREM now takes the value 1 if  real earnings management (REM) is high (above the 75th 
percentile) and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) is relatively low (below the 75th 
percentile), and 0 if REM is low and AEM is high or both REM and AEM are low. Panel B 
presents the results when we also include the observations with both high REM and high AEM. 
The variable RelREM now takes the value 1 if REM is high and AEM is low, and the value 0 if 
not. This means that the zero-group consists of the following three categories: 1) high REM and 
high AEM, 2) low REM and high AEM, and 3) low REM and low AEM. 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
Table 5 shows that the main results of H2 still hold, suggesting that firms with the family name 
included in the firm name are more likely to select the combination of high abnormal production 
costs (real earnings management) and low discretionary accruals (accrual-based earnings 
management) than any other combination of earnings management type (high AEM-high REM, 
high AEM-low REM, low AEM-low REM) compared to firms where the family name is not 
included in the firm name. This finding strengthens our support for H2. 
4.4. Propensity Score Matching 
As discussed in Section 3.3, descriptive statistics reveal that the family named family firms 
differ from the non-family named family firms in our sample on many characteristics. In this 
robustness test, we attempt to reduce any potential endogeneity bias stemming from different 
operating and financing structures between the two groups of firms. For this purpose, we 
employ a propensity score matching technique and match family named family firms with non-
family named family firms based on all the control variables in equations (1) and (3), including 
year and industry fixed effects (e.g. Mark L DeFond, Hung, Li, & Li, 2015). We use a probit 
model to obtain propensity scores with SameName as the outcome variable. The propensity 
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scores will then reflect the probability of being a family named family firm. Limiting matching 
to observations with propensity scores that fall within the common support of both groups 
(Bonacchi, Marra, & Zarowin, 2019), we further use the nearest neighbor matching technique 
without replacement (Hope, Yue, & Zhong, 2019), i.e., we match each family named family 
firm to a non-family named family firm with the p-score closest in value. The propensity score-
matched sample consists of 133 708 firm-year observations for H1 (equation (1)) and 32 296 
firm-year observations for H2 (equation (3)).16 Both samples have equal amounts of family 
named and non-family named firms.  
[Insert table 6 about here] 
Table 6 shows that the main results of both H1 and H2 still hold in this propensity score-
matched sample. 
4.5. Alternative Approach  
In this section, we use an alternative approach to test whether family named and non-family 
named firms differ in their earnings management strategies. In our main analyses, we 
constructed a dummy variable to reflect high levels of real earnings management combined 
with low levels of accrual-based earnings management, and vice versa. In this alternative 
approach, we use accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management in two 
separate equations (e.g. Achleitner et al., 2014).  
(6) 𝐴𝐸𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽32𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
+𝛽13𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
                                                          
16 As in the main test, the sample for equation (3) is smaller than the sample for equation (1). This is because 
equation (3) is run in a sample where the observations below the 25th percentile of AEMres and REMres are 
excluded (indicating income-decreasing earnings management), and firm-year observations with high levels on 
both AEMres and REMres or low levels of both AEMres and REMres are excluded. See Sections 3.2 and 4.3 for 
further discussion on this matter.  
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(7) 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽32𝑛𝑑_𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Where AEMres is the residual from equation (2) (i.e., the DD model specified in Section 3.2) 
and REMres is the residual from equation (4) (i.e., abnormal production costs specified in 
Section 3.2). Following Zang (2012), we identify a sample where earnings management is more 
likely to occur. We focus on the financing needs for private firms to identify this sample. Debt 
financing is the most important financing source for private firms (e.g. Gassen & Fülbier, 2015; 
Hope & Vyas, 2017), and a general finding in positive accounting theory is that a higher debt 
ratio is associated with more earnings management (e.g. Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). Thus, to identify a sample of private firms where earnings 
management is more likely to occur, we focus on a group of firms with stronger incentives to 
manage earnings, i.e., firms with high debt ratio. More specifically, we run the regression in a 
sample of firms with debt ratio above the median value of the main sample only.  
We choose to use firm-year observations with positive values of the residuals for several 
reasons. First, real earnings management has generally been used as a signed measure (i.e., the 
value of the residuals rather than the absolute value of the residuals) (e.g. Achleitner et al., 
2014; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012) and we 
want the two earnings management measures to be comparable to each other. This suggests the 
use of the signed value of accrual-based earnings management as well, rather than merely the 
absolute value. Second, Chen et al. (2018) caution against using the signed value of the residuals 
from earnings management studies without any form of transformation. This suggests the 
“transformation” of the variables by focusing on only positive or negative residuals. Third, high 
debt ratio has typically been linked to incentives to manage earnings upwards (i.e., positive 
residuals) to avoid debt covenant violations in classical positive accounting research (Mark L. 
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DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). 
Consequently, we run regression (6) in a sample of firms with positive AEMres only, and 
regression (7) in a sample of firms with positive REMres only. We also control for the level of 
real earnings management (REMres) in equation (6). If SameName is negative in regression (6) 
and positive in regression (7), this provides additional support for H2. 
 Table 7 presents the results from these regressions. As expected, the coefficient of 
SameName is significantly negatively associated with AEMres and significantly positively 
associated with REMres.  
[Insert table 7 about here] 
4.6. Untabulated Robustness Test 
We test H2 using a logistic regression model (equation (3)). We test whether our results are 
robust to using probit instead. Untabulated results show that our results are robust to the choice 
of regression model. Our results hold when using a probit model.  
4.7. Additional Analyses 
In this section, we further test the robustness of our results by attempting to test some of the 
theory underlying our hypotheses. Specifically, we test whether the tendency for family named 
family firms to select real earnings management over accrual-based earnings management, 
compared to non-family named firms, increase as incentives to manage earnings increases 
(proxied by debt ratio). We also investigate whether this difference in earnings management 
strategies between family named and non-family named family firms depends on detection risk 




4.7.1. Incentives to Manage Earnings (Debt Ratio) 
The potential gains of managing earnings are not equal in all situations, and thus affect the 
incentives to manage earnings. As the potential gains of managing earnings increase, the 
incentives to manage earnings increase as well. Earnings management incentives are often 
related to financial needs (e.g. Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 
1990). Firms want to get access to capital, preferably low-cost capital, needed to make 
necessary investments. Bank financing is an important source of financing in private firms 
(Gassen & Fülbier, 2015; Hope & Vyas, 2017), indicating that bank financing may be an 
important source of earnings management incentives in private firms. The earnings 
management literature suggests that firms may have incentives to increase earnings to avoid 
debt covenant violations or any restrictions associated with debt covenant violations (e.g. 
Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990).  
The difference in earnings management strategy (i.e., real earnings management vs. 
accrual-based earnings management) will likely be more pronounced as the incentives to 
manage earnings increase. We test this by interacting the variable SameName with debt ratio in 
equation (3). To make the interpretation of the main effect of SameName more informative in 
this regression, we mean center the variable DebtRatio and label it DebtRatioM.17 A positive 
interaction (SameName*DebtRatioM) suggests that the tendency for family named family firms 
to select real earnings management over accrual-based earnings management compared to non-
family named family firms increases with debt ratio.  
[Insert table 8 about here] 
                                                          
17 If we interact SameName with DebtRatio, the coefficient of SameName will reflect the difference between 
family named and non-family named family firms when DebtRatio is zero. None of the sample firms has a debt 
ratio of zero. Therefore, we mean center DebtRatio to make the coefficient of SameName more informative. 
When DebtRatio is mean centered (i.e., DebtRatioM), SameName reflects the difference between family named 
and non-family named family firms when DebtRatio is at its mean. 
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Table 8, panel A, presents the results from this test. The interaction term SameName 
*DebtRatioM is positive and statistically significant, as expected. Interpreting interaction 
effects in logit models is not straightforward, since they are conditional on the independent 
variables, suggesting they may have different signs and significance for different values of 
covariates (Ai & Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004). To better understand the 
interactions, we estimate the average marginal effects.  
The average marginal effect of DebtRatioM is significantly positive for family named 
firms (SameName=1) with a z-value of 5.63 (untabulated). For non-family named firms 
(SameName=0), the average marginal effect of DebtRatio is negative, but not statistically 
significant (z-value=-0.98, untabulated). Figure 1 illustrates this graphically. For family named 
firms, the tendency to favor real earnings management over accrual-based earnings 
management increases as DebtRatio increases. For non-family named firms, however, this 
tendency slightly decreases, though remains insignificant. Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that 
the differences between the groups (family named vs. non-family named) increase when 
DebtRatioM increases. The positive incremental effect of SameName is statistically significant 
from DebtRatioM=-0.1 upwards (z-value of 3.77 at DebtRatioM=-0.1, increasing to a z-value 
of 7.92 at DebtRatioM=0.4, untabulated). This suggests that as debt ratio increases, family 
named family firms’ tendency to favor real earnings management over accrual-based earnings 
management, relative to non-family named family firms, increases. 
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
4.7.2. Detection Risk (Big4) 
As discussed in Section 2, family named family firms are expected to favor real earnings 
management over accrual-based earnings management because real earnings management has 
a lower detection risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). Prior literature documents that real earnings 
management is more likely when firms are subjected to greater scrutiny (Cohen et al., 2008; 
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Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016; Zang, 2012). The use of a high quality auditor 
such as a Big 4 audit firm has been shown to increase audit quality in private firms (Che et al., 
2020), and firms that are audited by a high quality auditor have less accrual-based earnings 
management (Zang, 2012) and more real earnings management (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). This 
suggests that the use of a Big 4 audit firm will increase the likelihood of detecting accrual-based 
earnings management. The detection risk will increase for both family named firms and non-
family named firms, but family named firms will likely be more sensitive to this increase in 
detection risk, and relative to non-family named firms, they will favor real earnings 
management over accrual-based earnings management even more when detection risk is high. 
We test this by interacting the variable SameName with the variable Big4. Table 8, panel B, 
presents the results from this regression. The coefficient of SameName*Big4 is positive and 
highly significant.  
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 graphs the interaction from the logit model. From this figure we see that family named 
firms’ tendency to favor real earnings management over accrual-based earnings management, 
relative to non-family named firms, is strong when audited by a Big 4 audit firm. While the 
difference between the SameName group and non-SameName groups’ choice of earnings 
management strategy (real vs. accrual-based earnings management) is not statistically 
significant for family firms with non-Big 4 auditors (untabulated z-value of 0.945), the 
difference between the groups is both statistically significant and economically meaningful for 
firms which are audited by a Big 4 auditor. For Big 4 audited firms, the difference in probability 
between family named family firms and non-family named family firms is 13.5 percentage 
points, and this difference is highly significant with a z-value of 11.45 (untabulated).18  
                                                          
18 We have also tested an interaction between Big4 and SameName in the alternative approach regressions in 
Section 4.5 (untabulated). These tests confirm the findings in the current section. We find a positive interaction 
between Big4 and SameName in the regression with REMres as the outcome variable, and a negative interaction 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper examines family owners’ earnings management strategies using SEW theory. SEW 
theory suggests that family members are highly motivated by a wish to preserve and enhance 
their socioemotional wealth, even at the expense of financial wealth, if necessary (Berrone et 
al., 2012; Berrone et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Martin et 
al., 2016). Family members’ emphasis on various elements of socioemotional wealth is likely 
to vary within the family firm segment, leading to different earnings management strategies 
among family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014).  
This paper tests this empirically by focusing on a setting where family members are 
likely to identify strongly with the firm, i.e., when their family name is included in the firm 
name. Hence, we predict that family name congruence is a source of heterogeneity among 
family firms’ accounting practices. Specifically, we predict and find that family firms with the 
family name included in the firm name engage in less accrual-based earnings management and 
thus have higher earnings quality compared to non-family named family firms. Family 
members who have their family name included in the firm name are more likely to identify 
strongly with the family firm and to be sensitive to reputational costs (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 
2013). If family members identify strongly with the firm, they are less likely to manage earnings 
by manipulating accruals, as it would lead to a substantial socioemotional wealth loss for them 
if this reporting practice were uncovered  (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Pazzaglia et al., 2013).  
This paper also goes a step further and tests whether family members’ identification 
with the firm can predict their earnings management strategies in terms of selecting between 
accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Specifically, our second 
                                                          
in the regression with AEMres as the outcome variable. This suggests that family named family firms have 
higher levels of real earnings management and lower levels of accrual-based earnings management compared to 





hypothesis predicts that family firms are more likely to select real earnings management over 
accrual-based earnings management if they have their family name included in the firm name. 
Due to a higher detection risk of accrual-based earnings management compared to real earnings 
management (Das et al., 2011; Kothari et al., 2016; Zang, 2012), family owners with strong 
firm identification may be willing to endure the negative effect of real earnings management 
on financial performance to avoid the potential reputational loss associated with accrual-based 
earnings management if detected (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). Our empirical findings confirm 
this. Specifically, we are more likely to find the combination of high real earnings management 
and low accrual-based earnings management in family named firms compared to family firms 
that are not named after the family.  
Additional analysis reveals that the difference in earnings management strategies 
between family named and non-family named firms increase as incentives to manage earnings 
increase (proxied by debt ratio). Additional analysis also reveals that when detection risk is 
higher (proxied by Big4), family named firms’ propensity to select real earnings management 
over accrual-based earnings management, relative to non-family firms, is even more 
pronounced. This supports the theory underlying our hypothesis stating that family named firms 
favor real earnings management over accrual-based earnings management due to higher 
detection risk of accrual-based earnings management. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the 
literature on socioemotional wealth by demonstrating that family name congruence is a source 
of family firm heterogeneity to the extent that it can even predict variations in earnings 
management practices. We also contribute to the recent refinements of SEW theory, considering 
how financial wealth and socioemotional wealth may work in tandem (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2018; Gomez–Mejia et al., 2014; Martin, 2016) by documenting that the optimal trade-off 
between financial wealth and socioemotional wealth is likely to vary among family firms. 
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Family owners may be more willing to sacrifice financial wealth in order to protect their 
socioemotional wealth if they identify strongly with the family firm. Viewing the strategic 
decisions as a mixed gamble, family members are likely to trade off potential financial wealth 
and socioemotional wealth, and our findings suggest that family members who identify strongly 
with the firm are likely to put more weight on the socioemotional wealth aspect vs. the financial 
aspect while assessing the gamble. Second, our findings contribute to the earnings management 
literature by demonstrating that family name congruence is associated with both the level of 
accrual-based earnings management and the choice of real vs. accrual-based earnings 
management. To the best of our knowledge, these are new findings. Third, we use family name 
congruence as a proxy for family identity, thus providing further validity for a construct 
previously used in other family business studies (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010, 2014; Rousseau 
et al., 2018; Zellweger et al., 2013). Finally, we use data from private family firms as opposed 
to public family firms. Limited research exists on accounting practices in private family firms 
(Paiva et al., 2016), even though a large proportion of family firms are private and private firms 
are likely to be a good setting to test the predictions of SEW theory (Salvato & Moores, 2010).  
  The quality of our findings is of course limited to the extent that our proxy for 
identification with the firm and reputational concerns (family name included in the firm name) 
is a good proxy. Even though findings from prior research suggest that family name congruence 
is a valid proxy for identity and reputational concerns (e.g. Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010, 2014; 
Rousseau et al., 2018; Zellweger et al., 2013), future research should attempt to test the validity 
of these results using alternative proxies for identification with the firm. Further, future research 




Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
AccrEM Accrual-based earnings management, measured as the absolute values of the 





Earnings quality, measured as the absolute values of the residuals from the 
















A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the residuals from the abnormal 
production costs model (REM) is above the 75th percentile of the sample and the 
residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model (AEM) is between the 25th and 
75th percentile of the sample, and 0 if the residuals from the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model is above the 75th percentile of the sample and the residuals from the 
abnormal production cost model (REM) is between the 25th and 75th percentile of 
the sample.  
  
A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the residuals from the abnormal 
production costs model (REM) is above the 75th percentile of the sample and the 
residuals from the performance adjusted modified Jones model (AEM) is between 
the 25th and the 75th percentile of the sample, and 0 if the residuals from the 
performance adjusted modified Jones model is above the 75th percentile of the 
sample and the residuals from the abnormal production cost model (REM) is 
between the 25th and the 75th percentile of the sample 
 
Signed real earnings management, measured as the residuals from the abnormal 
production costs model (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
 
Signed accrual-based earnings management, measured as the residuals from the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, modified by McNichols (2002). 
  
SameName A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family name of one or more of the 
shareholders, CEO or board members is included in the firm name and 0 if not. 
  
Family_Ownership The aggregated fraction of shares held by the largest owning family, calculated using 
ultimate ownership. 
 
2nd_Largest_Owner Fraction of shares owned by the second largest shareholder. 
LOSS A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has negative earnings and 0 if not. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets.  
Big4 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statements are audited by one of the 




The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is from the largest owning family, 0 if not. 
 
FamilyChair Dummy variable that equals 1 if the chair of the board belongs to the controlling 
family and 0 if not. 
 
GROWTH 
Change in sales in year t ( . 
ROA Net income year t divided by the average book value of total assets in year t and t−1. 
FirmAge 
DebtRatioM 
Natural logarithm of number of years since foundation date. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Firm-years 
Observations in the CCGR database for the years 2002–2015 3 166 838 
Exclusion criteria  
Firms with sales less than 3.5 million NOK in at least one year 2 601 120 
Public firms and unlimited liability firms  59 167 
Financial firms 3 007 
Non-family firms 141 288 
Firms with missing information on family relationships 94 628 
Firms with missing information on other variables 58 587 





Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Family Named Firms vs. Non-Family Named Firms 
 Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  No. of observations  Difference 
in mean 
 FN-firms NFN-firms  FN-firms NFN-firms  FN-firms NFN-firms  FN-firms NFN-firms   
AccrEM 0.07 0.08  0.05 0.05  0.08 0.09  66 855 142 186  -0.01***  
RelREM 0.55 0.50  1.00 0.00  0.50 0.50  16 149 32 933  0.05*** 
Family_Ownership 0.92 0.89  1.00 1.00  0.15 0.16  66 855 142 186  0.03*** 
2nd_Largest_Owner 0.18 0.18  0.17 0.15  0.18 0.18  66 855 142 186  0.004*** 
ROA 0.08 0.08  0.07 0.07  0.14 0.16  66 855 142 186  -0.001**  
LOSS 0.19 0.20  0.00 0.00  0.39 0.40  66 855 142 186  -0.01***  
Total Assets (MNOK) 18.03 17.08  6.32 5.63  39.94 38.38  66 855 142 186  0.95***  
Big4 0.27 0.24  0.00 0.00  0.44 0.42  66 855 142 186  0.03*** 
FamilyCEO 0.81 0.75  1.00 1.00  0.39 0.43  66 855 142 186  0.06***  
FamilyChair 0.85 0.81  1.00 1.00  0.35 0.39  66 855 142 186  0.04*** 
DebtRatio 0.71 0.74  0.74 0.77  0.24 0.24  66 855 142 186  0.03***  
GROWTH 0.07 0.06  0.04 0.04  0.22 0.22  66 855 142 186  0.01***  




Panel B: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
                
                
  v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 
AccrEM v1 1.00              
RelREM v2 -0.57*** 1.00             
SameName v3 -0.03*** 0.05*** 1.00            
Family_Ownership v4 -0.01*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 1.00           
2nd_Largest_Owner v5 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01*** -0.31*** 1.00          
LOSS v6 0.18*** 0.19*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.02*** 1.00         
SIZE v7 -0.14*** -0.01** 0.04*** -0.10*** 0.05*** -0.11*** 1.00        
Big4 v8 -0.02*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.16*** 1.00       
FamilyCEO v9 -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.21*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.19*** -0.09*** 1.00      
FamilyChair v10 -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.05*** 0.25*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.17*** -0.06*** 0.15*** 1.00     
DebtRatio v11 0.22*** 0.10*** -0.06*** -0.00 -0.03*** 0.28*** -0.21*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.01*** 1.00    
GROWTH v12 0.11*** -0.01 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.00 -0.19*** 0.09*** -0.00** -0.01** -0.01*** 0.04*** 1.00   
ROA v13 -0.01*** -0.44*** -0.00* -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.61*** 0.03*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.28*** 0.25*** 1.00  
FirmAge v14 -0.11*** -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 0.23*** 0.00* -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.20*** -0.08*** -0.02*** 1.00 
This table reports summary statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics: mean, median, standard deviation and the number of observations for the subgroups (1) family name included 
in firm name, SameName=1, and (2) family name not included in firm name, SameName=0, for the largest sample used in our tests. It also shows the difference in mean between the 






Table 3. Regression Results for AccrEM and RelREM on Test and Control 
Variables 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 AccrEM RelREM 
 coefficients t-stat coefficients z-stat 
SameName -0.002*** (-4.46) 0.210*** (5.80) 
     
Family_Ownership -0.002 (-0.95) -0.038 (-0.35) 
2nd_Largest_Owner -0.007*** (-4.97) -0.155 (-1.59) 
LOSS 0.051*** (32.58) -0.342*** (-6.75) 
SIZE -0.008*** (-24.93) -0.030* (-1.77) 
Big4 -0.001 (-1.09) 0.232*** (6.10) 
FamilyCEO -0.006*** (-8.92) 0.225*** (5.56) 
FamilyChair -0.003*** (-4.39) 0.202*** (4.56) 
DebtRatio 0.066*** (36.94) 0.172** (2.19) 
GROWTH 0.046*** (28.11) 1.528*** (25.26) 
ROA 0.086*** (10.59) -12.168*** (-54.96) 
FirmAge -0.004*** (-11.36) -0.082*** (-3.85) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.143*** (23.44) 1.335*** (3.96) 
N 209 041  49 082  
adj. R2 0.115    
Pseudo R2   0.198  
This table presents the test for H1 and H2. Panel A presents the coefficients and corresponding t-
statistics of regressing AccrEM on the test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS), 
testing H1. Panel B present the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing RelREM on 
test and control variables using logistic regression, testing H2. The variables are defined in 
Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. The t- and z-statistics are adjusted for 
within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates 





Table 4. Regression Results for AccrEM and RelREM on Test and Control 
Variables Using an Alternative Earnings Management Measure 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 
 AccrEM-Jones RelREM-Jones 
 Coefficients t-stat coefficients z-stat 
SameName -0.005*** (-5.51) 0.209*** (6.21) 
     
Family_Ownership -0.001 (-0.20) 0.142 (1.42) 
2nd_Largest_Owner -0.013*** (-5.35) -0.195** (-2.19) 
LOSS 0.023*** (15.31) -0.080** (-2.37) 
SIZE -0.003*** (-6.34) -0.099*** (-6.33) 
Big4 0.002** (2.06) 0.219*** (6.40) 
FamilyCEO -0.014*** (-11.73) 0.153*** (4.24) 
FamilyChair -0.004*** (-3.17) 0.138*** (3.46) 
DebtRatio 0.088*** (38.85) 0.044 (0.67) 
GROWTH 0.075*** (29.05) 0.604*** (12.70) 
ROA 0.116*** (16.69) -1.908*** (-14.56) 
FirmAge -0.010*** (-15.80) -0.154*** (-8.00) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.128*** (13.31) 1.804*** (5.87) 
N 209 041  47 899  
adj. R2 0.060    
Pseudo R2   0.022  
This table presents the tests for H1 and H2 using an alternative measure of accrual-based earnings 
management (the performance adjusted modified Jones model). Panel A presents the coefficients 
and corresponding t-statistics of regressing AccrEM-Jones on the test and control variables using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), testing H1. Panel B presents the coefficients and corresponding z-
statistics of regressing RelREM-Jones on test and control variables using logistic regression, testing 
H2. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. The t- 
and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich 





Table 5. Alternative Classifications of REM and AEM Groups 
 Panel A: Low REM/Low 
AEM Included 
Panel B: Low REM/Low 
AEM and High 
REM/High AEM Included 
 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2  
 RelREM RelREM   
 coefficients z-stat coefficients z-stat 
SameName 0.175*** (5.49) 0.174*** (5.85) 
     
Family_Ownership 0.092 (0.99) 0.075 (0.86) 
2nd_Largest_Owner -0.350*** (-4.16) -0.304*** (-3.86) 
LOSS -0.240*** (-7.73) -0.255*** (-8.42) 
SIZE -0.112*** (-6.87) -0.094*** (-6.34) 
Big4 0.242*** (7.65) 0.240*** (8.10) 
FamilyCEO 0.075** (2.21) 0.080** (2.54) 
FamilyChair 0.130*** (3.51) 0.135*** (3.87) 
DebtRatio 0.420*** (6.54) 0.294*** (5.00) 
GROWTH 1.171*** (26.65) 1.041*** (25.52) 
ROA -4.686*** (-32.04) -5.111*** (-36.78) 
FirmAge -0.200*** (-11.38) -0.156*** (-9.61) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.572* (1.79) 0.135 (0.46) 
N 107 811  119 569  
Pseudo R2 0.045  0.045  
This table presents the test for H2 using an alternative classification on the variable RelREM. Panel 
A presents the results when firm-years with both relatively low real earnings management and 
relatively low accrual-based earnings management are included in the sample. These are classified 
with the zero-group of RelREM. Panel B presents the results when all observations are included in 
the sample, thus including those with both high levels of real earnings management combined with 
high levels of accrual-based earnings management as well. These are classified with the zero-group 
of RelREM. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. 
The z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich 




Table 6. Regression Results for AccrEM and RelREM on Test and Control 
Variables for Propensity Score Matched Sample 








 Coefficients t-stat coefficients z-stat 
SameName -0.003*** (-5.19) 0.149*** (4.16) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.066*** (35.26) 0.248** (2.15) 
N 133 708  32 296  
adj. R2 0.013    
pseudo R2   0.013  
This table presents the tests for H1 and H2 in a propensity score matched sample. The matching 
procedure is described in Section 4.4. Panel A presents the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics 
of regressing AccrEM on the test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS), testing 
H1. Panel B present the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing RelREM on test and 
control variables using logistic regression, testing H2. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed 
effects on year and industry are included. The t- and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster 
correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 




Table 7. Alternative Approach  
     
 AEMres  REMres  
 coefficients t-stat coefficients t-stat 
SameName -0.003*** (-2.87) 0.022*** (2.80) 
     
Family_Ownership 0.009*** (2.61) 0.008 (0.30) 
2nd_Largest_Owner -0.004 (-1.43) -0.031 (-1.47) 
LOSS 0.041*** (19.10) -0.010 (-1.30) 
SIZE -0.002*** (-2.81) -0.064*** (-13.89) 
Big4 -0.002 (-1.41) 0.031*** (3.71) 
FamilyCEO -0.006*** (-4.83) 0.010 (1.10) 
FamilyChair -0.008*** (-6.08) -0.014 (-1.33) 
DebtRatio 0.155*** (21.55) 0.175*** (5.82) 
GROWTH 0.003 (1.08) 0.406*** (28.55) 
ROA 0.372*** (35.46) -0.095*** (-2.83) 
FirmAge -0.007*** (-10.51) -0.054*** (-12.56) 
REMres 0.004*** (2.96)   
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.060*** (-4.61) 1.275*** (13.47) 
N 45 889  55 517  
adj. R2 0.294  0.148  
This table presents the test for the trade-off between real earnings management and accrual-based 
earnings management (i.e., H2) using an alternative approach. This approach is explained in detail 
in Section 4.5. The first two columns present the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics of 
regressing AEMres on the test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS). The last 
two columns present the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics of regressing REMres on test 
and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS). The variables are defined in Appendix. 
Fixed effects on year and industry are included. The t-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster 
correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 





Table 8. Additional analyses 
 Panel A: Incentives 
(DebtRatio) 
RelREM 
Panel B: Detection 
Risk (Big4) 
 RelREM 
 coefficients z-stat coefficients z-stat 
SameName 0.226*** (6.21) 0.003 (0.07) 
SameName*DebtRatioM 0.807*** (5.49)   
SameName*Big4   0.733*** (9.71) 
     
Family_Ownership -0.042 (-0.38) -0.031 (-0.28) 
2nd_Largest_Owner -0.150 (-1.53) -0.108 (-1.11) 
LOSS -0.340*** (-6.70) -0.337*** (-6.62) 
SIZE -0.029* (-1.72) -0.034** (-2.02) 
Big4 0.225*** (5.91) -0.025 (-0.55) 
FamilyCEO 0.220*** (5.42) 0.218*** (5.36) 
FamilyChair 0.203*** (4.56) 0.192*** (4.31) 
DebtRatio   0.145* (1.85) 
DebtRatioM -0.089 (-0.99)   
GROWTH 1.531*** (25.31) 1.540*** (25.40) 
ROA -12.188*** (-55.00) -12.220*** (-55.10) 
FirmAge -0.082*** (-3.84) -0.078*** (-3.68) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant 1.450*** (4.44) 1.504*** (4.45) 
N 49 082  49 082  
pseudo R2 0.199  0.201  
This table presents the results of the additional analyses described in Section 4.7. Panel A presents 
the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics when DebtRatioM is interacted with SameName in 
equation (3). Panel B presents the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics when Big4 is 
interacted with SameName in equation (3). Both regressions are estimated using logistic 
regression. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. 
The z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich 
Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent levels using two-tailed tests. 







Figure 1. Graphical Illustration of the Interaction SameName*DebtRatioM 






Figure 2. Graphical Illustration of the Interaction SameName*Big4 from 
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This study examines the reporting of impairment losses in family and non-family private firms. 
Drawing on socioemotional wealth theory, we predict that private family firms are more 
reluctant to report impairment losses compared to private non-family firms. We find that private 
family firms are less likely to report impairment losses and report lower impairment losses 
compared to private non-family firms. There is some evidence suggesting that private family 
firms with a family CEO report lower impairment losses than private family firms without a 
family CEO, but this result does not seem to be very robust and should be interpreted with 
caution. Finally, the likelihood to report impairment losses and the impairment amount 
increases with board independence in private family firms.  
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This paper examines impairment reporting practices in private family firms and non-family 
firms and whether CEO characteristics such as family ties with the largest owning family and 
board independence affect these impairment reporting practices. The earnings quality literature 
has basically investigated aggregated discretionary accruals rather than specific accruals 
(McNichols, 2000; McNichols & Stubben, 2018) and has not taken into account the fact that 
family controlled firms (family firms) might have significantly different incentives for making 
accounting choices than non-family controlled firms (non-family firms) (Paiva, Lourenço, & 
Branco, 2016). Investigating specific accruals rather than aggregated accruals makes it possible 
to conduct specific tests on the determinants of accounting choices (McNichols, 2000; 
McNichols & Stubben, 2018).  
In order to make accounting choices, the firms must be left with some discretionary 
freedom. Impairment losses are found to be among the most discretionary specific accruals. 
They generally suffer from significant measurement uncertainty and lack of being verifiable, 
and they are at risk of being opportunistically reported (Alciatore, Dee, Easton, & Spear, 1998; 
Beatty & Weber, 2006; Francis, Hanna, & Vincent, 1996; Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010; 
Lapointe-Antunes, Cormier, & Magnan, 2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Riedl, 2004; Stenheim 
& Madsen, 2016; Zang, 2008). Previous literature has demonstrated results suggesting that the 
reporting of impairment losses is associated with principal-agent related incentives such as 
inefficient remuneration contracts and debt contracts (e.g., Francis et al., 1996; Ramanna, 2008; 
Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Riedl, 2004; Stenheim & Madsen, 2016; Zang, 2008). 
Accounting choices and thus earnings quality in family firms are likely to differ from 
those in non-family firms due to more concentrated ownership, family involvement, and 
emphasis on the preservation of socioemotional wealth (Paiva et al., 2016). We use 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory to guide our hypotheses (e.g. Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-
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Mejia, 2012; Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, 
Berrone, & De Castro, 2011; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-
Fuentes, 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018; Kalm & Gomez-Mejia, 2016). SEW 
theory predicts that family owners are loss averse to the threat of losing control and influence 
over the firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, & Imperatore, 2014), and sensitive to 
reputational concerns (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). Both of these concerns are likely 
to affect impairment reporting practices.  
Impairment losses typically emerge in situations with poor performance as they are 
supposed to reflect expectations of reduced future cash flows (Francis et al., 1996; Kosi & 
Valentincic, 2013). These losses will, if recognized, reduce earnings and earnings-based 
performance measures. Consequently, family owners may be reluctant to report impairment 
losses and to reveal poor performance as this may cause a reputational loss or questions 
regarding the family’s control and influence over the firm. Based on this, we hypothesize that 
family firms are less likely to report impairment losses, and report lower impairment losses, 
compared to non-family firms.  
We also examine whether the impairment reporting practices vary among family firms 
with certain characteristics. We expect that more family control will reinforce the general 
tendency of family firms to avoid the recognition of impairment losses and that less family 
control will mitigate this trend. Specifically, we hypothesize that if the CEO is a member of the 
largest owning family, the family firm is less likely to report impairment losses, and if these 
losses are reported, they will generally report lower impairment losses. Finally, we hypothesize 
that both the likelihood of reporting impairment losses and the reported impairment loss 




Norway provides an excellent setting to test our hypotheses. First, low book-tax 
alignment (Nobes & Schwencke, 2006) allows us to investigate impairment decisions as distinct 
from tax motivations. Tax incentives have been suggested in the literature as a motivation for 
excessive recognition of impairment losses in private firms (Kosi & Valentincic, 2013; 
Szczesny & Valentincic, 2013). In a setting with book-tax conformity, large impairment losses 
will reduce tax payments and improve performance. This suggests that family firms may want 
to report higher impairment losses as this will have real cash flow consequences for them. Such 
incentives will be hard to separate from incentives to reduce impairment losses to avoid 
reporting poor performance (reputational concerns and threats to family control which suggests 
lower write downs) in a setting with high book-tax conformity. Second, all firm-year 
observations in our sample have audited financial statements.1 Third, this setting allows us to 
use a unique and rich dataset from private firms. Private firms are less likely to be subject to an 
external demand for timely loss recognition, thus making impairment losses more discretionary 
and susceptible to any reporting incentive of the firm (Kosi & Valentincic, 2013). Family 
relationships are determined through blood lines, marriage, and adoption. It spans back four 
generations and extends out to third cousins. 
Impairment losses are supposed to be faithfully reported if they reflect variables of 
economic impairment (Francis et al., 1996; Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Riedl, 2004; Stenheim & 
Madsen, 2016). The true economic impairment is, however, unobservable, which makes it 
necessary to use proxies to investigate whether or not impairment losses reflect economic 
impairment. The test design employed in this paper makes it possible to test, at least to some 
extent, whether or not impairment losses faithfully reflect economic impairment (e.g. Francis 
et al., 1996; Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Riedl, 2004; Stenheim & Madsen, 2016).  This is done 
                                                          
1 Effective May 2011, the smallest firms were allowed to deselect their auditor (cf. Norwegian Limited Liability 
Companies Act paragraph 7-6). They are not included in our sample because they have missing observations on 
the variables Big4 and lnAF (auditor fee). 
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by using a list of variables supposed to reflect economic impairment. Any additional 
associations between test variables and the reported impairment losses may indicate earnings 
management behavior. All other things being equal, there should be no difference in the 
impairment reporting practices of family and non-family firms, unless they have different 
incentives to use the discretion inherent in impairment decisions to alter the magnitude of 
reported impairments.  
We find that on average family firms are less likely to report impairment losses and 
report lower impairment losses compared to non-family firms, controlling for economic 
conditions that affect the underlying economic impairment. This supports our first hypothesis. 
The notion underlying this hypothesis suggests that family firms report lower impairment losses 
compared to non-family firms because family owners are reluctant to report impairment losses. 
Thus, non-family firms report impairment losses that better reflect economic fundamentals. 
However, an alternative explanation is that non-family firms report more impairment losses 
because they have stronger incentives to use impairment losses as an earnings management 
instrument, indicating that family firms are the ones which report impairment losses that better 
reflect economic fundamentals (Greco, Ferramosca, & Allegrini, 2015).  
This alternative explanation is probably less likely in a private firm setting such as the 
one used in this study. Incentives to increase impairment losses to smooth earnings or take a 
big bath are lower in private firms compared to public firms (e.g. Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; 
Kosi & Valentincic, 2013; Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010). Nevertheless, we 
perform several additional tests to investigate whether our results may be caused by impairment 
increasing earnings management incentives in non-family firms rather than a general reluctance 
in family firms to report impairment losses. We find no evidence suggesting that these findings 
are caused by more earnings management in non-family firms causing higher impairment losses 
(e.g., big bath accounting or income smoothing incentives), as suggested by evidence from 
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public firms (Greco et al., 2015). On the contrary, additional analysis suggests that non-family 
firms report impairment losses that better reflect future economic fundamentals such as future 
cash flows, sales growth, and performance (ROA).  
Analyses within the family firm segment provides little robust findings regarding family 
CEOs, but more robust findings regarding board independence. Specifically, in the main test, 
we find that family firms with a family CEO report lower impairment losses, compared to 
family firms without a family CEO. However, we find no significant differences in the 
likelihood of reporting impairment losses for family firms with family CEOs and non-family 
CEOs. Furthermore, in robustness tests, we find no significant association with family CEOs 
and the impairment losses using tobit regression, or when we use an alternative definition of 
family firms. This suggests that the main findings regarding family CEOs are not very robust 
and should be interpreted with caution. The findings regarding board independence, however, 
appear to be more robust, and suggest that both the likelihood of reporting impairment losses 
and the reported impairment amounts increase with board independence in family firms.  
Our contribution to the family firm and impairment loss literature is threefold. First, we 
document variations in earnings quality, due to variations in impairment reporting practices in 
family firms versus non-family firms, which means that we are investigating specific accruals 
(i.e., impairment losses) rather than aggregate accruals. There is limited research on specific 
accruals in family firms in general, and within the private firm segment it is, to the best of our 
knowledge, non-existent. Second, we document these differences in earnings quality using data 
from private firms rather than public firms. Hope (2013) encourages researchers to examine 
family ownership in private firms as opposed to public firms. Most research on family 
ownership to date is conducted on public firms, but private firms provide more variation in 
family ownership (Hope, 2013). The private firm setting also helps disentangle the effect of 
family firms’ reluctance to report impairment losses from the effect of earnings management 
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incentives leading to big bath accounting and income smoothing in non-family firms. There is 
probably fewer incentives for big bath accounting and income smoothing in private firms 
compared to public firms due to lower manager-owner conflicts and better communication 
through private channels (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Kosi & Valentincic, 2013). This makes it 
less likely that our results are driven by non-family firms’ incentives for big bath accounting or 
income smoothing rather than family firms’ incentives to avoid reporting large impairment 
losses. As far as we are aware, no prior study has investigated the role of family ownership in 
determining impairment losses in a private firm setting. Third, we document that impairment 
loss practices among family firms are associated with board independence (i.e., lack of family 
presence on the board). To the best of our knowledge, these are new research findings.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the literature and hypotheses 
development. Section 3 describes the research design and summary statistics. Main results, 
robustness tests and additional tests are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. The Regulation of Impairment Losses 
All the firms in this setting prepare their financial statements according to the Norwegian 
Accounting Act and Norwegian Accounting Standards (Norwegian Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles: NGAAP), which are in compliance with the European Union directives 
on financial accounting.2 The NGAAP standards have over a long period of time been adapted 
to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), although they are not fully in line 
with these standards.  
                                                          
2 The 4th and 7th EU directives have now been replaced by a consolidated EU directive (2013). This new 
directive is not yet implemented as part of the Norwegian Accounting Act.  
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When it comes to the accounting of impairment losses, the NGAAP standard3 is to a large extent 
similar to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, but with some simplifications for small firms. 
Still, the NGAAP standard does not require goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
life to be tested for impairment losses annually. They are tested for impairment losses when 
indicators signal an impairment loss.  
The general idea of the NGAAP standard on impairment losses is that the reporting firm 
observes some impairment indicators based on external and internal information, and if these 
indicators signal that the carrying amount (i.e., the book values) may not be recoverable, assets 
should be tested for impairment. If the impairment test demonstrates that the carrying amounts 
are higher than the recoverable amounts, assets are written down to the amounts that are 
recoverable. The recoverable amount is defined as the higher of the net selling price and the 
present value of estimated net cash flows from future exploitation of the asset (i.e., value in 
use). 
This test procedure applies to the individual assets as they are recorded in the financial 
statements. However, the firms may have assets for which the recoverable amounts are not 
reliably measurable (because input data are missing or unreliable) or economically meaningful 
(because assets do not generate cash flows in isolation). In these cases, the assets are aggregated 
for impairment testing purposes into cash-generating units, which are the smallest identifiable 
group of assets which generates cash inflows that are largely independent of the cash inflows 
from other assets or groups of assets. Whenever indicators signal a possible impairment, the 
carrying amount of the cash-generating unit is compared with its recoverable amount. If the 
comparison demonstrates an impairment, the carrying amount of the cash generating unit is 
                                                          
3 https://www.regnskapsstiftelsen.no/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/NRSF-Nedskrivning-av-anleggsmidler-
2009.pdf (in Norwegian). 
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written down. The standards provide further details when it comes to the allocation of the 
impairment to various assets contained in the cash-generating unit.  
The impairment test procedure provides significant discretion, which may provide the 
firm managers with opportunities to align the impairment accounting to their reporting 
incentives. There is significant discretion when cash-generating units are established (and when 
goodwill and corporate assets are allocated to these units), when assessing impairment 
indicators, and in particular when estimating recoverable amounts (Ramanna & Watts, 2012).  
2.2 Impairment Losses and Earnings Quality 
The recognition of impairment losses is intended to increase the informativeness of earnings by 
signaling expectations of reduced future cash flows to outside parties (Kosi & Valentincic, 
2013). However, the recognition of impairment losses is found to be highly discretionary, which 
in turn may harm the informativeness of earnings. Impairment losses generally suffer from 
significant measurement uncertainty and lack of verifiability, and consequently they are at risk 
of being opportunistically reported (Alciatore et al., 1998; Beatty & Weber, 2006; Francis et 
al., 1996; Kothari et al., 2010; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2008; Ramanna, 2008; Ramanna & 
Watts, 2012; Riedl, 2004; Stenheim & Madsen, 2016; Zang, 2008). Prior studies demonstrate 
that impairment losses are not always faithfully reported (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Ramanna, 
2008; Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Riedl, 2004; Zang, 2008). They are found to be associated with 
proxies of earnings management incentives rather than proxies for economic impairment in 
both public and private firms (Francis et al., 1996; Greco et al., 2015; Kosi & Valentincic, 2013; 
Riedl, 2004).  
Nonetheless, this is not the whole picture. The literature adds important nuances to the 
above research findings. A study by Greco et al. (2015) investigates impairment reporting 
practices in public family and non-family firms. They find evidence suggesting that public non-
family firms report impairment losses for earnings management purposes to a larger extent than 
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public family firms. Specifically, they find that public non-family firms report higher 
impairment losses compared to public family firms both when earnings performance is 
particularly poor and when it is particularly good, suggesting that public non-family firms 
engage more in big bath accounting and earnings smoothing than public family firms. They 
attribute these findings to more type I agency conflicts in public non-family firms than in public 
family firms, based on the argument that managers of these firms have stronger incentives to 
report impairment losses for earnings management purposes in order to maximize personal 
wealth, for instance through compensation contracts or for signaling smooth earnings streams 
to outsiders. 
These findings do not necessarily speak to private family and private non-family firms. 
A substantial literature has demonstrated that financial reporting practices, hereby designated 
earnings management incentives in private firms, differ from those in public firms (e.g. Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005; Burghstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2013), which 
have the general implication that findings on financial reporting practices in public firms may 
not reflect these practices in private firms (Hope, Langli, & Thomas, 2012). Earnings 
management incentives caused by compensation contracts and signaling to outsiders are likely 
to be of less concern in private firms compared to public firms (Burghstahler et al., 2006). The 
external demand for timely and accurate recognition of impairment losses in earnings is lower 
in private firms than in public firms, making impairment losses especially prone to managerial 
discretion in private firms (Kosi & Valentincic, 2013). Since the incentives to manage earnings 
to affect compensation contracts or signaling to outsiders is lower in private firms, other 
considerations such as the preservation of socioemotional wealth (see the next section) may 




2.3 Socioemotional Wealth Theory and the Reporting of Impairments 
Socioemotional wealth theory originated from within the field of family firm research and 
serves to explain differences in behavior between family and non-family firms as well as among 
family firms. According to this theory, family owners and managers may behave differently 
from non-family owners and managers because they strive to enhance and protect their 
socioemotional wealth. SEW theory predicts that socioemotional wealth is the main reference 
point for family principals and thus that their actions and decisions will be influenced by their 
desire to avoid any socioemotional wealth loss (e.g.,  Berrone et al., 2012; Berrone et al., 2010; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). The theory 
goes as far as saying that even if financial goals and socioemotional wealth goals are in conflict, 
family principals will favor the latter over the former, thus potentially behaving 
opportunistically towards non-family stakeholders (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014).  
SEW theory builds on behavioral agency theory, which integrates elements from 
prospect theory, behavioral theory of the firm, and agency theory (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Prospect theory suggests that risk preferences are not constant, but vary depending on whether 
the expected outcome is a loss or a gain. This is called loss aversion and predicts that people 
will be risk averse to expected gains, though will exhibit risk seeking behavior when attempting 
to avoid a potential loss (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 149; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). SEW theory incorporates prospect theory, which suggests 
that family owners will be loss averse to SEW, implying that family owners will accept risks 
to avoid a loss in SEW (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et 
al., 2007). This is particularly relevant to the setting of impairment losses. As discussed in the 
sections below, the reporting of impairment losses may trigger a SEW loss for family owners 
(i.e., reputational loss or threats to family control). Family owners may then be willing to 
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manage earnings to avoid this SEW loss, i.e., they are willing to risk an even greater SEW loss 
(i.e., if earnings management is detected) to avoid the loss in SEW triggered by reporting 
impairment losses.  
An important dimension of SEW is that family owners are loss averse to the threat of 
losing some of their control and influence over the firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2014). Such perceived threats to the family’s ultimate control may trigger family principals 
to manage earnings to ensure their continued control over the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). 
An example of a situation where family control could be threatened is if the firm performs 
poorly, as this may induce criticism and questions regarding the family’s management of the 
firm. This may provide incentives for family owners to manage earnings in order to conceal 
poor performance. Decisions on whether to write down assets, and the impairment amount, 
emerges in situations with poor firm performance (e.g. Francis et al., 1996). This may provide 
incentives for family principals to reduce the impairment amount in order to minimize the effect 
on observable firm performance. Hence, family principals may be reluctant to report 
impairment losses  
SEW theory also predicts that family principals may be sensitive to reputational 
concerns by family principals’ strong identification with the firm (e.g. Berrone et al., 2012; 
Cennamo et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014). The family firm 
becomes the family’s pride and heritage, and the family name may be associated with the family 
firm as well. Large write downs and consequently large losses may result in reputational costs 
for family firms (Greco et al., 2015), motivating family owners to avoid large impairment 
losses. 
Financial statements of all private limited liability firms in Norway can easily be 
accessed by anyone online, even for the smallest firms. Consequently, poor reported 
performance can affect the private family firm reputation negatively even if it is not well-known 
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nationally. For instance, neighbors, competitors, friends, and anyone else in the community 
who know of the firm can easily access their financial statements and see that they perform 
poorly. This may motivate family owners to avoid large write downs.  
Being accused of manipulating earnings by avoiding impairment losses will also 
negatively affect the reputation of family firms. However, there are several forces at play 
regarding why they might be willing to take the risk of managing reported impairment losses. 
They will only suffer reputational losses if they are actually accused of avoiding impairment 
losses. Impairment losses are highly discretionary and thus as long as family firms comply with 
auditors’ requests to increase underreported impairment losses, it will not be known to the 
public that the auditors disagreed with the initial recognized losses. Hence, family firms may 
be willing to take the risk of avoiding impairment losses to avoid revealing poor performance 
or relinquishing family control. 
Based on this discussion, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Family firms are less likely to report impairment losses compared to 
non-family firms.   
Hypothesis 1b: Family firms report lower impairment losses than non-family firms. 
If the family firm has engaged a family member to serve in the CEO position, family 
control and influence over the firm increases compared to a situation where the family firm has 
an external CEO. This makes it easier for the family members to make decisions based on 
socioemotional wealth considerations, when the CEO is a family member (Stockmans et al., 
2010). In the case of family CEOs, the CEO’s interests are better aligned with those of the 
dominant (family) shareholder (Yang, 2010). Thus, a family CEO is likely to reinforce the 




Evidence from public family firms suggests a negative association between family CEO 
and earnings management (i.e., aggregated discretionary accruals) (Wang, 2006; Yang, 2010), 
while a study using private family firms suggests that a family CEO reinforces the general 
earnings management strategy of the controlling family (Kvaal et al., 2012). If the general 
tendency of family firms is to report lower impairment losses compared to non-family firms, 
we expect that the presence of a family CEO, as opposed to a CEO who is not a member of the 
controlling family, will reinforce this reporting behavior. Formally stated: 
Hypothesis 2a: Family firms are less likely to report impairment losses if the CEO is a 
member of the controlling family compared to family firms where the CEO is not a member of 
the controlling family.  
Hypothesis 2b: Family firms report lower impairment losses when the CEO is a member 
of the controlling family compared to family firms where the CEO is not a member of the 
controlling family.  
The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance research. Board 
independence has been found to be an efficient corporate governance mechanism to reduce 
earnings management behavior (e.g. Klein, 2002; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005; Prencipe & 
Bar-Yosef, 2011). In the case of family firms, we define independent board members as board 
members who are not related to the controlling family. Independent board members can monitor 
the family members and prevent them from making reporting decisions based on 
socioemotional wealth concerns. Thus, independent board members are likely to mitigate the 
general earnings management strategy of the controlling family (Kvaal et al., 2012). 
Conditional on that the general reporting strategy of family firms is to report lower impairment 





Hypothesis 3a: Family firms are more likely to report impairment losses as the 
proportion of non-family board members on the board of directors increases.  
Hypothesis 3b: Family firms’ reported impairment losses increase as the proportion of 
non-family board members on the board of directors increases.  
3. Research Design and Summary Statistics 
3.1 Sample 
Our data are obtained from the CCGR database at the BI Norwegian Business School. There 
are 3 316 306 firm-year observations in the database for the period of 2001 to 2015. In order to 
exclude the smallest firms with little economic significance, we require a minimum of 2 million 
NOK (consumer price adjusted) in yearly sales to be included in the sample.4 After eliminating 
firms with less than 2 million NOK,  public firms, unlimited liability firms, financial firms, and 
firms with missing information on family relationships and other variables, our final sample 
consists of 510 741 firm-year observations. The details of the sample selection process are 
outlined in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
  
                                                          
4 We chose 2 million NOK instead of 1 million NOK, which has been used as a cut-off in previous research on 
Norwegian private firms (Che & Langli, 2015; Sundkvist, Che, & Stenheim, 2020). This is because very few of 
the firm-years in the group between 1 million NOK and 2 million NOK report impairment losses (less than 
0.07%). Thus, including these firm-year observations would reduce the power of our tests.  
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3.2 Variable Measurement and Methodology 
We specify the following regression equations to test our first hypotheses: 
(1) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where ImpDec is a dummy variable reflecting the impairment decision. It takes the value 1 if 
the firm has reported impairment losses that year and 0 if not. ImpAsset indicates the impairment 
amount divided by lagged total assets multiplied by 100. It reflects the impairment of fixed 
assets (both tangible and intangible assets) and is defined here as a positive amount. FamilyFirm 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is defined as a family firm and 0 if not. Prior 
studies examining family firms have often used the level of family ownership to define whether 
the firm is a family firm or not (e.g. Chau & Gray, 2010; Che & Langli, 2015; Ding, Qu, & 
Zhuang, 2011; Pazzaglia, Mengoli, & Sapienza, 2013; Yang, 2010). In private firms, where 
ownership concentration and family ownership is higher than in public firms, it is natural to use 
50% as a cutoff to separate family firms from non-family firms (e.g. Che & Langli, 2015; 
Stockmans et al., 2010; Sundkvist et al., 2020). If the family owns more than 50% of the shares, 
it has simple majority and to a large extent controls the firm. With simple majority, the family 
can for instance appoint or dismiss the board members (cf. The Norwegian Limited Liability 
Companies Act, paragraph 5-17).5 Normally, the board appoints the CEO (cf. paragraph 6-2).  
                                                          
5 Normally, one share give the right to cast one vote at the general meeting, implying that an ownership stake 
above 50% is required to have simple majority. 
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If the family owns less than 50% of the shares, however, non-family owners combined 
have simple majority, and can block proposals from the family, appoint board members, etc., 
thus rendering the family with less power over the firm. Consequently, FamilyFirm is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the largest owning family owns more than 50% of the shares and 0 if 
not. 
We include several proxies for economic factors that may affect the impairment amount. 
Performance is likely to affect impairment losses (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). We include 
two variables to control for performance: preROA and GROWTH. preROA indicates return on 
assets before impairment losses, measured as pre-impairment net income, scaled by lagged total 
assets. The decision to report impairment losses and the reported impairment amount is likely 
to be negatively associated with performance, thus the likelihood to report impairment losses 
and the magnitude of impairment losses increases when performance decreases. The variable 
GROWTH measures growth in sales as the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. 
GROWTH is included in the model as an alternative performance measure and is expected to 
be negatively associated with ImpAsset and ImpDec. preSIZE is measured as the natural 
logarithm of pre-impairment total assets. Prior research documents that larger private firms 
report higher impairment losses (Kosi & Valentincic, 2013). preDebtRatio is measured as the 
ratio of total debt to pre-impairment total assets, and is included in the model because prior 
research on private firms documents that debt ratio is associated with impairment losses (Kosi 
& Valentincic, 2013).  
The variable Hist reflects prior impairments by the firm and is measured as lagged 
ImpAsset. Prior research has demonstrated that the likelihood of reporting impairment losses 
increases if the firm has a history of reporting impairment losses (Elliott & Hanna, 1996). We 
use two proxies for audit quality: Big4 and lnAF. Big4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms and 0 if not. The use of a Big 4 auditor has 
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been shown to improve audit quality in private firms (Che, Hope, & Langli, 2020). lnAF is the 
natural logarithm of audit fees and is used as a proxy for audit effort (Hope et al., 2012). 
SecondLargest is measured as the fraction of ownership of the second largest shareholder, 
regardless of whether the second largest shareholders is a family member or not, and is included 
in the model to control for ownership concentration, as this might affect the opportunity for 
both managers and the largest shareholder to behave opportunistically and affect reported 
impairment losses. FirmAge is included to control for the generational effect in family firms, 
as the emphasis on socioemotional wealth goals is likely to vary across family generations 
(Stockmans et al., 2010). This variable is measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since a firm’s foundation date.  
The variables preROA, preSIZE, GROWTH, preDebtRatio, and lnAF are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. The dependent variable, ImpAsset, and the lagged version of this 
variable, hist, are winsorized at the 99th percentile of non-zero values.6 We control for year and 
industry fixed effects in all our regressions. The standard errors are adjusted for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity by using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator, clustered at 
the firm level (e.g. Petersen, 2009). Equation (1) is a logistic regression model and equation (2) 
is tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. H1a and H1b imply a negative 
coefficient of FamilyFirm in both models.  
We specify the following regression equations to test H2a, H2b, H3a, and H3b: 
 
(3) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
                                                          
6 There are 226 firm-year observations with reported impairment reversals in our sample, which we set to zero. 





= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The response variables and control variables are the same as in equation (1) and (2), except that 
FamilyOwnership is here included as an additional control variable, as the level of family 
ownership spans from above 50% to 100% in the sample, and prior research suggests that the 
level of family ownership is associated with earnings quality in private family firms (Sundkvist 
et al., 2020). The test variables are FamilyCEO and BoardInd. FamliyCEO is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the CEO belongs to the largest owning family and 0 if not. BoardInd measures 
the ratio of board members who are not a member of the largest owning family. Specifically, it 
is the number of board members who are not a member of the controlling family divided by the 
total number of board members.  
As with equation (1) and (2), we control for year and industry fixed effects, and the standard 
errors are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity by using the Huber-White 
Sandwich Estimator, clustered at the firm level (e.g. Petersen, 2009). Equation (3) is tested 
using logistic regression, and equation (2) is tested using ordinary least squares regression. As 
we are here interested in variation among family firms, equations (3) and (4) are run using a 
sample of family firms only. H2a and H2b imply a negative coefficient of FamilyCEO, while 




3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for family firms, 
while panel B presents descriptive statistics for non-family firms. The total number of family 
firms in our sample is 339 817 and the number of non-family firms is 170 926. Untabulated 
statistics show that 2 957 of the family firm-year observations have reported impairment losses 
and 2597 of the non-family firm-year observations. This implies that even though family firms 
constitute two thirds of the total sample, they contribute to just above half of the reported 
impairment losses. This is also reflected by the higher value in ImpDec on non-family firms 
(0.02) compared to family firms (0.01), implying that about 1% of the firm-year observations 
of family firms and 2% of the firm-year observations of non-family firms have reported 
impairment losses during the sample period. Average ImpAsset is 0.05 for family firms and 
0.08 for non-family firms. This implies that reported impairment losses for family firms in our 
sample is on average 0.05% of lagged total assets for family firm observations and 0.08% of 
lagged total assets for non-family firms.7  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Non-family firms in our sample are on average larger (26.6 million NOK vs. 15.76 
million NOK in total pre-impairment assets) and have higher GROWTH (13% vs. 9%). They 
are also more likely to be audited by a Big 4 audit firm (30% vs. 23% of the sample) and have 
higher audit fees (42.97 vs. 34.88 thousand NOK). preROA is on average 9% for family and 
10% for non-family firms. preDebtRatio is on average 75% for both family and non-family 
firms. Non-family firms have a history of higher impairment losses, with an average Hist of 
0.07 for non-family firms and 0.04 for family firms. Family firms are on average older (15.05 
vs. 13.84 years) and the ownership stake of the second largest shareholder is 28% in non-family 
                                                          
7 ImpAsset is measured as the impairment amount divided by lagged total assets multiplied by 100. 
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firms and 18% in family firms. In family firms, 77% of the firm-year observations have a family 
CEO, average board independence is 20% and average family ownership is 90%.  
Table 2, panel C, reports correlation coefficients for the whole sample of private firms 
(used to test H1a and H1b), while panel D of Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients for the 
subsample of family firms only (used to test H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b). We see that the 
correlations among the test and control variables are reasonably low. We also see that the test 
variable FamilyFirm is negatively correlated with ImpDec and ImpAsset in panel C. From panel 
D, we note that the test variable FamilyCEO is negatively correlated with both ImpDec and 
ImpAsset, ant that the test variable IndBoard is positively correlated with both ImpDec and 
ImpAsset. This provides some preliminary support for our hypotheses.  
4. Results 
4.1 Main Results 
Table 3 reports the results from the main tests. Panel A presents the results for the whole sample, 
testing H1a and H1b. The first two columns of panel A present the results from regressing 
ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression (equation (1)). Our test variable, 
FamilyFirm, is negative and significant at the 1% level (β1=-0.271, z-statistics=-6.99). This 
suggests that, after controlling for economic factors that are likely to affect the decision to report 
impairment losses, family firms are significantly less likely to report impairment losses 
compared to non-family firms. The last two columns of panel A report the results from 
regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using OLS (equation (2)). The variable 
FamilyFirm is negative and significant at the 1% level (β1=-0.015, t-statistics=-3.75), 
suggesting that family firms report significantly lower impairment losses even after controlling 
for economic factors that are likely to affect the reported impairment amount.  
The coefficient of preROA is negative and significant in both models. A negative 
coefficient of preROA suggests that the decision to report impairment losses and the impairment 
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amount is negatively associated with performance prior to the impairment decision. lnAF is 
positive in both models, suggesting that firms with higher audit fees are more likely to report 
impairment losses and report higher impairment losses. The positive coefficient of 
preDebtRatio in model 2 suggests that firms with higher debt ratio report higher impairment 
losses. Larger firms are more likely to report impairment losses and report higher impairment 
losses, as indicated by the positive coefficients of preSIZE. The variable Big4, a proxy for audit 
quality, is significantly positive in both models, suggesting that firms audited by a Big 4 auditor 
are more likely to report impairment losses and report higher impairment losses. Both the 
likelihood to report impairment losses and the reported amount decreases with the ownership 
stake of the second largest shareholder and decreases with time, as indicated by the negative 
coefficients of SecondLargest and FirmAge.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3, panel B, reports the results from the regression within the family firm segment, testing 
H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b. The first two columns of panel B report the results from regressing 
ImpDec on test and control variables for family firms only (equation (3)). The coefficient of 
FamilyCEO is not significant. Thus, we do not get support for H2a. The coefficient of BoardInd 
is positive and significant (β2=0.418, z-statistics=4.97), suggesting that family firms are more 
likely to report impairment losses as board independence increases. This provides support for 
H3a. The last two columns of panel B present the results from regressing ImpAsset on test and 
control variables (equation (4)). The variable FamilyCEO is significantly negative (β1=-0.021, 
t-statistics=-3.65), suggesting that family firms with a family CEO report lower impairment 
amounts compared to family firms where the CEO is not a family member. This supports H2b. 
The coefficient of BoardInd is positive and significant (β2=0.048, t-statistics=4.80), suggesting 
that the amount of reported impairment losses increases with board independence in family 
firms, providing support for H3b.  
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4.2. Alternative Explanation  
The main results show that family firms are less likely to report impairment losses and report 
lower impairment amounts compared to non-family firms. The theory underlying our 
hypotheses suggests that family controlled firms may be reluctant to write down in order to 
avoid threats to family control or to avoid reputational loss related to poor performance. 
However, an alternative explanation for these results is that non-family firms have incentives 
to increase impairment losses due to big bath accounting or income smoothing. Evidence from 
public firms suggests that non-family firms have incentives to increase impairment losses when 
performance is good to smooth earnings and “save” for future periods, and incentives to 
increase impairment losses also when performance is bad to “clear the decks,” making it easier 
to report better performance in the future (Greco et al., 2015). Motivations underlying such 
strategies in non-family firms have been identified as maximizing managerial compensation 
and signaling smooth earnings to outside parties (Greco et al., 2015). These incentives, 
however, are likely to be smaller in private firms compared to public firms (Burghstahler et al., 
2006). 
CEOs’ incentives to take a big bath are closely related to agency conflicts between 
manager and owners. Such agency conflicts are likely to increase with dispersed ownership as 
there are no large owners to monitor the manager. It is probably less of a concern that these 
results are influenced by big bath accounting in non-family firms when using data from private 
firms as opposed to public firms. Less dispersed ownership in private firms makes it easier to 
monitor CEOs and avoid big bath accounting (Stockmans et al., 2010). Further, incentives to 
smooth earnings to present a smooth earnings path to outsiders are less likely to be a concern 
in private firms, as communication to a larger extent takes place through private channels (Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2005; Kosi & Valentincic, 2013).  
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Even though big bath accounting and income smoothing is unlikely to cause the 
observed differences between family firms and non-family firms’ impairment practices in 
private firms, we still conduct several additional tests to examine this alternative interpretation 
further. First, we test whether the variable Big4 (a proxy for audit quality) is associated with 
more and higher impairment losses across both family and non-family firms. Second, we run 
the regression on a sample of firms where we have excluded firms with stronger incentives to 
manage earnings through big bath accounting or earnings smoothing. Third, we test whether 
impairment losses better reflect economic fundamentals in family vs. non-family firms by 
interacting FamilyFirm with future cash flows, future sales growth, and future performance 
(ROA).  
4.2.1. Audit quality 
In the first test we examine the variable Big4 for samples of family firms and non-family firms 
separately. A positive coefficient of the variable Big4 suggests that firms audited by a Big 4 
auditor report more impairment losses. A possible interpretation of this result is that the general 
tendency for private firms is to be reluctant to report impairment losses and thus a Big 4 auditor 
will to a larger extent require higher impairment losses. The use of a Big 4 auditor has been 
shown to improve audit quality in private firms (Che et al., 2020). In this test we investigate 
whether this tendency of higher reported impairment losses for Big 4 audited firms holds across 
both family firms and non-family firms. Table 4 suggests that the use of a Big 4 auditor is 
associated with higher impairment losses in both non-family firms and family firms. This does 
not support the alternative explanation that non-family firms are in general more susceptible to 
big bath accounting. If this was the case, a Big 4 auditor should reduce rather than increase 
impairment losses in non-family firms. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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4.2.2. Big Bath Accounting and Income Smoothing 
In the second test we examine whether the results still hold when we exclude firm-year 
observations with strong incentives for big bath accounting or income smoothing. We rely upon 
prior research to identify these firm-year observations (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Greco et al., 
2015; Riedl, 2004). Big bath accounting is more likely when the change in earnings 
performance is especially poor, as this might provide incentives to charge additional costs in 
the current year, making it easier to report better earnings in the future. Thus, we exclude firm-
year observations when the change in earnings (measured as the change in pre-impairment 
earnings from t-1 to t, scaled by lagged total assets) is below the median of non-zero negative 
values (Greco et al., 2015; Riedl, 2004). Income smoothing, on the other hand, is more likely 
to occur when the change in earnings is especially good, creating incentives to manage earnings 
downwards in order to create reserves and “save” for the future. Thus, we exclude firm-year 
observations when the change in earnings (measured as the change in pre-impairment earnings 
from t-1 to t, scaled by lagged total assets) is above the median value of non-zero positive values 
(Greco et al., 2015; Riedl, 2004). By excluding these firm-year observations we are left with a 
sample of firm-years where big bath accounting and income smoothing is less likely. If our 
main results hold in this sample, a higher propensity for big bath accounting and income 
smoothing for non-family firms is unlikely to explain the main results. Table 5 shows that our 
results still hold when we exclude these firm-year observations. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.2.3. Future Economic Fundamentals 
In our third test we examine whether the association between reported impairment losses and 
future economic fundamentals differ between family and non-family firms. Impairment losses 
are supposed to reflect diminished expectations of future cash flows (Kosi & Valentincic, 
2013), implying that impairment losses should be negatively associated with future cash flows 
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(Gordon & Hsu, 2018). Greco et al. (2015) argue that impairment losses should be negatively 
associated with future performance (ROA) and sales growth as well. Taken together, this 
implies that the impairment amount better reflects economic impairment to the extent that it is 
negatively associated with future cash flows, sales growth and/or performance (ROA). We test 
whether family and non-family firms differ in this manner by interacting future cash flows, 
future sales growth and future ROA with FamilyFirm, as presented in the model below. 
(5) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑝𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
EconFund is economic fundamentals and is one of the three variables 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 
or 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 is cash flows from operations in year t+1, measured as net income 
before extraordinary items minus total accruals for firm i in year t+1, scaled by pre-impairment 
total assets in year t 8.  𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 is measured as the percentage change in sales from year 
t to year t+1. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 is measured as net income in year t+1 scaled by pre-impairment total 
assets in year t.9 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 reports the results from this regression. The coefficients of 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 
and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 are all negative and significant, while the coefficients of the interaction terms 
𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ∗ 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 and 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 are 
                                                          
8 A substantial portion of the firms in our sample is not required to issue cash flow statements. Consequently, we 
calculate cash flows using the balance sheet method. Total accruals= changes in non-cash current assets less 
changes in current non-interest-bearing liabilities+depreciation expenses+impairment losses. 
9 We adjust for the impairment amount for numbers measured in the event-year. For instance, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 
use net income year t+1 and pre-impairment assets year t, while 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 use pre-impairment net income year t 




positive and significant. Taken together, this suggests that the negative association between the 
impairment amount and future economic fundamentals such as cash flows from operations, 
sales growth, and ROA is weaker for family firms compared to non-family firms. As the 
associations between impairment losses and these economic fundamentals are expected to be 
negative, weaker associations in family firms can be interpreted as indications that impairment 
losses better reflect economic impairment losses in non-family firms than in family firms. This 
is consistent with the theory underlying our hypotheses, which suggests a general reluctance to 
report impairment losses in family firms. 
4.3.  Tobit Regressions 
In our main analysis we use OLS regression to test for differences in the impairment amount 
between family and non-family firms and logistic regression to test for differences between the 
likelihood that family firms vs. non-family firms will report impairment losses. In this 
robustness test, we combine the two and test whether family firms report higher impairment 
losses, conditional on the impairment decision. We also test whether a family CEO is associated 
with lower impairment losses and whether board independence is associated with higher 
impairment losses among family firms, conditional on the impairment decision. We model the 
impairment decision and impairment amount together by using a tobit regression (Francis et al., 
1996; Kosi & Valentincic, 2013; Riedl, 2004; Szczesny & Valentincic, 2013; Tobin, 1958). 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Table 7 reports the results from the tobit regressions. The coefficient of FamilyFirm is negative 
and significant, suggesting that conditional on the decision to report impairment losses, family 
firms report lower impairment losses compared to non-family firms. This is in line with our 
main results, which showed both a lower propensity for reporting impairment losses and lower 
impairment amount for family firms compared to non-family firms. The coefficient of 
FamilyCEO is not significant in the tobit regression. In the main results we found FamilyCEO 
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to be significantly negatively related to the impairment amount but not the likelihood to report 
impairment losses. The coefficient of BoardInd is positive and significant in the tobit 
regression, suggesting that board independence is positively associated with the impairment 
amount in family firms, conditional on the impairment decision. This supports our main results, 
where we found board independence to be positively associated with both the impairment 
amount and the likelihood to report impairment losses.  
4.4 Size and Propensity Score Matching  
Summary statistics (Table 2) show that family firms and non-family firms differ with regard to 
size, measured as pre-impairment total assets. Untabulated analysis reveals that this difference 
in average pre-impairment total assets between the groups is mainly driven by the largest firms. 
Among the  largest 10% of firms in the sample, non-family firms are on average 20 million 
NOK larger than family firms, while this difference in size is only 1.35 million NOK for the 
remaining firms in the sample (those below the 90th percentile based on preSIZE).  
We do control for preSIZE in all our analysis, thus this differences in size is not likely 
to affect our results. Still, we conduct an additional robustness test where we exclude the largest 
10% of firms from the sample to make sure that differences in total assets do not interfere with 
the results. In this truncated sample, family and non-family firms are also more equal regarding 
other variables such as audit fees (an average of 34 thousand NOK for non-family firms and 30 
thousand NOK for family firms) and Big4 (an average of 0.25 for non-family firms and 0.22 
for family firms). 
 Table 8, panel A, reports the results from this test when the largest 10% of firms are 
excluded from the sample. FamilyFirm is negative and significant in both models, indicating 
that our main results still hold. The coefficients and t- and z-values are somewhat smaller than 
in the main test. This is not surprising, given that impairment losses are reported more 
frequently among the largest firms. Untabulated analysis shows that 3.6% of the largest 10% of 
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firms (i.e., the firms we have now excluded from the sample) have reported impairment losses, 
but only 0.8% of the remaining firms in the sample (i.e., the firms below the 90th percentile 
based on preSIZE) reported impairment losses. Thus, when we exclude the firms that most 
frequently report impairment losses from the sample, we risk “throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater,” and lower coefficients and significance levels in this sample are not surprising. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
  Summary statistics reveals that the two groups of firms (family vs. non-family firms) 
differ on other dimensions besides just size. To further assess whether any of these differences 
may bias our main results, we rerun equation (1) and (2) (main test models for H1a and H1b 
outlined in Section 3.2) in a propensity score matched sample. The propensity scores are 
estimated using a probit model with FamilyFirm as the outcome variable. We match on all the 
control variables in equation (1) and (2), including industry and year fixed effects (e.g. DeFond, 
Hung, Li, & Li, 2015). We use nearest neighbor matching without replacement, with common 
support restriction (Bonacchi, Marra, & Zarowin, 2019; Hope, Yue, & Zhong, 2019). Thus, 
each observation from a family firm is matched with the non-family firm observation with the 
propensity score closest in value.  
Table 8, panel B, reports the results from this test. The coefficient of FamilyFirm is 
negative and significant (1% level) in the propensity score matched sample, consistent with the 
main results.  
4.5 Alternative Definition of Family Firms and Economic Significance 
In our main analysis, we define a family firm as a firm with more than 50% family ownership, 
regardless of whether the family ownership consists of multiple family owners or one single 
person. In this robustness test, we require more than one family owner, in addition to more than 
50% family ownership, to be defined as a family firm. Firm-year observations with more than 
50% ownership but only one family owner are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 9, panels A and B, present the results of these regressions. Panel A presents the results 
from equations (1) and (2), testing differences between family and non-family firms (H1a and 
H1b). FamilyFirm is negative and significant in both regressions, suggesting that our main 
results regarding differences between family and non-family firms are robust to this alternative 
definition of family firms. Panel B presents the results from equations (3) and (4) in a subsample 
of family firms only. FamilyCEO is not significantly associated with either ImpDec or ImpAsset 
in this sample. In the main test, FamilyCEO was significantly negatively associated with 
ImpAsset, but not ImpDec. This lack of significant association with ImpAsset in this robustness 
test further confirms the findings of the last robustness test (i.e., tobit regression) that the 
association between FamilyCEO and ImpAsset observed in the main test is not very robust. The 
variable BoardInd is positive and significantly associated with both ImpDec and ImpAsset. This 
is in line with the main findings and supports H3a and H3b, stating that family firms are more 
likely to report impairment losses, and report higher impairment losses, as the ratio of 
independent board members increases.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
We also wish to assess the economic significance of our results further. For this purpose, 
we focus on a specific situation where a certain type of firms are likely to experience poor 
performance or at least a rapid decline in performance, suggesting a possible impairment. 
Specifically, we examine the rapid decline in oil prices starting in 2014 and use this as an 
exogenous shock that was likely to trigger a need for reporting impairment losses in oil price 
exposed firms. We estimate equations (1) and (2) (see Section 3.2) in a sample of oil firms for 
the period 2014–201510. Table 9, panel C, reports the results from these regressions. Consistent 
                                                          
10 Firms with the following industry codes are defined as oil firms or oil-related firms: 06.000: Extraction of 
crude petroleum and natural gas, 09.100: Service activities for petroleum and natural gas, 49.500: Pipeline, 
52.125: Services related to pipelines, 30.113: Construction of oil platforms and modules, 30.116: Installation 
work on drilling rigs and modules, and 52.223: Supply bases. This is based on a report from Statistics Norway 
regarding employees in the oil industry (i.e. Eikeland, 2014).  
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with our main results, the coefficient of FamilyFirm is negative at the 10% level with a p-value 
of 0.057, suggesting that family firms were less likely to report impairment losses in the period 
after the rapid decline in oil price.  
Using the margins command in Software for Statistics and Data Science (STATA), we find 
that the average marginal effect of FamilyFirm is -0.09, i.e., the likelihood of reporting 
impairment losses was 9 percentage point higher for non-family firms. This difference is 
significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.072. This suggests that in this specific situation 
where the firms in the sample were most likely hit by a negative economic shock, which is 
likely to trigger a need for impairment, the difference between the likelihood of reporting 
impairment losses between family and non-family firms was substantial and economically 
significant. We find no significant difference in the impairment amount in this sample. The 
coefficient is, as expected, negative, but not significant with a p-value of 0.259. Given our small 
sample (N=113) and the fact that only 12% of these reported impairment losses (untabulated), 
it might be hard to find statistically significant results.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigates the reporting of impairment losses in family versus non-family private 
firms, and variations among family firms. Impairment losses are highly discretionary and may 
reflect earnings management incentives (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Greco et al., 2015; Riedl, 
2004). Family firms are likely to have different reporting incentives from non-family firms, 
suggesting that the reporting of impairment losses and consequently earnings quality may differ 
between family and non-family firms (e.g. Greco et al., 2015; Paiva et al., 2016).  
The overall results suggest that family firms are less likely to report impairment losses and 
report lower impairment losses compared to non-family firms, controlling for economic 
conditions that probably reflect the economic impairment. The underlying notion is that family 
firms are more reluctant to report impairment losses than non-family firms. An alternative 
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explanation is that non-family firms report more impairment losses in order to meet income 
smoothing or big bath accounting incentives, though this explanation is less evident in a private 
firm setting. When performing additional tests, we do find evidence suggesting that family 
firms in general are reluctant to report impairment losses, and that the reported impairment 
losses in non-family firms reflect future economic fundamentals to a larger extent than the 
reported impairment losses in family firms.  
We also examine whether the reporting of impairment losses varies with family power and 
influence among private family firms. We find some evidence suggesting that a family firm 
with a family CEO reports lower impairment losses than a family firm where the CEO is not a 
family member, though these findings are not very robust, and we do not find significant 
differences in the likelihood of reporting impairment losses related to whether or not the CEO 
is a family member. Our results also suggest that board members who are not family members 
are positively associated with both the likelihood of reporting impairment losses and the 
impairment amount, suggesting that independent board members mitigate the general tendency 
of family firms to avoid reporting impairment losses. 
Since the true economic impairment is unobservable, it is necessary to use proxies to control 
for whether impairment losses are faithfully reported or not. We base our proxies on prior 
research (e.g. Francis et al., 1996; Greco et al., 2015; Riedl, 2004), but the validity of our results 
is limited to the extent that these proxies capture true economic impairment. This study is 
conducted in a setting with low book-tax conformity. Future research should examine whether 
these results are generalizable to a high book-tax conformity setting. In such a setting, firms 
may have incentives to manage earnings downwards in order to reduce tax payments, and it 
would be interesting to examine whether family firms’ desires to reduce tax payments 




Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Outcome Variables 
ImpDec Impairment decision, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has 
reported impairment losses current year and 0 if not. 
ImpAsset Impairment losses, measured as impairment scaled by lagged total 









A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the family ownership is more 
than 50% and 0 if not. 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is a member of the 
controlling family and 0 if not. 
 
The number of board members who are not a member of the controlling 
family divided by the total number of board members. 
 
Control Variables  
preSIZE Natural logarithm of pre-impairment total assets. 
Big4 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statements are audited 
by one of the big 4 audit firms and 0 if not. 
 
preDebtRatio The ratio of total debt to pre-impairment total assets. 
GROWTH Change in sales in year t ( . 
preROA 
 
Net income in year t plus impairment, divided by lagged total assets.  
lnAF Natural logarithm of auditor fee. 
Hist Impairment history, measured as lagged ImpAsset (ImpAssett-1). 
SecondLargest Fraction of shares owned by the second largest shareholder   
lnFirmAge Natural logarithm of number of years since foundation date 
Family_Ownership The aggregated fraction of shares held by the largest owning family, 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Firm-years 
Observations in the CCGR database for the years 2001–2015        3 316 306  
Exclusion criteria  
Firms with sales less than 2 million NOK in at least one year        2 520 703  
Public firms or unlimited liability firms             85 085 
Financial firms               4 032  
Firm-years with missing values on family ownership           119 303  
Firm-years with missing values on other variables             76 442  





Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Family Firms 
         
 N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
ImpDec 339 816 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ImpAsset 339 816 0.05 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
preROA 339 816 0.09 0.17 -0.16 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.39 
Audit Fee (TNOK) 339 816 34.88 30.63 10.00 18.00 26.00 40.00 89.00 
Total Assets (MNOK) 339 816 15.76 40.70 0.91 2.27 4.73 11.65 60.13 
preDebtRatio 339 816 0.75 0.27 0.31 0.59 0.77 0.89 1.13 
GROWTH 339 816 0.09 0.32 -0.26 -0.05 0.04 0.16 0.58 
Hist 339 816 0.04 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Big4 339 816 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SecondLargest 339 816 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.33 0.50 
FirmAge 339 816 15.05 12.78 2.00 6.00 12.00 20.00  37.00 
FamilyCEO 339 816 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
BoardInd 339 816 0.20 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.75 




Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Non-family Firms 
         
 N Mean SD p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 
ImpDec 170 925 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ImpAsset 170 925 0.08 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
preROA 170 925 0.10 0.18 -0.17 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.43 
Audit Fee (TNOK) 170 925 42.97 41.69 10.00 19.00 30.00 48.00 129.00 
Total Assets (MNOK) 170 925 26.60 61.14 1.01 2.76 6.55 19.08 125.81 
preDebtRatio 170 925 0.75 0.26 0.33 0.60 0.76 0.89 1.11 
GROWTH 170 925 0.13 0.39 -0.27 -0.04 0.05 0.19 0.81 
Hist 170 925 0.07 1.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Big4 170 925 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SecondLargest 170 925 0.28 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.40 0.50 





Panel C: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for the Whole Sample 
              
              
  v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 
ImpDec                   v1 1.00            
ImpAsset               v2 0.52*** 1.00           
FamilyFirm v3 -0.03*** -0.01*** 1.00          
preROA v4 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 1.00         
GROWTH v5 0.00* -0.00** -0.06*** 0.23*** 1.00        
preSIZE v6 0.09*** 0.03*** -0.12*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 1.00       
preDebtRatio v7 -0.00** 0.01*** 0.00*** -0.28*** 0.05*** -0.23*** 1.00      
Hist v8 0.10*** 0.13*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.00*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 1.00     
Big4 v9 0.05*** 0.03*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 0.01*** 0.22*** -0.03*** 0.03*** 1.00    
lnAF v10 0.08*** 0.02*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 0.55*** -0.05*** 0.02*** 0.16*** 1.00   
SecondLargest v11 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.29*** 0.03*** 0.01*** -0.04*** 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.05*** -0.02*** 1.00  





Panel D: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for the Subsample of Family Firms Only 
                
                
  v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 
ImpDec                   v1 1.00              
ImpAsset               v2 0.53*** 1.00             
FamilyCEO v3 -0.02*** -0.02*** 1.00            
BoardInd v4 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.33*** 1.00           
preROA v5 -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 1.00          
GROWTH v6 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.24*** 1.00         
preSIZE v7 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.18*** 0.24*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 1.00        
preDebtRatio v8 0.00* 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.30*** 0.05*** -0.23*** 1.00       
Hist v9 0.11*** 0.14*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.01*** -0.00* 0.01*** 0.03*** 1.00      
Big4 v10 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.09*** 0.09*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.18*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 1.00     
lnAF v11 0.06*** 0.02*** -0.12*** 0.24*** -0.06*** -0.03*** 0.53*** -0.04*** 0.02*** 0.12*** 1.00    
SecondLargest v12 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02*** 0.07*** 0.00* -0.00 0.05*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.01*** 0.04*** 1.00   
lnFirmAge v13 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.22*** 0.25*** -0.20*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.22*** 0.04*** 1.00  
Family_Ownership v14 -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.20*** -0.47*** -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.10*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.10*** -0.32*** -0.00 1.00 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th percentiles) for family firms.  
Panel B presents descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th percentiles) for non-family firms. 
Panel C provides the Pearson correlations for the whole sample of private firms (used to test H1a and H1b). 
Panel D provides the Pearson correlations for the subsample of family firms only (used to test H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b). 





Table 3. Regression Results for ImpDec and ImpAsset on Test and Control Variables  
Panel A: Family vs. Non-family Firms – H1a and H1b Panel B: Family Firms – H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b 
 ImpDec  ImpAsset                ImpDec  ImpAsset                
 Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat 
FamilyFirm -0.271*** (-6.99) -0.015*** (-3.75)     
FamilyCEO     0.010 (0.18) -0.021*** (-3.65) 
BoardInd     0.418*** (4.97) 0.048*** (4.80) 
         
preROA -1.363*** (-10.19) -0.083*** (-4.22) -0.859*** (-4.89) 0.025 (0.81) 
GROWTH 0.004 (0.10) -0.023*** (-3.45) -0.044 (-0.64) 0.003 (0.24) 
preSIZE 0.403*** (21.48) 0.025*** (10.29) 0.312*** (13.24) 0.020*** (6.80) 
preDebtRatio 0.055 (0.70) 0.019* (1.83) 0.250** (2.50) 0.018* (1.80) 
Hist 0.114*** (17.71) 0.136*** (7.48) 0.128*** (13.98) 0.187*** (5.17) 
Big4 0.330*** (8.68) 0.037*** (8.31) 0.205*** (4.01) 0.021*** (3.75) 
lnAF 0.278*** (8.60) 0.006* (1.72) 0.321*** (7.56) -0.001 (-0.35) 
SecondLargest -0.499*** (-4.47) -0.032*** (-3.55) -0.276* (-1.86) -0.018 (-1.34) 
lnFirmAge -0.133*** (-6.46) -0.025*** (-10.82) -0.099*** (-3.56) -0.015*** (-5.57) 
Family_Ownership     0.065 (0.40) 0.004 (0.21) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -11.522*** (-39.09) -0.299*** (-8.33) -10.723*** (-26.24) -0.232*** (-4.96) 
N 510 734  510 741  339 775  339 816  
adj. R2   0.019    0.027  
pseudo R2 0.095    0.069    
This table presents the test for H1, H2 and H3. Panel A presents the results for H1a and H1b (equations (1) and (2)), addressing differences between family and non-
family firms. Panel B presents the results for H2a, H2b, H3a and H3c (equations (3) and (4)), addressing variations among family firms. The first two columns of panel 
A present the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. The last two columns of panel A 
present the results of regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The test variable of interest in panel A is FamilyFirm. 
The first two columns of panel B present the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. The 
last two columns of panel A presents the results of regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The test variables of 
interest in panel B are FamilyCEO and BoardInd, and the regressions are run in a sample of family firms only. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on 
year and industry are included. The t-and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates 
significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent levels using two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4. Audit Quality (Big4) 
 Panel A: Family Firms Panel B: Non-family Firms  
 ImpDec  ImpAsset                ImpDec  ImpAsset                 
 Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat  
preROA -0.900*** (-5.08) -0.029 (-1.22) -1.775*** (-9.30) -0.161*** (-4.90)  
GROWTH -0.040 (-0.59) -0.026*** (-3.61) 0.032 (0.56) -0.022* (-1.79)  
preSIZE 0.335*** (14.31) 0.018*** (6.34) 0.462*** (16.56) 0.033*** (7.95)  
preDebtRatio 0.271*** (2.72) 0.035*** (3.08) -0.184 (-1.55) -0.010 (-0.50)  
Hist 0.130*** (14.17) 0.149*** (5.84) 0.095*** (12.47) 0.118*** (4.67)  
          
Big4 0.223*** (4.39) 0.024*** (4.75) 0.442*** (7.70) 0.055*** (6.71)  
          
lnAF 0.350*** (8.28) 0.006 (1.56) 0.197*** (4.28) 0.003 (0.50)  
SecondLargest -0.283** (-2.12) -0.007 (-0.69) -0.679*** (-3.17) -0.068*** (-3.36)  
lnFirmAge -0.105*** (-3.78) -0.018*** (-7.21) -0.163*** (-5.47) -0.036*** (-8.01)  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Constant -11.045*** (-30.32) -0.247*** (-5.92) -12.123*** (-25.80) -0.358*** (-5.57)  
N 339 775  339 816  170 922  170 925   
adj. R2   0.022    0.018   
pseudo R2 0.068    0.122     
This table presents the results from equations (1) and (2) for samples of family firms and non-family firms separately. The variable of interest in this robustness test is Big4. 
Panel A presents the results from the subsamples of family firms only, while panel B presents the results from the subsamples of non-family firms only. The first two columns 
of panel A present the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. The last two columns of panel 
A present the results of regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The first two columns of panel B present the coefficients 
and corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. The last two columns of panel B present the results of regressing 
ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. 
The t- and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent levels 









Table 5. Reduced Sample with Fewer Incentives for Big Bath Accounting 
and Income Smoothing  
     
 ImpDec  ImpAsset                
 Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Familyfirm -0.301*** (-5.55) -0.008** (-2.15) 
     
preROA -2.024*** (-6.53) -0.152*** (-4.68) 
GROWTH -0.162* (-1.96) -0.020* (-1.95) 
preSIZE 0.460*** (16.73) 0.016*** (7.05) 
preDebtRatio -0.353*** (-2.70) -0.021* (-1.72) 
Hist 0.186*** (11.48) 0.246*** (5.50) 
Big4 0.281*** (5.24) 0.018*** (4.17) 
lnAF 0.234*** (5.10) -0.001 (-0.25) 
SecondLargest -0.424*** (-2.66) -0.027*** (-2.62) 
lnFirmAge -0.153*** (-5.05) -0.016*** (-6.33) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes  
_cons -12.103*** (-27.40) -0.140*** (-3.99) 
N 255 947  255 954  
adj. R2   0.052  
pseudo R2 0.110    
This table presents the results from equations (1) and (2) for a reduced sample with fewer incentives for 
big bath accounting and income smoothing. The first two columns present the coefficients and 
corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. 
The last two columns present the results of regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year 
and industry are included. The t- and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the 





Table 6. Future Economic Fundamentals 
 Panel A: CFO Panel B: GROWTH Panel C: ROA 
 ImpAsset               ImpAsset                ImpAsset               
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Familyfirm -0.018*** (-4.08) -0.018*** (-4.11) -0.022*** (-4.35) 
CFOt+1 -0.058
*** (-4.73)     
FamilyFirm* CFOt+1 0.035
** (2.45)     
GROWTHt+1   -0.082
*** (-6.46)   
FamilyFirm* GROWTHt+1   0.042
*** (2.83)   
ROAt+1     -0.183
*** (-8.49) 
FamilyFirm* ROAt+1     0.093
*** (4.02) 
preROA -0.043** (-2.20) -0.061*** (-3.16) 0.003 (0.11) 
GROWTH -0.025*** (-3.96) -0.024*** (-3.86) -0.027*** (-4.31) 
preSIZE 0.025*** (10.75) 0.026*** (11.13) 0.025*** (10.69) 
preDebtRatio 0.003 (0.32) 0.005 (0.53) 0.007 (0.82) 
Hist 0.139*** (7.27) 0.139*** (7.27) 0.139*** (7.27) 
Big4 0.035*** (8.17) 0.035*** (8.16) 0.035*** (8.13) 
lnAF 0.005 (1.43) 0.004 (1.22) 0.005 (1.43) 
SecondLargest -0.031*** (-3.54) -0.032*** (-3.66) -0.029*** (-3.36) 
lnFirmAge -0.022*** (-9.88) -0.023*** (-10.26) -0.021*** (-9.80) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.299*** (-8.87) -0.312*** (-9.27) -0.298*** (-8.87) 
N 501 236  501 236  501 236  
adj. R2 0.022  0.022  0.022  
This table presents the results from equation (5). Panel A presents the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from regressing ImpAsset on test and 
control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The economic fundamentals variable of interest in this regression is future CFO. Panel 
B presents the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression. The economic fundamentals variable of interest in this regression is future GROWTH. Panel C presents the coefficients and corresponding 
t-statistics from regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The economic fundamentals variable 
of interest in this regression is future ROA. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. The t-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation 




Table 7. Tobit Regressions 
 Panel A: Family vs. Non-
family Firms – H1b 
Panel B: Family Firms – H2b 
and H3b 
 ImpAsset  ImpAsset  
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
FamilyFirm -1.608*** (-6.57)   
FamilyCEO   -0.218 (-0.61) 
Boardind   2.858*** (5.08) 
     
preROA -8.317*** (-9.52) -5.303*** (-4.46) 
GROWTH -0.209 (-0.70) -0.678 (-1.48) 
preSIZE 2.551*** (19.99) 2.059*** (12.28) 
preDebtRatio 0.908* (1.79) 2.162*** (3.24) 
Hist 1.113*** (21.56) 1.276*** (17.30) 
Big4 2.347*** (9.43) 1.574*** (4.71) 
lnAF 1.785*** (8.72) 1.953*** (7.11) 
SecondLargest -3.172*** (-4.58) -1.842** (-1.97) 
lnFirmAge -1.065*** (-7.71) -0.818*** (-4.46) 
Family_Ownership   -0.023 (-0.02) 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant -83.234*** (-32.50) -80.691*** (-23.06) 
N 510 741  339 816  
pseudo R2 0.063  0.050  
This table presents the results from equations (2) and (4), using tobit regression. The first two columns 
present the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics of regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables 
as presented in equation (2). The last two columns present the results of regressing ImpAsset on test and 
control variables as presented in equation (4) in a sample of family firms only. The variables are defined in 
Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. The t- statistics are adjusted for within-cluster 
correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 




Table 8. Sample without the Largest 10% of Firms and Propensity Score Matching 
 Panel A: Largest 10% of Firms Dropped Panel B: Propensity Score Matching 
 ImpDec  ImpAsset  ImpDec  ImpAsset  
 Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients z-stat Coefficients t-stat 
FamilyFirm -0.167*** (-3.56) -0.009** (-2.28) -0.365*** (-8.70) -0.019*** (-3.98) 
preROA -1.265*** (-8.59) -0.074*** (-3.95)     
GROWTH -0.033 (-0.57) -0.018*** (-2.72)     
preSIZE 0.413*** (15.43) 0.013*** (5.98)     
preDebtRatio 0.203** (2.26) 0.019* (1.90)     
Hist 0.106*** (14.79) 0.105*** (5.69)     
Big4 0.283*** (6.21) 0.030*** (6.61)     
lnAF 0.335*** (8.58) 0.018*** (6.19)     
SecondLargest -0.359*** (-2.81) -0.018* (-1.95)     
lnFirmAge -0.131*** (-5.36) -0.019*** (-8.86)     
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -12.004*** (-29.08) -0.169*** (-4.82) -3.853*** (-30.40) 0.098*** (6.17) 
N 459 661  459 668  341 834  341 838  
adj. R2   0.012    0.002  
pseudo R2 0.053    0.022    
This table presents the results from equations (1) and (2), for a reduced sample without the  largest 10% of firms (panel A) and for a propensity score matched sample (panel 
B). The first two columns of each panel present the coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. The 
last two columns of each panel present the results of regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The variables are defined 
in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are included. The t-and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator.  





Table 9. Alternative Definition of Family Firms and Oil Price Shock 
 Panel A: More than One Family 
Owner Full Sample 
Panel B: More than One Family 
Owner Family Firms Only 
Panel C: Oil Firms After the Oil 
Price Shock (2014/2015) 
 ImpDec ImpAsset ImpDec ImpAsset ImpDec ImpAsset 
 Coeff. z-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. z-stat Coeff. t-stat 
FamilyFirm -0.235*** (-4.99) -0.011** (-2.56)     -1.326* (-1.90) -0.744 (-1.14) 
FamilyCEO     0.069 (0.91) -0.012 (-1.31)     
BoardInd     0.380*** (2.93) 0.059*** (3.62)     
             
preROA -1.402*** (-8.68) -0.074*** (-2.69) -0.561** (-2.08) 0.158*** (2.77) 1.816 (0.57) -0.975 (-0.60) 
GROWTH 0.020 (0.40) -0.027*** (-2.95) -0.040 (-0.39) -0.025* (-1.69) 1.011 (1.49) 1.462 (1.06) 
preSIZE 0.414*** (18.52) 0.026*** (8.97) 0.309*** (9.14) 0.018*** (4.53) 0.903 (1.40) 0.270 (1.16) 
preDebtRatio -0.068 (-0.71) -0.002 (-0.14) 0.198 (1.31) 0.004 (0.31) -0.563 (-0.36) -0.314 (-0.44) 
Hist 0.114*** (14.04) 0.148*** (6.25) 0.149*** (9.76) 0.255*** (3.80) 0.458* (1.91) 0.293** (2.53) 
Big4 0.392*** (8.66) 0.043*** (7.37) 0.296*** (4.09) 0.020** (2.28) 1.419 (1.20) -0.904 (-0.65) 
lnAF 0.227*** (6.02) 0.001 (0.23) 0.265*** (4.33) -0.007 (-1.22) 0.601 (1.56) 0.058 (0.32) 
SecondLargest -0.810*** (-4.81) -0.086*** (-5.25) -0.843*** (-3.06) -0.058* (-1.96) 5.266 (1.31) -1.112 (-0.25) 
lnFirmAge -0.149*** (-6.03) -0.029*** (-9.40) -0.119*** (-2.80) -0.018*** (-4.25) -0.137 (-0.27) -0.316 (-0.98) 
Family_Ownership     0.415* (1.83) 0.021 (0.88)     
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -11.412*** (-31.27) -0.274*** (-6.34) -10.607*** (-17.84) -0.200*** (-3.06) -23.936** (-2.06) -2.841 (-1.16) 
N 317 246  317 251  146 311  146 326  113  113  
adj. R2   0.023    0.048    0.085  
pseudo R2 0.106    0.076    0.381    
This table presents the results from equations (1) and (2), in various subsamples. Panel A presents the results from a sample with both family and non-family firms, requiring more 
than one family owner to be defined as a family firm. Panel B presents the results from family firms only, when requiring more than one family owner to be defined as a family 
firm. Panel C presents the results from oil price exposed firms in the period after the rapid decline in oil price (2014/2015). The first two columns of each panel present the 
coefficients and corresponding z-statistics of regressing ImpDec on test and control variables using logistic regression. The last two columns of each panel present the results of 
regressing ImpAsset on test and control variables using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The variables are defined in Appendix. Fixed effects on year and industry are 
included. The t- and z-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of a negative shock to performance on earnings quality in a 
private firm setting. Private firms are fundamentally different from public firms, with the 
consequence that results from public firms may not be generalizable to private firms (e.g. Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2005; Burghstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Hope, Langli, & Thomas, 2012). 
Fundamental performance is unobservable and therefore difficult to measure. Existing research 
has used proxies that are subject to estimation errors and endogeneity concerns (e.g. Balsam, 
Haw, & Lilien, 1995; Mark L. DeFond & Park, 1997). This study attempts to overcome this 
issue by taking advantage of the exogenous shock in oil price which occurred in 2014 and using 
a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effect of a negative shift in performance 
on earnings quality. The results suggest that a negative shock in fundamental performance 
lowers earnings quality.  
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This paper examines the effect of a decline in fundamental performance, proxied by a drop in 
oil prices, on earnings quality in private firms. A significant portion of the Norwegian economy 
is heavily exposed to the volatility of oil prices, whereas the remainder is less exposed, making 
it possible to conduct a difference-in-differences design to test the effect of fundamental 
performance, proxied by oil prices, on earnings quality.  
Extant research in this field has mainly been conducted on public firms, yields mixed 
results and may suffer from endogeneity bias due to the use of accounting-based performance 
measures (e.g., ROA) or a lack of control group. Several studies demonstrate that extreme 
performance leads to more earnings management and less earnings quality due to stronger 
earnings management incentives (e.g. Balsam et al., 1995; Mark L. DeFond & Park, 1997; 
Keating & L. Zimmerman, 1999; Mollik, Mir, McIver, & Bepari, 2013; Persakis & Iatridis, 
2015; Pong, Chia, Lapsley, & Lee, 2007), though some studies examining the financial crisis 
suggest less earnings management after the crisis, possibly due to increased monitoring 
(Cimini, 2015; Filip & Raffournier, 2014). The models estimating earnings management and 
earnings quality are also found to be heavily affected by situations of extreme performance (e.g. 
Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005), however the performance 
measures leading to these results suffer from endogeneity concerns due to the use of accounting-
based performance measures (e.g., ROA). 
The findings regarding public firms in situations of extreme performance may not be 
valid for private firms. The incentives and opportunities to manage earnings are likely different 
due to factors such as more concentrated ownership, more debt financing and the lack of 
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disciplinary capital market forces (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Bar-Yosef, D’Augusta, & 
Prencipe, 2019; Burghstahler et al., 2006; Hope & Vyas, 2017).  
Concentrated ownership may cause wealth expropriation of a controlling owner at the 
expense of non-controlling owners (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Earnings management may serve 
as an instrument to facilitate or to conceal such expropriation. Debt financing may lead to 
stronger earnings management incentives in situations where firms need to raise new debt or 
there is risk of debt covenant violations (e.g. Mark L. DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002; Sweeney, 1994; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Capital market incentives, 
however, are less prominent in private firms, which suggest that they are less inclined to use 
earnings management to smooth earnings or to meet or beat analyst’s earnings forecasts. Private 
firms are also less subject to disciplinary capital market forces and less concerned with earnings 
informativeness, since they can communicate through private channels more easily than public 
firms (Burghstahler et al., 2006). 
Prior research on earnings quality and performance has generally used accounting-based 
measures of performance (e.g. Balsam et al., 1995; Mark L. DeFond & Park, 1997; Keating & 
L. Zimmerman, 1999; Kothari et al., 2005). Since a firm’s fundamental performance is 
unobservable, accounting earnings will be a function of fundamental performance and the 
accounting system used to measure fundamental performance (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). 
Earnings quality will then be a function of the ability of the accounting system to measure 
fundamental performance (e.g., fair value vs. historical cost), and the application of the 
accounting system (e.g., intentional and unintentional estimation errors and bias) (Dechow et 
al., 2010; Mark L. DeFond, 2010). The literature has not been able to distinguish the effect of 
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fundamental performance from the effect of the accounting system on earnings quality. Dechow 
et al. (2010) call for more research on this matter.  
This study responds to this call and aims to isolate the effect of fundamental 
performance while keeping the ability of the accounting system to measure fundamental 
performance constant. This is done by using a difference-in-differences design which allows us 
to capture the impact of fundamental performance, proxied by the drop in oil prices, without 
relying on accounting-based performance measures. Firms less affected by the drop in oil prices 
are used as control group. By measuring the difference in earnings quality before and after the 
drop for both the treatment and control group, and then measuring the difference of the 
differences across these two groups, we aim to isolate the effect which the change in 
performance, caused by the drop in oil prices, has on earnings quality. The significant drop in 
oil prices in 2014 is here used as an exogenous event. We focus on Norwegian firms, as Norway 
provides an excellent setting for using the oil price as a proxy for fundamental performance. By 
using a control group, we control for the general trend in the Norwegian economy and for the 
institutional setting which could affect earnings quality at that time regardless of the oil prices. 
Since the drop in oil prices was an external event outside the control of the individual firms, 
selection bias should not be a big concern in our design.  
Prior research demonstrates that oil prices are likely to be a good measure of 
fundamental performance for oil firms (Hall & Stammerjohan, 1997; Han & Wang, 1998). A 
possible drawback of this approach is that oil price exposed companies may use derivatives to 
hedge against the exposure to oil price risk. If this is the case, the impact of oil prices on 
performance will be reduced, at least in the short run. However, future expected income will 
fall. It will probably not be possible to renew these hedging contracts with the same prices. The 
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extent to which hedging offsets some of the impact on performance will also work against 
finding any predicted differences in earnings quality between the oil price exposed firms and 
the control group.  
Firms with extreme performance are likely to engage in earnings management (Kothari 
et al., 2005). Poor performance can generate incentives to manage earnings in order to hide 
poor performance (income smoothing), or to charge additional costs in the current period to 
make it easier to report better earnings in the future (big bath) (Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 
2002). Thus, we expect to find that a decline in fundamental performance, caused by a drop in 
oil prices, will increase earnings management and lower earnings quality in the oil industry.  
The results support our hypothesis that a negative shock in performance lowers earnings 
quality. This result still holds after controlling for accounting-based performance measures such 
as ROA and LOSS (negative net income), suggesting that changes in fundamental performance 
are not fully captured by accounting-based performance measures. Our results are also robust 
to the inclusion of firm fixed effects and using an alternative control group based on propensity 
score matching. Finally, we test whether our results are robust to various models of earnings 
management or earnings quality. We find that the results are sensitive to the choice of model.  
Our findings are robust to an alternative specification of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model (DD model) where we account for asymmetric gain and loss recognition, as suggested 
by Ball and Shivakumar (2006), but we fail to find any significant results by using the 
performance adjusted modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005). This may be due to the 
alternative control for fundamental performance in the DD model, where the mapping of 
accruals in cash flows accounts for this relation. A negative shift in performance will likely 
reduce future cash flows, and if this is not properly accounted for in current earnings (e.g., 
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through write downs), the model will likely reveal this through increased positive discretionary 
accruals. In the performance adjusted Jones model, on the other hand, the relationship between 
non-discretionary accruals and performance is accounted for using ROA in the estimation 
model. A serious limitation with this approach is that if earnings are managed, this will affect 
ROA as well. Consequently, the model can compare ROA of a firm with managed earnings to 
the same ROA of a firm with unmanaged earnings when estimating non-discretionary and 
discretionary accruals. This will cause the discretionary accruals estimate to be too low, 
resulting in low power tests (Dechow et al., 2010).  
In additional analysis we test whether our results seem to be driven by an increase in 
positive accruals or an increase in negative discretionary accruals. An increase in negative 
discretionary accruals may indicate big bath accounting, while an increase in positive 
discretionary accruals may indicate that managers attempt to reduce the negative effect of 
reduced performance on earnings. We find no indication that our main results are driven by an 
increase in negative discretionary accruals, but rather by an increase in positive discretionary 
accruals. Consequently, we find no indications of big bath accounting. On the contrary, our 
results suggest that managers respond to the decline in performance by increasing positive 
accruals, suggesting an attempt to dampen the negative shock to true performance on reported 
earnings. 
We make multiple contributions to the literature. First, we provide a relatively clean 
identification of the impact of performance on earnings quality. Using a difference-in-
differences design and exploiting the decline in performance of oil companies due to the rapid 
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decline of oil prices in 2014, allows us to examine the impact of performance on earnings 
quality without the use of a specific observable performance measure.  
Second, we focus on private firms as it is especially challenging to measure performance 
in a private firm setting due to the lack of observable equity market prices. Private firms 
contribute to a large portion of the economic activity both in Norway and worldwide, which 
makes it important to assess determinants of earnings quality in these firms (Hope et al., 2012). 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has examined the impact of performance on 
earnings quality in private firms.  
Third, we perform additional tests with alternative discretionary accruals models and 
document that the ability of the accrual models to detect earnings management caused by a 
shock to performance may vary among the models. We argue that this difference may be 
attributable to variations in how the models control for performance, as this is the main 
distinction between the models. 
 Fourth, we provide additional insights on earnings quality in a specific industry, i.e., 
the oil industry. Prior research on oil firms has mainly focused on incentives to manage earnings 
downwards to avoid political costs associated with reporting high performance in this industry 
(e.g. Byard, Hossain, & Mitra, 2007; Hall & Stammerjohan, 1997; Han & Wang, 1998). We 
focus on a group of oil firms that are less susceptible to political costs, i.e., private oil firms, 
and document that these may have incentives to manage earnings to conceal true performance 
as well. Finally, we document that our results still hold after controlling for measured 




The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature 
and outlines the hypothesis development. Section 3 explains our research design and data, while 
Section 4 presents summary statistics, main findings, robustness tests and additional analysis. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Earnings Management Strategies  
A negative shock to fundamental performance, e.g., a significant decline in oil prices for oil 
price exposed firms, may lead to lower earnings quality due to more earnings management. 
Given sufficient flexibility and discretion, and sufficiently low detection risk, engaging in 
earnings management may provide the managers of these firms with some net benefits (Fields, 
Lys, & Vincent, 2001; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). A negative shock in fundamental 
performance could give rise to earnings management incentives leading to two different 
reporting strategies. The first and most obvious strategy is to manage earnings upwards, that is 
to engage in income increasing earnings management. Several studies have documented that 
managers attempt to hide poor fundamental performance through income increasing earnings 
management (Balsam et al., 1995; Mark L. DeFond & Park, 1997; Keating & L. Zimmerman, 
1999). The second and less obvious strategy is to manage earnings downwards (i.e., a big bath 
or income decreasing earnings management). Some prior studies have found evidence of 
income decreasing earnings management in times of financial crises (Mollik et al., 2013; 
Persakis & Iatridis, 2015; Pong et al., 2007). The latter of these two strategies will be discussed 
later in this section.  
Several incentives may motivate managers to engage in income increasing earnings 
management. One set of incentives stems from the desire to prevent shareholders (and 
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potentially other stakeholders) from raising questions and concerns about the low firm 
performance, which could eventually lead to questions about the managers’ capabilities for 
running the firm (Mark L. DeFond & Park, 1997; Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995).  
 A different set of incentives relevant in a private firm setting is related to debt financing. 
Debt is the most important financing source for private firms (Hope & Vyas, 2017) and may 
give rise to incentives to manage earnings upwards. A classical result in positive accounting 
theory is that the likelihood of income increasing earnings management increases when the 
debt-to-equity ratio increases (Fields et al., 2001; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990). 
Most long-term private debt contracts have one or more accounting-based debt covenants 
(Dichev & Skinner, 2002). These will in general be closer to being violated when reported 
earnings decreases. Upon violation, they will impose some costs on the firm, which will 
eventually also harm the managers.  
Prior evidence suggests that debt covenants are associated with income increasing 
earnings management to reduce the likelihood of debt covenant violations (e.g. Mark L. DeFond 
& Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), and that they have been suggested as a prominent 
motivation for earnings management in troubled periods (e.g. Filip & Raffournier, 2014). 
Evidence from private firms has also documented the importance of debt financing as a 
determinant of earnings quality (e.g. Gassen & Fülbier, 2015). Thus, poor fundamental 
performance may motivate managers to engage in income increasing earnings management to 
offset some of the effects of poor fundamental performance on reported earnings (Ahmad-
Zaluki, Campbell, & Goodacre, 2011).   
If the negative shock in performance is sufficiently large, managers may select income 
decreasing earnings management, i.e., to take a big bath, rather than income increasing earnings 
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management. Taking a big bath involves underreporting the current period’s earnings by 
charging the current period with as much costs as possible, including future periods’ costs. This 
makes it easier to report higher earnings in the future, since some of the costs have already been 
charged (Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002). Some studies on public firms suggest an increase 
in income decreasing discretionary accruals in times of financial crises (e.g. Mollik et al., 2013; 
Persakis & Iatridis, 2015; Pong et al., 2007), indicative of a sort of big bath behavior, making 
it easier to report higher earnings after the crisis (e.g. Persakis & Iatridis, 2015).  
Since the negative shock in our setting was caused by an external event outside the 
managers’ control, this may increase the likelihood of taking a bath and placing the blame on 
the external event. Still, the managers will probably be compared to managers of comparable 
firms facing similar conditions. This may reduce incentives for big bath accounting, as it can 
potentially cause earnings to fall below that of comparable firms. In addition, big bath 
accounting may increase the likelihood of debt covenant violations. Since debt financing is the 
primary financing source for private firms (e.g. Hope & Vyas, 2017), managers of private firms 
may be less inclined to engage in big bath accounting compared to public firms.  
The literature discussed so far suggests that poor fundamental performance increases 
the likelihood of earnings management, though it is not straightforward whether managers will 
respond with income increasing or income decreasing earnings management. Some prior 
studies also suggest that firms experiencing economic crises are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. A crisis or economic downturn can increase monitoring from auditors, creditors 
and other stakeholders, thus reducing managers’ discretion and opportunity to manage earnings 
(Filip & Raffournier, 2014; Pong et al., 2007). Increased litigation risk and demand for timely 
loss recognition during recession periods should also reduce earnings management during 
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financial crises (Filip & Raffournier, 2014). In line with these arguments, some prior studies 
suggest that economic downturns are associated with less earnings management (Cimini, 2015; 
Filip & Raffournier, 2014). These studies are conducted on public firms, and incentives and 
opportunities for earnings management in private firms may differ significantly from those in 
public firms (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Burghstahler et al., 2006; Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 
2013), thus suggesting that findings from public firms may not be generalizable to private firms 
(Hope et al., 2012). Private firms in general face lower litigation risk and less demand for timely 
loss recognition from stakeholders compared to public firms, and litigation risk in Norway is 
generally low (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Burghstahler et al., 2006; Hope & Langli, 2010). 
Thus, the constraining effects on earnings management in economic crises observed among 
public firms may not be applicable to private firms, suggesting that the first order effect of 
decline in fundamental performance in private firms is likely to be more earnings management 
and consequently less earnings quality.  
Based on the literature review and discussion in this section, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 




3. Data, Sample, and Research Design 
3.1. Challenges in Measuring Performance 
Measuring true performance is challenging, and prior studies on earnings quality and 
performance have used various measures such as return on assets (ROA), pre-managed 
earnings, and cash flows (e.g. Balsam et al., 1995; Mark L. DeFond & Park, 1997; Kothari et 
al., 2005). The most common measure, however, is ROA. It is calculated using accounting 
figures and is therefore a noisy measure of fundamental performance. It is a function of 
fundamental performance, accounting regulation and the implementation of the accounting 
regulation.  
One particular aspect is highly influential when it comes to ROA, and that is the magnitude 
of tangible assets. As most accounting regimes, including Norway’s, require all tangible assets 
to be reported in the balance sheet, there are generally restrictions regarding doing the same for 
intangible assets, especially for internally generated intangible assets. Thus, firms with few 
tangible assets, typically knowledge-intensive firms such as auditing firms and consulting 
firms, will have higher ROA than firms with ample tangible assets such as industrial firms. This 
problem can to some extent be mitigated by comparing ROA within industries. If the accounting 
figures are managed, however, this introduces severe endogeneity problems. ROA will then be 
a function of earnings management and true performance, which suggests that ROA is a noisy 
measure of true performance.  
Using the oil price as a proxy for fundamental performance in a sample of oil price exposed 
firms, the performance effect on earnings quality can be controlled for without the use of 
accounting-based performance measures.  
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3.2. Data and Sample 
Our sample consists of Norwegian private limited liability firms. Accounting data and industry 
data are collected from the CCGR database at the BI Norwegian Business School. Firms are 
classified as either oil firms or non-oil firms (control group) based on their industry code. This 
classification is based on a report from Statistics Norway regarding employees in the oil 
industry (i.e., Eikeland, 2014). According to this report, the following industry codes are oil 
firms or oil-related firms: 
- 06.000 – Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
- 09.100 – Service activities for petroleum and natural gas 
- 30.113 – Construction of oil platforms and modules 
- 30.116 – Installation work on drilling rigs and modules 
- 49.500 – Pipeline 
- 52.125 – Services related to pipelines 
- 52.223 – Supply bases 
To isolate the effect of the negative shock in oil prices, we use a difference-in-
differences estimator, using firms that are not defined as oil firms or oil-related firms as 
controls. This design controls for heterogeneity between the two groups before treatment, and 
time trends that would have affected earnings quality regardless of treatment. Oil prices started 
to decline in the last half of 2014, and we define 2014 as the year after the oil shock and 2013 
as the year before the oil shock.  
There are 560 391 observations in the CCGR database for the years 2013 and 2014. 
After eliminating firms with sales less than 1 million NOK in the sample period, public firms, 
non-limited liability firms, financial firms, and firms with missing information on necessary 
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variables or not present in both time periods, our sample consists of 130 158 observations. Out 
of these observations, only 438 observations pertain to oil firms while the remainder pertain to 
non-oil firms. We use this as our first sample, and we construct a second sample by restricting 
the industries in the control group. This second sample is an attempt to make the two groups 
more similar. For our second sample, we require that the firms in the control group only consist 
of firms in the same broad industry group as the firms in the treatment group (the oil firms). 
The firms in the treatment group all come from industry group B, C, and H1. Hence, we require 
that the firms in the control group must also come from industry group B, C, and H. This limits 
our sample to 16 353, where 438 observations pertain to oil firms and the remaining 
observations to non-oil firms. Table 1 describes the details of the sample selection process.  
[Insert table 1 about here] 
3.3. Model Specification 
We specify the following main model to test our hypothesis: 
(1) 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
EarningsQuality is measured using the DD model, modified by McNichols (2002).  
We run the following regression for each industry year with a minimum of 20 observations:  
(2) 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
  
                                                          
1 Industry group B=Mining and quarrying, Industry group C=Manufacturing, and industry group 
H=Transportation and storage. An overview of industry codes and their corresponding industry groups can be 
found on Statistics Norway’s website: https://www.ssb.no/en/klass/klassifikasjoner/6 (retrieved 18.08.2017). 
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Where 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡  is working capital accruals, measured as change in current assets – change 
in cash – change in short-term debt + change in interest-bearing short-term debt + change in 
proposed dividends, scaled by lagged total assets. 𝐶𝐹𝑂 is cash flows from operations, measured 
as net income before extraordinary items less total accruals, scaled by lagged total assets (Hope, 
Thomas, & Vyas, 2016). Total accruals is measured as working capital accruals + depreciation 
expenses + impairment losses.2 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual change in revenues, scaled by lagged total 
assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡  is property, plant, and equipment, scaled by lagged total assets. 
We winsorize the variables in this model at the 1st and 99th percentiles (e.g. Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005). This model is estimated for each industry year with a 
minimum of 20 observations. The residuals measure the discretionary working capital accrual, 
and the absolute values of these firm-specific residuals (multiplied by -1) are used as our proxy 
for earnings quality (e.g. Hope et al., 2013). 
Oil is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an oil company and 0 if not. OS is a 
time dummy that equals 1 for the time period after the oil shock (2014) and 0 before the oil 
shock (2013). The interaction variable Oil*OS measures the treatment effect. This variable tests 
our hypothesis and is expected to be negative. Control variables are included in the model based 
on prior research.  
A control variable of special importance in this design is to control for audit effort. 
Auditors may have increased their effort in oil companies after the performance shock. 
Increased audit effort should increase earnings quality. This could induce systematic 
differences between the treatment and control groups that were not present prior to the event. 
                                                          
2 Depreciation expenses and impairment losses are reflected as negative amounts in the database. 
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A common proxy for audit effort is to use audit fees (e.g. Hope et al., 2012). lnAF is measured 
as the natural logarithm of audit fees. SizeAssets is measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets. DebtRatio is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. It is included in the model 
to control for a possible increased demand for accounting information from debtholders (Hope 
et al., 2016) and motivations to manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violations (e.g. Mark 
L. DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Growth is measured as changes in sales from year t-1 to year 
t. Big4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statements are audited by one of the 
Big 4 audit firms and 0 if not. Prior research documents that the use of a Big 4 audit firm is 
associated with earnings quality (e.g.,  Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; 
Che, Hope, & Langli, 2020) SizeSale is an additional size variable measured as the natural 
logarithm of total revenue. This variable is included in the model because oil firms and non-oil 
firms are likely to differ significantly when it comes to size, where oil firms are typically larger 
than non-oil firms. lnFirmAge is measured as the natural logarithm of years since foundation 
date. Together with Growth and the size variables, this variable is included in the model to 
account for differences in operating volatility which may affect earnings quality (e.g. Hribar & 
Nichols, 2007). 
The variables SizeAssets, DebtRatio, Growth and SizeSales are winsorized at the 1% 
level. We adjust for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity by calculating the standard errors 
using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator, clustered at the firm level (e.g. Petersen, 2009).   
𝛽3 measures the treatment effect, and we expect this coefficient to be negative. Variable 




4.1. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Panel A and panel B present descriptive statistics 
for oil firms and non-oil firms in sample 1 and sample 2 respectively. In both samples, mean 
EarningsQuality is higher for the group of non-oil firms (-0.09 in sample 1 and -0.08 in sample 
2) compared to the group of oil firms (-0.12).3 Audit fees are on average higher for the oil firms 
(369.87) than for the non-oil firms (sample 1=44.13, sample 2=66.41). Oil firms are on average 
larger, measured by total assets (total assets=366.68 million NOK), than non-oil firms (total 
assets=37.13 million NOK in sample 1 and 61.86 million NOK in sample 2). We observe large 
differences in size when proxied by total revenue as well. Average total revenue for oil firms is 
294.76 million NOK, while the corresponding value for non-oil firms is 31.64 million NOK in 
sample 1 and 58.56 million NOK in sample 2. These substantial differences in size between oil 
firms and non-oil firms highlights the importance of using both total assets and total sales as 
control variables to proxy for size in the regressions. We also perform robustness tests further 
addressing this issue in Section 4.5 and 4.7. 
The average debt ratio is similar for both oil-firms and non-oil firms in sample 1 (0.7), 
but slightly lower for non-oil firms in sample 2 (0.67). Sales growth is also higher in oil firms 
(Growth=0.27) compared to non-oil firms (Growth=0.13 in sample 1 and 0.11 in sample 2). A 
total of 80% of the oil firms are audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, while the corresponding 
number for non-oil firms is 31% for sample 1 and 37% for sample 2. Average firm age is 16.36 
years for oil firms and for non-oil firms the corresponding number is 16.18 years in sample 1 
                                                          
3 A number closer to zero suggests less accrual estimation errors and therefore higher earnings quality. 
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and 18.24 years in sample 2. Descriptive statistics reveal that the treatment and the control 
groups differ on several characteristics, but the two groups (oil firms and non-oil firms) appear 
somewhat more similar in sample 2. In Section 4.5, we obtain a more similar control group 
using propensity score matching. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Panel C and panel D of Table 2 report the correlation coefficients between the test and control 
variables for both samples. The correlation between Oil*OS and EarningsQuality is negative 
in both samples, providing preliminary support for our hypothesis. The correlation between 
Oil*OS and Oil is high (0.71 in sample 1 and 0.70 in sample 2) due to the way these variables 
are constructed. Our proxy for audit effort, lnAF, is highly correlated with both size variables. 
The correlation between lnAF and SizeAssets is 0.49 in sample 1 and 0.71 in sample 2, and the 
correlation between lnAF and SizeSales is 0.69 in sample 1 and 0.75 in sample 2. This is not 
surprising, as larger firms probably have more complex operations, thus requiring more audit 
effort. The two size variables are also highly correlated with each other. The correlation 
between SizeAssets and SizeSales is 0.56 in sample 1 and 0.79 in sample 2. Again, this is not 
surprising, as both of these variables are meant to proxy for size. Due to the relatively high 
correlations between some of the control variables, we examine the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) to check whether multicollinearity may be a problem in our analysis. The mean VIF-
value is approximately 3 in both models, and the VIF-value is the same for both Size variables. 
Thus, multicollinearity is not likely to be a problem in our analysis. In untabulated robustness 
tests we also find that our results are robust to excluding one of the Size variables from the 
model (see Section 4.7). 
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4.2. Main Results 
Table 3 presents the results from regressing EarningsQuality on test and control variables 
specified in regression equation (1) in Section 3.  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
The coefficient of the treatment variable Oil is negative and significant  (β1=-0.026, t-
statistics=-2.81 in sample 1; β =-0.027, t-statistics=-2.91 in sample 2), indicating that 
EarningsQuality is on average lower for oil firms compared to non-oil firms prior to the oil 
shock. This variable controls for differences between the two groups prior to treatment (oil 
shock). OS is negative and significant (β2=-0.003, t-statistics=-5.02 in sample 1; β2=-0.005, t-
statistics=-3.50 in sample 2), suggesting that EarningsQuality is lower in the period after the 
oil shock for the control group. This variable controls for general trends in the economy absent 
treatment. 
The coefficient of Oil*OS measures the treatment effect, and tests our hypothesis. This 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level in both samples (β3=-0.026, t-statistics=-
2.48 in sample 1; β3=-0.022, t-statistics=-2.18 in sample 2). The coefficient has the expected 
sign and indicates that the reduction in earnings quality after the oil shock is higher/stronger for 
oil firms than non-oil firms. In other words, oil firms have lower earnings quality after the oil 
shock, controlling for the change in earnings quality for non-oil firms and the difference in 
earnings quality between the two groups before the oil shock. This indicates that a negative 
shock to performance lowers earnings quality and provides support for our hypothesis. The 
difference in earnings quality between the oil firms and non-oil firms is about twice as large 
after the oil shock compared to prior to the oil shock. The difference between the two groups 
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before the oil shock is measured by β1 (-0.026 in sample 1 and -0.027 in sample 2), and the 
difference between the two groups after the oil shock is given by the sum of β1 and β3 (-0.026–
0.026=-0.052 in sample 1 and -0.027–0.022=-0.049 in sample 2). This suggests that our results 
are not only statistically significant but have economic significance as well.  
All the control variables are significantly associated with EarningsQuality at the 1% 
level. The coefficient of audit fees (lnAF) is negative in both samples. This suggests that firms 
with high audit fees have lower earnings quality compared to firms with low audit fees. 
However, it does not necessarily mean that audit fees, which is a proxy for audit effort, lowers 
earnings quality. The more likely explanation is that firms with intrinsically low earnings 
quality requires more audit effort.  
Both our size proxies, i.e., SizeAssets and SizeSales, are positively associated with 
EarningsQuality in our tests. This indicates that larger firms have higher earnings quality than 
smaller firms. Growth and DebtRatio are both negatively associated with earnings quality.  
The coefficient of Big4 is negative and significant, indicating that firms audited by a 
Big 4 audit firm have lower earnings quality compared to firms audited by a non-Big 4 audit 
firm. As with lnAF, this does not necessarily mean that being audited by a Big 4 firm lowers 
earnings quality. According to the summary statistics presented in Table 2, Big 4 audits were 
highly represented in the sample of oil firms (80%), but much less represented in the sample of 
non-oil firms (31% in sample 1 and 37% in sample 2). Our results also show that oil firms 
generally have lower earnings quality (β1 in Table 3 is significantly negative). Taken together, 
this may indicate that firms with intrinsically low earnings quality in our sample are more likely 
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to select a Big 4 audit firm, causing a negative association between EarningsQuality and Big4. 
lnFirmAge also has a positive coefficient in both samples, indicating that earnings quality 
increases with firm age.  
4.3. Controlling for Measured Performance 
In this section we test whether our results still hold after we control for measured performance 
by including ROA and LOSS (negative net income) in equation (1). ROA is return on assets, 
measured as net income divided by total assets. LOSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if net 
income is negative and 0 if not.  
Table 4 reports the results from this test. The interaction Oil*OS is still negative and 
significant, suggesting that there is an effect of reduced fundamental performance on earnings 
quality, even after controlling for accounting-based performance.4 This also indicates that 
accounting-based performance measures, which are extensively used in prior research, do not 
fully capture fundamental performance.  
[Insert table 4 about here] 
                                                          
4 We have also tested whether the effect of LOSS is different between oil firms and non-oil firms by interacting 
Oil with LOSS. This interaction is not significant, indicating that the effect of LOSS does not differ between oil 
firms and non-oil firms, but the main results still hold. We use ROA as a continuous variable including both 
negative and positive ROA, rather than focusing on only positive ROA. This is because ROA contains more 
information about negative performance than LOSS. LOSS is a dummy variable which only indicates whether or 
not there has been a loss, while negative ROA provides information about the size of the loss, which may be 
correlated with earnings quality. However, an advantage of using posROA is that that the effect of losses on 
earnings quality will then be concentrated in the variable LOSS and not reflected in ROA. To ensure that this 
choice does not have an effect on the results on Oil*LOSS, we rerun equation (3) using posROA instead of ROA. 
posROA equals ROA if ROA is positive and 0 if not. Untabulated results show that Oil*LOSS is still insignificant 
when we use posROA instead of ROA. 
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4.4. Alternative Measures of Earnings Quality 
In this section, we test whether our results hold using alternative discretionary accruals models. 
Extant research documents that the ability of the discretionary accruals models to capture 
earnings management varies among different models, especially when performance is extreme 
(e.g. Dechow et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005). The oil firms in our sample likely experienced 
an extreme decline in performance due to the fall in oil prices. This makes our setting especially 
interesting to assess whether the different accrual models vary in their ability to detect earnings 
management. For this purpose, we rerun the main regression using (1) the DD model modified 
by McNichols (2002) with asymmetric gain and loss recognition (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006), 
and (2) the performance adjusted modified Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005). 
 Ball and Shivakumar (2006) suggest a piecewise linear specification of the accrual 
models. Accounting rules require losses to be incorporated in earnings in a timely manner, but 
traditional earnings management measures do not incorporate timely loss recognition and the 
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses required by accounting regulation. Consequently, 
these models assume a linear relation between accruals and cash flows, which is unlikely to be 
valid (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; Basu, 1997). Such model misspecifications may be especially 
problematic when performance is extreme (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006). Thus, we test whether 
our results still hold when we incorporate asymmetric gain and loss recognition in the DD 
model as suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2006), and implemented by, for instance, Hope, 
Thomas, and Vyas (2017): 
(3) 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐷𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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The variables in this model are defined in section 3.3, with the exception of DCFO which is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if CFO current year is negative and 0 if not. 
The performance adjusted Jones model is also interesting in this setting because it 
includes the accounting-based performance measure ROA to control for variations in 
performance across firms. Consequently, in theory, this should result in residuals that represent 
discretionary accruals which are excessive to what can be explained by variations in 
performance across firms (Kothari et al., 2005). A drawback of this approach is that ROA is 
affected by both true performance and earnings management, and there is no way of knowing 
whether the sample firms’ ROA reflects only performance (limited of course by the ability of 
the accounting system to measure performance) or whether it reflects earnings management 
instead. For instance, if firm A has a ROA of 18% due to income increasing earnings 
management, but “true” ROA (adjusted for earnings management) is 16%, then the 
performance adjusted model will compare it to the level of accruals for another firm with a 
ROA of 18%, while it should have been compared to another firm with a ROA of 16% (Dechow 
et al., 2010). This will likely cause an underestimation of discretionary accruals for firm A, and 
the model will not be able to detect this earnings management. Thus, the performance adjusted 
Jones model risks “throwing the baby out with the bath water.”  
One of the main differences between the performance adjusted Jones model and the DD 
model modified by McNichols (2002) is how it accounts for the relation between performance 
and accruals.5 In the DD model, performance is controlled for by the mapping of accruals in 
                                                          
5 Another difference is that the DD model uses working capital accruals while the Jones model uses total 
accruals. In untabulated tests we rerun the DD model with total accruals instead of working capital accruals and 
find that our main results hold. Thus, the differences between the results using the DD model and the 
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cash flows, while the performance adjusted modified Jones model controls for performance 
using ROA. Consequently, if these two models differ in their ability to detect earnings 
management in our setting, it is likely attributable to how they model the relationship between 
performance and normal or non-discretionary accruals.  
The performance adjusted modified Jones (1991) model, as modified by Dechow et al. 
(1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) is outlined below: 
(4) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =∝0+∝1 (
1
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖.𝑡−1
) +∝2 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +∝3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +∝4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
Where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑖,𝑡 indicates total accruals measured as working capital accruals + 
depreciation expenses + impairment losses.6 ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is annual change in revenues less annual 
change in receivables, scaled by lagged total assets. 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is property, plant, and equipment 
for firm i in year t, scaled by lagged total assets, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is net income for firm i in year t 
scaled by average total assets. All variables in equations (3) and (4) are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. The models are estimated for each industry-year with a minimum of 20 
observations, and the absolute values of the firm-specific residuals, multiplied by -1 are our 
measures of earnings quality (Hope et al., 2013). 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
                                                          
performance adjusted Jones model observed in this subsection is not likely to be attributable to the use of 
working capital accruals vs. total accruals. 
6 Working capital accruals is measured as change in current assets – change in cash – change in short-term debt 
+ change in interest-bearing short-term debt + change in proposed dividends. Depreciation expenses and 
impairment losses are reflected in the database as a negative amount. 
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Table 5 reports the results from the regressions with alternative measures of earnings 
management. Our results are qualitatively the same when using the DD model with asymmetric 
gain and loss recognition, but we fail to find significant results with the performance adjusted 
Jones model. Dechow et al. (2010) caution against using the performance adjusted Jones model 
in studies where performance motivated earnings management is of interest, as it may extract 
too much discretion from the discretionary accruals estimate. The mapping of accruals in cash 
flows, as in the DD model, may better account for the normal relationship between accruals and 
performance. For instance, a decline in fundamental performance, as in our setting, should 
result in reduced future cash flows. If these expectations of reduced future cash flows are not 
incorporated in earnings in a timely manner through negative accruals (e.g., write downs), this 
will result in poorer mapping of accruals in cash flows and consequently the model will 
recognize this as earnings management. 
4.5. Propensity Score Matching and Firm Fixed Effects 
The difference-in-differences estimator assumes that the change in the outcome variable 
(earnings quality) over time is constant between the two groups in the absence of treatment, 
i.e., the trend is parallel. In the main analysis, we control for the possibility that this assumption 
may not hold by adding control variables to the regression. An even stronger approach to deal 
with a possible breach of this assumption is to use a matched sample as control group. In this 
robustness test we use propensity score matching to determine the control group.  
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We match on all the control variables in equation (1) (Mark L DeFond, Hung, Li, & Li, 
2015; Hope, Yue, & Zhong, 2019). In addition, we also match on ROA and LOSS.7 We obtain 
propensity scores by including all these variables in a probit model with Oil as the outcome 
variable, i.e., the propensity scores reflect the probability of being an oil firm prior to treatment. 
We match treatment and control firms using nearest neighbor matching without replacement 
(Hope et al., 2019). We also restrict the matching to observations with propensity scores that 
fall within the common support of both groups (Bonacchi, Marra, & Zarowin, 2019). We match 
on ex ante values of the control variables (e.g. Hope et al., 2019), i.e., the value of the control 
variables in the year 2013, and we restrict the matching to firms in the main industry groups 
which includes oil firms, i.e., industry groups B, C, and H. Our matched sample consists of 424 
treated firms (oil firms) and 424 control firms (non-oil firms). The results are reported in Table 
6, panel A. The coefficient of Oil*OS is negative, as in the main test, and significant at the 5% 
level.  
[Insert table 6 about here] 
We also test whether our results hold when controlling for time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity using firm fixed effects. We control for firm fixed effects in all three samples 
(sample 1, sample 2 and propensity score matched sample). Table 6, panels B, C and D, report 
the results from these regressions and demonstrates that the results hold.  
                                                          
7 ROA and LOSS are not included in the main analysis because they are proxies of the same underlying variable 
as our treatment effect (performance). In the propensity score matching procedure, however, we include ROA 
and LOSS because we match on values prior to the oil shock (i.e., 2013 observations). Thus, including ROA and 
LOSS in the matching procedure does not control for the change in measured performance; it only makes the two 
groups more similar with regard to measured performance prior to treatment. 
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4.6. Placebo Test 
We perform a placebo test on a period where oil prices were relatively stable. Oil prices have 
generally been quite volatile, but the period 2002–2003 appears to be relatively stable. We thus 
selected this period for the placebo test.8 We replace the dummy variable OS in equation (1) 
with the variable OSplacebo. OSplacebo is a dummy variable that equals 0 if the year is 2002 
and 1 if the year is 2003. Applying the same sample restrictions as in the main test provides us 
with a sample of 101 544 firm year observations in sample 1 and 15 944 firm-year observations 
in sample 2, where 326 observations pertain to oil firms and the remaining observations to non-
oil firms. Since the oil price was stable in this period, we expect Oil* OSplacebo to have no 
effect.  
[Insert table 7 about here] 
Table 7 reports the results from this regression. Oil*OSplacebo is not statistically significant 
and the placebo test is passed.  
4.7. Untabulated Robustness Tests 
We perform several robustness tests on equation (1) which are not tabulated. To further address 
whether multicollinearity may be a problem, as we include two variables to proxy for size (i.e., 
SalesAssets and SizeSales), we rerun the regression excluding either one of the size variables 
and the results hold. We also rerun the DD model using total accruals as the outcome variable 
instead of working capital accruals, and the results hold. 
                                                          
8 This is based on historical values for the Brent spot prices. According to the US Energy Information 
Administration, the yearly closing price was approximately $30 each year in 2002 and 2003 (see 





Discretionary accrual estimations may be affected when some, but not all, of the firms 
within an industry year experience an economic shock (Owens, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2017). We 
attempt to test whether this may have affected our results by rerunning the DD model for oil 
firms and non-oil firms separately (within each industry year). Untabulated analysis shows that 
our results are robust to this alternative estimation procedure.  
4.8. Additional Analysis with Signed Discretionary Accruals 
In this section we test whether the negative effect of reduced fundamental performance on 
earnings quality is attributed to more income increasing discretionary accruals or more income 
decreasing discretionary accruals.  
This is interesting for at least two reasons. First, it will provide an indication of whether 
managers of private firms responded to the negative shock in performance by reducing the 
negative impact on earnings (i.e., positive discretionary accruals) or whether they responded by 
taking a big bath (i.e., negative discretionary accruals). Second, prior research has demonstrated 
that traditional models used to measure earnings management, such as the Jones model and the 
modified Jones model, do not perform well for firms exhibiting extreme performance (Dechow 
et al., 1995; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000). Specifically, these models tend to over-reject the 
null hypothesis of no earnings management for firm-years with extreme performance, i.e., firm-
years with extreme positive performance will also tend to have large discretionary positive 
accruals, and firms with extreme negative performance will also tend to have large negative 
discretionary accruals. It is therefore difficult to examine whether firms experiencing extreme 
performance have higher discretionary accruals due to earnings management or because of a 
mechanical relationship between discretionary accruals and performance (Kothari et al., 2005).  
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However, these findings are obtained using accounting-based measures on performance 
such as ROA, and it is not given that the models perform poorly on firms with extreme changes 
in fundamental performance. Still, this additional test will also address this issue. If the increase 
in the absolute value of discretionary accruals is driven by an increase in income decreasing 
discretionary accruals (i.e., large negative accruals) it will be hard to determine whether our 
findings are caused by earnings management strategies such as big bath accounting or whether 
the models perform poorly. 
[Insert table 8 about here] 
Table 8 show the results from these regressions. Columns 1 and 2 present the coefficients 
and corresponding t-statistics for the subsample of positive discretionary accruals. The 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting an increase in income 
increasing discretionary accruals for oil firms. Columns 3 and 4 present the coefficients and 
corresponding t-statistics for the subsample of firms with negative discretionary accruals. The 
coefficient is negative, but not significant. Taken together, these results suggest that managers 
of private firms respond to a negative shock to performance by managing accruals to conceal 
some of the impact on earnings.  
We find no evidence that managers of private firms engage in big bath accounting. Further, 
the non-significant coefficient of negative discretionary accruals suggests that our original 
results are not caused by model misspecification, to the extent that firms with extreme negative 
change in performance also have large negative discretionary accruals, because the models may 
have difficulties separating normal and discretionary accruals for firms with extreme 




This paper investigates how performance affects earnings quality of private firms by examining 
a negative shift in performance. More specifically, we exploit an exogenous shock that affected 
the fundamental performance of some firms in the Norwegian economy, and use a difference-
in-differences design to assess the effect of this shock to performance on earnings quality. Our 
results indicate that this negative shock to performance resulted in lower earnings quality for 
the firms affected, supporting our hypothesis. Additional analysis also suggests that this result 
holds even after controlling for measured performance.  
 We choose to focus on a negative shock to performance rather than a positive shock as 
a negative shock is likely associated with less estimation problems in the DD model. Norwegian 
accounting regulation (GAAP) requires all unrealized losses to be incorporated into earnings, 
but rarely allows unrealized gains to be included in the earnings figure. Thus, a positive shock 
to performance could produce a poor mapping of accruals into cash flows caused by accounting 
regulation rather than earnings management. Consequently, the DD model could overestimate 
discretionary accruals. This is not likely to be a problem in our setting, since unrealized losses 
should be included in earnings.  
Our results are robust across three different samples of control groups (i.e., all non-oil 
firms (sample 1), non-oil firms restricted to the same industry groups as the oil firms (sample 
2), and a propensity score matched control sample. The results also hold after controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by adding firm fixed effects. 
As with all earnings management research, our results are of course limited by the ability 
for discretionary accruals models to estimate discretionary accruals correctly. We find that our 
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results are robust to an alternative specification of the DD model including asymmetric gain 
and loss recognition (Ball & Shivakumar, 2006), but we do not find any significant effects using 
the performance matched Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005). We argue that this may be 
attributed to a better control for fundamental performance in the DD model where the mapping 
of accruals into cash flows accounts for this, rather than ROA.  
Additional analysis reveals that our main results seem to be driven by an increase in 
positive discretionary accruals, suggesting that managers of private firms experiencing a 
negative shock to performance seem to manage earnings upwards to mitigate the effect on 
reported performance (earnings).  
Our results imply that managers of private firms experiencing a decline in performance 
may manage earnings to offset some of the effect on reported performance. This suggests that 
the users of financial statements of private firms should be careful and attentive to the risk of 
earnings management when making decisions based on accounting figures from private firms 
experience a negative shock to performance.  
Future research should attempt to analyze the effect of a positive shift in performance 
while addressing the aforementioned challenges (i.e., the accounting regulation typically do not 
permit recognition of unrealized gains in earnings). A boom in salmon prices can for instance 
be used as a measure of a positive shift in fundamental performance for the affected firms. If 
the same results are observed for a positive shift in performance, this might suggest that 
managers smooth earnings as a response to changes in fundamental performance. Future 
research should also test the effect of a negative shock to performance in other industries in 
order to increase the external validity of these results.   
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Appendix. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
EarningsQuality Earnings quality, measured as the absolute values of the residuals from 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, modified by McNichols (2002), 
multiplied by -1. 
EarningsQualityAsym Earnings quality, measured as the absolute values of the residuals from 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, modified by McNichols (2002) 
and incorporating asymmetric gains and losses, multiplied by -1. 
EarningsQualityJones Earnings quality, measured as the absolute values of the residuals from the 
performance adjusted modified Jones model. 
DiscretionaryAccruals Discretionary accruals, measured as the value of the residuals from the 
Dechow  and Dichev (2002) model, modified by McNichols (2002). 
Oil Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is defined as an oil company and 
0 if not. 
OS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the time period is after the oil shock 
(2014) and 0 if before (2013). 
Oil*OS A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is defined as an oil company 
and the time period is after the oil shock and 0 if not. 
lnAF Natural logarithm of audit fees. 
SizeAssets Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Big4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the financial statements are audited by 
one of the Big 4 audit firms and 0 if not. 
DebtRatio The ratio of total debt to total assets. 
Growth Change in sales in year t (  . 
SizeSales Natural logarithm of total sales. 
Firm Age Natural logarithm of number of years since foundation date. 
ROA Net income in year t divided by the average book value of total assets in 
year t and t−1. 
LOSS A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has negative earnings and 0 if 
not. 
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Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
Sample Selection 
    
Sample 1 Sample 2 
Firm-years Firm-years 
Observations in the CCGR database for the years 2013–2014         560 391            560 391  
Exclusion criteria   
Firms with sales less than 1 million NOK         289 231            289 231  
Public firms 
                
383                    383  
Non-limited liability firm           34 160              34 160  
Financial firms             2 594                 2 594  
Firms with missing information on other variables or not 
present in both time periods         103 865            103 865  
Firms in other industries            113 805  





Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Sample 1 
 Oil price exposed firms Control group 
 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
EarningsQuality 438 -0.12 0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.03 129 720 -0.09 0.13 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 
Audit Fee (TNOK) 438 369.87 639.43 45.00 131.00 374.00 129 720 44.13 263.18 17.00 26.00 43.00 
Total Assets (MNOK) 438 366.68 349.77 43.97 220.01 852.60 129 720 37.13 109.22 3.05 7.65 21.78 
DebtRatio 438 0.70 0.38 0.49 0.73 0.87 129 720 0.70 0.35 0.49 0.70 0.86 
Growth 438 0.27 1.26 -0.13 0.04 0.22 129 720 0.13 0.73 -0.06 0.03 0.14 
Big4 438 0.80 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 129 720 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Total Revenue (MNOK) 438 294.76 261.45 33.82 223.14 635.99 129 720 31.64 82.74 3.67 8.44 21.89 
FirmAge 438 16.36 12.38 8.00 12.00 21.00 129 720 16.18 13.68 7.00 13.00 21.00 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Sample 2 
 Oil price exposed firms Control group 
 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
EarningsQuality 438 -0.12 0.15 -0.15 -0.07 -0.03 15 915 -0.08 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 
Audit Fee (TNOK) 438 369.87 639.43 45.00 131.00 374.00 15 915 66.41 160.00 22.00 35.00 61.00 
Total Assets (MNOK) 438 366.68 349.77 43.97 220.01 852.60 15 915 61.86 158.47 3.95 9.88 32.98 
DebtRatio 438 0.70 0.38 0.49 0.73 0.87 15 915 0.67 0.33 0.48 0.67 0.83 
Growth 438 0.27 1.26 -0.13 0.04 0.22 15 915 0.11 0.65 -0.07 0.03 0.16 
Big4 438 0.80 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 15 915 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Total Revenue (MNOK) 438 294.76 261.45 33.82 223.14 635.99 15 915 58.56 121.41 6.62 15.45 45.51 




Panel C: Correlations Sample 1 
  v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 
EarningsQuality                     v1 1.00           
Oil                       v2 -0.01*** 1.00          
OS                       v3 0.00 0.00 1.00         
Oil*OS                v4 -0.01*** 0.71*** 0.04*** 1.00        
lnAF                    v5 0.02*** 0.11*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 1.00       
SizeAssets          v6 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.49*** 1.00      
DebtRatio            v7 -0.27*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00* -0.17*** 1.00     
Growth                v8 -0.16*** 0.01*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 1.00    
Big4                     v9 0.02*** 0.06*** -0.00 0.04*** 0.23*** 0.29*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 1.00   
SizeSales           v10 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 0.69*** 0.56*** -0.00 0.06*** 0.23*** 1.00  
lnFirmAge           v11 0.11*** 0.00 0.07*** 0.01** 0.19*** 0.17*** -0.14*** -0.08*** 0.04*** 0.15*** 1.00 
 
Panel D: Correlations Sample 2 
  v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 v11 
EarningsQuality v1 1.00           
Oil                    v2 -0.05*** 1.00          
OS                     v3 -0.01* 0.00 1.00         
Oil*OS              v4 -0.04*** 0.70*** 0.12*** 1.00        
lnAF                  v5 0.07*** 0.22*** 0.02** 0.16*** 1.00       
SizeAssets          v6 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.71*** 1.00      
DebtRatio          v7 -0.27*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.13*** 1.00     
Growth                v8 -0.14*** 0.04*** -0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.08*** 0.02*** 1.00    
Big4                     v9 -0.00 0.14*** -0.00 0.10*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.01 0.02* 1.00   
SizeSales           v10 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.75*** 0.79*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.35*** 1.00  
lnFirmAge            v11 0.11*** -0.02*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.20*** 0.15*** -0.16*** -0.09*** 0.03*** 0.15*** 1.00 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th percentiles, minimum and maximum value) for sample 1.  
Panel B presents descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 95th percentiles, minimum and maximum value) for sample 2.   
Panel C provides the Pearson correlations among the variables in sample 1.  
Panel D provides the Pearson correlations among the variables in sample 2.  
The variables are defined in Appendix. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent levels using two-tailed tests. 
248 
 
Table 3. Regression Results for Earnings Quality on Test and Control 
Variables 
 
 Sample 1  Sample 2  
 EarningsQuality  EarningsQuality  
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
     
Oil -0.026*** (-2.81) -0.027*** (-2.91) 
OS -0.003*** (-5.02) -0.005*** (-3.50) 
     
Oil*OS -0.026** (-2.48) -0.022** (-2.18) 
     
lnAF -0.013*** (-18.17) -0.009*** (-4.38) 
SizeAssets 0.013*** (24.43) 0.008*** (5.40) 
DebtRatio -0.089*** (-35.85) -0.087*** (-13.34) 
Growth -0.031*** (-23.85) -0.024*** (-8.52) 
Big4 -0.006*** (-6.43) -0.012*** (-5.15) 
SizeSales 0.005*** (9.05) 0.009*** (4.74) 
lnFirmAge 0.005*** (9.70) 0.007*** (4.39) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.289*** (-39.72) -0.289*** (-16.76) 
N 130 158  16 353  
adj. R2 0.139  0.121  
This table presents the results of regressing EarningsQuality on test and control variables using OLS. The 
variables are defined in Appendix. Column 1 reports the coefficients from the regression equation specified 
in Section 3.3, controlling for industry fixed effects, for sample 1. Column 2 reports the corresponding t-
statistics. Column 3 reports the coefficients from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, 
controlling for industry fixed effects, for sample 2. Column 4 reports the corresponding t-statistics. The t-
statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** 





Table 4. Regression Results for Earnings Quality on Test and Control 
Variables – Controlling for Measured Performance 
 
 Sample 1  Sample 2  
 EarningsQuality  EarningsQuality  
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Oil -0.025*** (-2.68) -0.026*** (-2.84) 
OS -0.003*** (-5.21) -0.005*** (-3.56) 
     
Oil*OS -0.023** (-2.24) -0.020** (-1.99) 
     
lnAF -0.012*** (-16.49) -0.008*** (-4.13) 
SizeAssets 0.012*** (22.61) 0.008*** (5.17) 
DebtRatio -0.087*** (-35.05) -0.085*** (-13.09) 
Growth -0.030*** (-23.42) -0.024*** (-8.39) 
Big4 -0.006*** (-6.61) -0.012*** (-5.04) 
SizeSales 0.005*** (7.61) 0.008*** (4.28) 
lnFirmAge 0.005*** (8.96) 0.006*** (3.98) 
ROA -0.087*** (-12.27) -0.074*** (-3.56) 
LOSS -0.044*** (-31.21) -0.036*** (-8.92) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.251*** (-34.81) -0.263*** (-15.37) 
N 130 158  16 353  
adj. R2 0.151  0.131  
This table presents the results of regressing EarningsQuality on test and control variables (including ROA 
and LOSS) using OLS. The variables are defined in Appendix. Column 1 reports the coefficients from the 
regression equation specified in Section 3.3, controlling for year and industry fixed effects, for sample 1. 
Column 2 reports the corresponding t-statistics. Column 3 reports the coefficients from the regression 
equation specified in Section 3.3, controlling for year and industry fixed effects, for sample 2. Column 4 
reports the corresponding t-statistics. The t-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the 






Table 5. Alternative Measures of Earnings Quality 
 Panel A: Earnings Quality Measured Using the DD 
Model with Asymmetric Gain and Loss Recognition 
Panel B: Earnings Quality Measured Using the 
Performance Adjusted Modified Jones Model 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 1 Sample 2 
 EarningsQualityAsym EarningsQualityAsym EarningsQualityJones EarningsQualityJones 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Oil -0.027*** (-3.08) -0.028*** (-3.10) -0.032* (-1.94) -0.033* (-1.94) 
OS -0.003*** (-4.58) -0.005*** (-3.81) -0.001 (-1.26) -0.000 (-0.09) 
         
Oil*OS -0.028*** (-2.65) -0.024** (-2.29) -0.015 (-0.79) -0.016 (-0.85) 
         
lnAF -0.013*** (-18.30) -0.009*** (-4.57) -0.007*** (-6.53) -0.001 (-0.18) 
SizeAssets 0.014*** (28.55) 0.009*** (6.22) 0.012*** (17.24) 0.008*** (4.04) 
DebtRatio -0.089*** (-35.68) -0.086*** (-13.38) -0.080*** (-30.97) -0.082*** (-11.36) 
Growth -0.029*** (-23.08) -0.024*** (-8.47) -0.047*** (-28.79) -0.047*** (-8.97) 
Big4 -0.005*** (-6.27) -0.012*** (-5.16) -0.014*** (-10.56) -0.027*** (-7.19) 
SizeSales 0.004*** (6.70) 0.008*** (4.70) -0.001 (-1.05) 0.003 (1.30) 
lnFirmAge 0.005*** (9.10) 0.006*** (4.30) 0.015*** (18.49) 0.017*** (7.51) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.289*** (-40.06) -0.290*** (-17.16) -0.265*** (-24.76) -0.319*** (-11.88) 
N 130 158  16 353  130 158  16 353  
adj. R2 0.143  0.123  0.096  0.080  
This table presents the results of regressing alternative measures of EarningsQuality on test and control variables using OLS. The variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A 
reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, but with earnings quality measured using an alternative specification 
of the DD model as described in Section 4.4, for sample 1 and sample 2 respectively. Panel B reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from the regression equation 
specified in Section 3.3, but with earnings quality measured using the Jones model as described in Section 4.4, for sample 1 and sample 2 respectively. The t-statistics are adjusted 





Table 6. Matched Sample and/or Firm Fixed Effects 
 Panel A: Matched Sample Panel B: Including Firm 
Fixed Effects in Sample 1 
Panel C: Including Firm 
Fixed Effects in Sample 2 
Panel D: Including Firm 
Fixed Effects in Matched 
Sample 
 EarningsQuality  EarningsQuality  EarningsQuality  EarningsQuality  
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Oil -0.019 (-1.20)       
OS 0.013 (1.30) -0.002** (-2.20) -0.005** (-2.53) 0.013 (1.31) 
         
Oil*OS -0.034** (-2.30) -0.024** (-2.36) -0.020** (-1.98) -0.034** (-2.30) 
         
lnAF   0.001 (0.55) 0.001 (0.25)   
SizeAssets   -0.044*** (-10.62) -0.026** (-2.45)   
DebtRatio   -0.058*** (-6.64) -0.022 (-0.92)   
Growth   -0.022*** (-13.69) -0.019*** (-5.35)   
Big4   0.002 (0.32) -0.018** (-1.99)   
SizeSales   0.023*** (6.22) 0.025*** (2.79)   
lnFirmAge   0.012 (1.49) 0.013 (0.67)   
Industry fixed effects Yes  No  No  No  
Firm fixed effects No  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant -0.090*** (-7.23) 0.253*** (3.47) -0.089 (-0.52) -0.099*** (-27.22) 
N 848  130 158  16 353  848  
adj. R2 0.012  0.032  0.022  0.011  
This table presents the results of regressing EarningsQuality on test and control variables in alternative samples using OLS. The variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A 
reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, using a propensity score matched sample and excluding control 
variables. Panel B reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, and including firm fixed effects, in sample 1. 
Panel C reports the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, and including firm fixed effects, in sample 2. Panel D reports 
the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, including firm fixed effects and excluding control variables for the propensity 
score matched sample. The t-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 





Table 7. Placebo Test 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 
 EarningsQuality EarningsQuality 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Oil -0.025** (-2.38) -0.023** (-1.98) 
OSplacebo -0.004*** (-5.46) -0.003* (-1.77) 
     
Oil*OSplacebo 0.012 (0.99) 0.015 (1.17) 
     
lnAF -0.016*** (-20.30) -0.011*** (-5.58) 
SizeAssets 0.018*** (27.49) 0.010*** (6.57) 
DebtRatio -0.100*** (-35.10) -0.089*** (-13.01) 
Growth -0.040*** (-25.62) -0.038*** (-8.00) 
Big4 -0.009*** (-8.22) -0.013*** (-5.07) 
SizeSales 0.003*** (4.83) 0.006*** (3.51) 
lnFirmAge 0.002*** (3.48) 0.003** (2.17) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  
_cons -0.283*** (-36.58) -0.235*** (-14.57) 
N 101 544  15 944  
adj. R2 0.158  0.135  
This table presents the result of regressing EarningsQuality on test and control variables using OLS. 
The variables are defined in Appendix. Column 1 reports the coefficients from the regression 
equation specified in Section 3.3, but substitutes OSplacebo for OS, for sample 1. Column 2 reports 
the corresponding t-statistics. Column 3 reports the coefficients from the regression equation 
specified in Section 3.3, but substitutes OSplacebo for OS, for sample 2. Column 4 reports the 
corresponding t-statistics. The t-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-





Table 8. Signed Discretionary Accruals 
 Panel A: Positive Discretionary Accruals Panel B: Negative Discretionary Accruals 










 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Oil 0.017 (1.61) 0.015 (1.36) -0.033** (-2.36) -0.035** (-2.49) 
OS 0.002** (2.33) 0.006** (2.13) -0.003*** (-4.76) -0.005*** (-2.64) 
         
Oil*OS 0.048** (2.15) 0.045** (2.05) -0.008 (-0.49) -0.008 (-0.48) 
         
lnAF 0.010*** (8.56) 0.003 (0.79) -0.016*** (-18.78) -0.013*** (-5.85) 
SizeAssets -0.009*** (-8.49) -0.002 (-0.76) 0.015*** (29.35) 0.011*** (8.26) 
DebtRatio 0.052*** (14.23) 0.052*** (5.67) -0.116*** (-37.03) -0.113*** (-12.99) 
Growth 0.038*** (17.79) 0.023*** (5.98) -0.023*** (-15.72) -0.024*** (-5.91) 
Big4 0.002 (1.56) 0.009** (2.54) -0.009*** (-9.14) -0.016*** (-5.85) 
SizeSales -0.008*** (-7.45) -0.010*** (-3.22) 0.004*** (6.68) 0.008*** (4.34) 
lnFirmAge -0.009*** (-9.78) -0.010*** (-3.84) 0.003*** (4.12) 0.004** (2.38) 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Constant 0.326*** (28.33) 0.274*** (9.59) -0.252*** (-30.49) -0.297*** (-16.52) 
N 59 667  7 590  70 491  8 763  
adj. R2 0.087  0.056  0.220  0.214  
This table presents the results of regressing signed discretionary accruals on test and control variables using OLS. The variables are defined in Appendix. Panel A reports the 
results from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, but with the signed value of discretionary accruals, for firm-year observations with positive discretionary accruals. 
Columns 1 and 2 report the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for sample 1. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for sample 2. Panel B 
reports the results from the regression equation specified in Section 3.3, but with the signed value of discretionary accruals, for firm-year observations with negative discretionary 
accruals. Columns 5 and 6 report the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for sample 1. Columns 7 and 8 report the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for sample 2. 
The t-statistics are adjusted for within-cluster correlation using the Huber-White Sandwich Estimator. * (**) *** indicates significance at the 10 (5) 1 percent levels using two-
tailed tests. 
 
